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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
RECONSIDERED
A. BROOKE OVERBYt
CRA has been in force for 15 years. Presumably more than enough time
to work out any procedural or process problems. Regrettably, that does not
appear to have been the case. It seems that we are still struggling with the
basics of implementing this law properly.'
INTRODUCTION
The next few years will bring significant development in banking
law. Ever since its enactment in 1977, the Community Reinvestment
Act (the CRA or the Act),2 a seemingly modest piece of legislation
intended to motivate certain financial institutions to meet communi-
ty credit needs, has been the focus of intense criticism within the
financial community. As Senator Cranston's statement indicates,
much of the debate has centered upon the very basic issue of how
to enforce the Act properly. Regulators' enforcement efforts
evoked consternation from the financial institutions regulated under
the Act,' the community groups representing the intended benefi-
ciaries of the Act,4 and even from Congress itself.5 The regulators'
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'Current Status of the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearings] (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
' See, e.g.,John C. Foreman &J. McDuffie Brunson, CRA: Bankers on the Defensive,
BANK MGMT., Jan. 1991, at 34 (discussing bankers' anxiety, frustration, and
uncertainty in response to CRA enforcement).
" See 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Michael Bodaken,
Community Reinvestment Coordinator, Office of Mayor Tom Bradley, L.A., Cal.)
(stating that regulators evaluate too leniently); id. at 34-36 (statement of Calvin
Bradford, President, Community Reinvestment Associates, Des Plaines, Ill.) (stating
that the CRA leads to inefficiency and excessive paperwork); id. at 97 (testimony of
Gilda Haas, Communities for Accountable Reinvestment) (concluding that "for the
most part, neither banks nor regulators have yet delivered the promise of the
[CRA]").
5 See 1 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 102D
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT 1-6
(1431)
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response to these charges was one of frustration. The Act contains
little more than the scant directive that agencies "encourage"6 the
institutions they supervise to meet community credit needs, and that
they should take the institutions' performances in meeting those
needs "into account" when evaluating applications to the agency.
7
Given these bare legislative mandates, the agencies' perceptions of
being caught in the maelstrom of the CRA debate8 with no ability
to extract themselves are palpable.
The most recent endeavor to break this deadlock over CRA
enforcement has, not surprisingly, come up short in spite of nearly
two years of public debate. In July of 1993, President Clinton gave
regulators their "marching orders"9 when he instructed financial
institution regulators to develop new regulations to enforce the
CRA. 1° After a series of well-publicized public hearings held across
(Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter SENATE PRINT] (describing how the CRA's goals have
not been met even though a majority of banks have been receiving satisfactory or
better ratings); see also Effective Implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on General Oversigh4 Investigations, and the Resolution of
Failed Financial Institutions of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong., lst Sess. 1-4 (1993) (statement of Chairman Flake) (summarizinghow the
CRA has failed to achieve its goal of preventing redlining); 1992 Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Cranston) (describing the inadequacy of CRA
evaluations); id. at 19 (statement of Sen. Sasser) (stating that "despite CRA's passage,
lending patterns still reflect discrimination against certain communities and certain
ethnic groups"); Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 Senate Hearings] (opening statement of Chairman Proxmire) (criticizing
regulators' enforcement efforts to date).
6 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
7 § 2903(2).
8 See, e.g., Statement of Lawrence B. Lindsey, Member, Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House
Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 285, 285 (1993)
(explaining that regulators are "caught in the middle" and "receive brickbats from all
sides"); William M. Isaac, Comment: Reform of CRA Ought to Be Guided by Its Original
Purpose, AM. BANKER, Mar. 30, 1994, at 16 (statement of former FDIC chair)
(explaining that "regulators ... were caught in the middle").
" Lawrence Lindsey, Presiding Member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Opening Remarks at the Public Meeting Regarding Ideas on Community
Reinvestment Act Reform Before the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 5
(Aug. 25, 1993) (transcript on file with author).
10 President Clinton's directive to alter the CRA enforcement apparatus was
accompanied by a bill to establish funding for community development financial
institutions. See infra text accompanying notes 402-06. Clinton campaigned on a
promise to strengthen the CRA and to enhance community development lending
programs. See, e.g., BILL CLINTON & AL GORE, PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 12 (1992)
(promising to "[e]ase the credit crunch in our inner cities by passing a more progres-
sive [CRA] to prevent redlining, and by requiring financial institutions to invest in
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the country," in December of 1993 regulators released for com-
ment a proposed CRA enforcement scheme that would have
constituted a significant shift in CRA policy. 2 Most significantly,
the proposals attempted to respond to industry complaints that the
existing enforcement regime provided ambiguous performance
standards and excessive paperwork, as well as to activists' and
politicians' concerns that the existing CRA regime "overempha-
size[d] process and underemphasize[d] performance." 3  The
December 1993 proposals set forth quantifiable performance
criteria to be used in assessing whether an institution was meeting
community credit needs and established an evaluation system that
sought to reward results in community lending over an institution's
efforts to meet credit needs.1 4 While under the old CRA regime a
gallant attempt to meet community credit needs might have
warranted an outstanding grade under the CRA, under the
proposed regulations, an institution would have to demonstrate that
its efforts produced quantifiable results-loans actually made to
communities.
The December attempt to combine reduced regulatory burden
with verifiable results predictably sparked an extreme reaction from
all sides. 15  It was not until October of 1994 that regulators
published for comment a revised set of CRA enforcement regula-
tions that modified considerably their December proposal, yet
retained the emphasis on results rather than efforts. 6 While
their communities").
" See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466, 67,467
(1993) (proposed Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter December 1993 Proposed Regulations]
(stating that "[t]o implement the President's initiative, the four agencies held a series
of seven public hearings across the country").
12 See id. at 67,466 ("The proposed procedures are designed to emphasize perfor-
mance rather than process ... ').
1 Id. at 67,467.
4 See id. at 67,468. The most controversial provision of the December 1993
proposal was the market share component of the December 1993 LendingTest, which
required regulators to give predominant consideration to an institution's market
share of loans in low- and moderate-income geographies, as well as to wealthier
geographies. See id. at 67,487. In effect, this test leaned dangerously close to
complete government oversight of the local market for credit and was modified
significantly in the October proposals. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations,
59 Fed. Reg. 51,232, 51,237 (1994) (proposed Oct. 7, 1994) (discussing comments on
the market share component and reasons for modifying the Lending Test).
" Regulators received over 6700 comments on the December proposal from the
financial industry, consumer interest groups, governmental entities, and other
interested parties. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg.
51,232, 51,233-34.
16 See id. at 51,234 (stating that "the revised proposal would further emphasize the
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regulators reviewed the onslaught of comments on that proposal
and ultimately, in late April of 1995, approved the final enforce-
ment regulations, 17 Congress began a concerted effort to forestall
or undercut the effectiveness of any final rules.
1 8
The intensity of the response to the regulators' proposals, and
the lengthy as well as highly contentious process that has surround-
ed the CRA revision efforts, indicates that the CRA is certain to
engender continued objection. Some regulators have questioned
whether a results-based CRA would lead us dangerously close to
credit allocation, 19 a policy that is expressly rejected in the legisla-
tive history of the CRA.2" Larger institutions have objected to the
paperwork burden and compliance costs of the CRA, and have
questioned whether some of the proposals increased rather than
reduced those costs.21 Yet, less stringent reporting and perfor-
mance criteria for smaller institutions have evoked objections from
community activist groups.22 On the legislative side, the stream of
institution's performance with respect to low- and moderate-income individuals").
" See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (joint final rules); see also Industry
Attacks New Reporting and Enforcement Sanctions in CRA Proposal, BANKING POL'Y REP.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 4 (delineating the banking industry's objections to October
proposal).
I' Congress's move against the revision effort had both informal and formal
components. Informally, the House by letter requested regulators to delay any final
changes until hearings first could be held on CRA reform. See Barbara A. Rehm,
House Pane; Eyeing Hearings, Seeks a Delay in CRA Reform, AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 1995,
at 2. In addition, formal bills were introduced in the House and Senate placing a
moratorium on new regulations, which may or may not block the new CRA rules. See
Barbara A. Rehm, Moratorium on Regulation May Hit Banks: Exemptions Soughtfor Key
Proposals, AM. BANKER, Jan. 13, 1995, at 1. Finally, a number of bills have proposed
substantial modifications to the CRA. See, e.g., S. 650, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 131-
135, 231 (1995) (proposing numerous amendments to the CRA and prohibiting any
additional reporting requirements), available in LEXIS, Legis library, Bills file; H.R.
1362, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 121-129 (1995) (same), available in LEXIS, Legis
library, Bills file.
" See Claudia Cummins, Fed Criticizes Clinton Plan on Overhaul of the CRA, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 13, 1993, at 1, 3 ("'We are not only contemplating credit allocation, we
are contemplating resource allocation.'" (quotingJohn P. LaWare, Member, Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)).
20 See infra text accompanying notes 106-11 (discussing congressional reactions to
the CRA).
21 See, e.g., Cummins, supra note 19, at 3 (explaining that some federal governors
are concerned over data collection costs); Claudia Cummins, U.S.: Vary CRA Rules
for Big, Small Banks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1, 3 (quotingDonald Ogilvie of the
American Bankers Association (ABA) as saying that the ABA has "some serious
concerns about added data collection requirements").
' See Claudia Cummins, CRA Overhaul Set for Unveiling This Week, AM. BANKER,
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bills proposing modifications to the CRA shows no sign of abat-
ing."3 Finally, financial service providers not currently subject to
the mandates of the CRA have stepped up lobbying efforts to
ensure that they too will not become caught in the CRA's often
ineluctable grasp.
24
It accordingly appears that the most recent experience in
developing a new CRA enforcement mechanism reinforces the
proposition that, with respect to the CRA, only two planes of
agreement exist. Certainly everyone shares the vision to which the
Act's inspirational name-"community reinvestment"-alludes. That
our communities merit investment is a point beyond question.
Beyond such lofty truisms lies an agreement to disagree. We know
that we care, but controversy arises as to why we do-and how to go
about making the vision a reality. With respect to the CRA itself,
the precise issue is how far to intervene in the private lending
decisions of financial institutions to accomplish the goal.
The debate to date over the scope of such intervention has
fallen into two sharply divergent camps. On the one hand, the CRA
has been identified by some as a crucial step toward, if not a key to,
solving the problems of inadequate housing, urban decay, and
violence that have become issues of national importance. 25  In
Dec. 6, 1993, at 3 (explaining that activists oppose the less stringent requirements for
small banks, and estimating that 80% of banks will be able to receive easier
treatment).
2- See, e.g., supra note 18 (citing recent legislative initiatives); infra note 378 (citing
various proposals for CRA modifications).
24 See, e.g., James B. Arndorfer, Industiy Gets a Chill over CRA Compliance, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 3, 1993, at 8 (stating that credit unions would oppose amending the
CRA to apply to them); BankAmerica's Argumentsfor PuttingNonbanks Under CRA, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 28, 1993, at 12 (asserting that the entire financial service industry,
including mutual funds, should be included under the CRA's "big tent"); Karen Gullo,
Finance Companies Gear up to Ward off CRA Regulation, AM. BANKER, Dec. 22, 1993,
at 4 (proclaiming that finance companies are "gearing up for battle" to avoid being
subject to the CRA); Edward Kulkosky, Activists Say Study Supports Call for Applying
CRA to Nonbanks, AM. BANKER, Mar. 9, 1994, at 10 (explaining a Woodstock Institute
study, which suggested that mortgage companies should fall within the CRA's scope);
Snigdha Prakash, Rep. Kennedy Boosts Pressure to Put CRA on Mortgage Lenders, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 29, 1994, at 10 (describing the position of Stephen Ashley, president
of the Mortgage Bankers Association, who "said he thought mortgage banks could go
out of business, if their loans in targeted areas did not meet the underwriting criteria
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac," when asked what bad consequences he foresaw if
a CRA law were applied to mortgage bankers).
15 See, e.g., 1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Sen. Cranston)
(claiming that the "CRA is arguably the most important federal tool for increasing
private lending in the inner cities"). The 1992 riots in South Central Los Angeles
heightened congressional concern with community disinvestment and stricter enforce-
1995] 1435
1436 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1431
their view, only the lax effort of regulators to enforce the CRA has
undercut materialization of this appealing end. Yet, the movement
toward more aggressive intervention through heavy-handed
enforcement has not by any stretch received universal acclaim. At
the other extreme, the Act's interference with the otherwise private
market for credit is more controversial as a matter of banking law.
That the Act seems to compel suboptimal lending patterns26 impels
some commentators swiftly to the conclusion that the CRA is
questionable social policy2 7 or "fundamentally flawed . .. anachro-
nistic and ultimately self-defeating."
28
The irreconcilable nature of these extremes in the dialogue over
community investment and the CRA indicates that the problems
that have arisen with respect to the CRA since its enactment do not
devolve from some minor and ultimately resolvable disagreement
over "enforcement." Yet, this is how we have talked about the CRA
to date. Enforcement of what and why-toward what end? The
rhetoric of enforcement unfortunately has concealed the much
ment of the CRA:
We saw clearly in Los Angeles... what can happen when a community that
has been systematically disinvested erupts in rage and frustration. While
Los Angeles must be the most prominent example we have, similar
problems exist in virtually every major metropolitan area in the country....
Access to capital for home ownership, small business, and economic
development is even more critical if distressed urban neighborhoods are to
be revitalized.
Id. at 1-2; see also Provision on Financial Services to Cities Affected by Civil
Disturbances, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 532, 532 (1992) (Federal Reserve Board Announce-
ment in response to Los Angeles riots) (stating that the Federal Reserve would "tak[e]
into account investment in the affected areas by state member banks located outside
those areas when assessing [CRA] performance and evaluating applications submitted
to the Federal Reserve"); Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes,
Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1396 (1993) (explaining that the CRA has played an
important role in neighborhood revitalization efforts despite lack of enforcement).
A recent legislative proposal would expand the CRA to encompass an institution's
historic preservation efforts. See H.R. 3683, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Another
proposal supports CRA activities "that help to fight the causes of violence and to
prevent crime." S. Res. 163, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
26 See William C. Gruben et al., Imperfect Information and the Community Reinvest.
ment Act, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. ECON. REV., Summer 1990, at 27,41 (describing
how the CRA interferes with what otherwise might be optimal lending patterns).
17 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic
Analysis, 77 IOwA L. REV. 1083, 1111 (1992) ("Whatever the merit of the CRA itself
... it is dubious social policy.... ."). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291
(1993) (offering a broad economic critique of the CRA).
28 LawrenceJ. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in
the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 282 (1993).
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
more fundamental and primary concern of what obligations
financial institutions should have to their communities, and to the
individuals that constitute those communities. Accordingly, the
future of the CRA requires not just learning how to enforce the law
properly, but more importantly how to conceptualize and construct
the essential ethos of the financial institution.
This Article disengages the CRA from the more superficial
debate of enforcement and instead analyzes it within the context of
this more fundamental question of the character of financial
institutions. The Article argues that, in spite of the Act's name, talk
of "community" is the CRA's principal ambiguity, and one that has
provided the major obstacle to effectuation of the Act's purpose.
The CRA's implication that banks and other institutions regulated
under the Act should owe some special duty toward their local
communities provides the nexus for the debate over community.
The economic soul of such institutions leads some to reject
wholesale the CRA and, with it, such duties. 29 In contrast, some
suggest that the success of the CRA should be assessed under and
critiqued by a communitarian paradigm, if not a communitarian
agenda, for financial institution regulation."0 Implicit in this
communitarian position is the proposition that banks and other
financial institutions are not-and should not be-merely objective
economic actors responding to market forces, but rather should be
active, and good, community citizens. Such radically divergent
positions on community, financial rationality, and institutional
citizenship explain the CRA's lack of success to date. Unfortunately,
it appears that the Act will continue to fall short of its potential as
long as the dialogue about the CRA is oriented around the concept
' See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 294 (noting that "the CRA in its present
form does more harm than good").
o See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment:
Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1470-71 (1994) [hereinafter Taibi, Community Economic
Empowerment] (noting that"[a] review and critique of the CRA's successes and failures
can more effectively improve people's lives and create a multi-racial political
consensus than can current paradigms"); Anthony D. Taibi, Race Consciousness,
CommunitarianisM, and Banking Regulation, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 1103, 1114-16 n.46,
1116 [hereinafter Taibi, Communitarianism and Banking Regulation] (discussing
banking regulation from the perspective of "community empowerment" as well as of
civil rights issues). Taibi criticizes the CRA for not going beyond procedural fairness
and argues that banking regulations should ensure that an appropriate lending level
is actually attained in all communities. See Taibi, Community Economic Empowerment,
supra, at 1484-515.
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of "community." Neither side in the battle will be completely
satisfied with the changes in CRA enforcement, and the CRA debate
can be expected to continue to rage, despite regulators' most recent
efforts to enhance enforcement of the Act. The underlying
problems that the CRA was intended to address, however, will
remain unresolved. That we fiddle about community while the war
against poverty is being lost may be just politics, but it is not
inevitable, and certainly not ideal.
If talk of community is the CRA's fundamental error, the
question becomes what remains of the CRA once the community
has been excised from "community reinvestment." While this
Article argues that the Act has little, if anything, to do with
"community," it does not advocate repeal of the CRA. Rather, this
Article posits that individual equality, rather than community,
constitutes the best underlying justification for some sort of CRA-
type intervention into the affairs of financial institutions. Once the
CRA is moved into equality's realm, remodelling the scope of
legislative intervention and regulatory enforcement can occur. This
Article proposes that equality of access and equality of opportunity
should be the guiding justifications for assessing the proper scope
of intervention through the CRA. Applying these principles, a
limited intervention into the affairs of financial institutions through
the CRA is mandated. Most significantly, it will be argued that the
efforts-based regulatory enforcement regime that resulted in such
intense criticism was at base the proper approach to CRA enforce-
ment and that the new results-based enforcement regime urged
upon regulators by community groups and the Clinton administra-
tion is, unless carefully implemented and enforced, misguided."'
In short, despite the incessant dialogue over proper enforcement,
regulators had in fact been getting the CRA largely right all along,
if only instinctively, in equality's name.
Part I of this Article addresses in detail the unfortunate
development of the CRA to date. The debate over proper enforce-
ment is discussed more fully in the context of the legislative history
of the CRA and of the efforts of regulators to devise a means to
enforce the Act. Part II describes the communitarian and anti-
community economic views on the CRA and argues that each view
fails to provide a convincing justification for intervention or
nonintervention. Part II then develops more fully the individual
s See infra text accompanying notes 334-48.
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equality underpinnings of the CRA. Part III critiques the most
recent effort to strengthen CRA enforcement. Finally, the equality
perspective on the CRA suggests a framework both for interpreting
the new CRA regulatory enforcement regime as well as for advanc-
ing other legislative and regulatory initiatives that, although not
necessarily a proper subject of the CRA, will advance us toward the
goals that the CRA envisions. Part IV accordingly advances these
specific proposals for reform.
I. TEXT, IMPLEMENTATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR A PURPOSE
The intensity of the debate generated by the CRA evidences that
the path toward the vision of community investment has been a
difficult and largely unsuccessful one. Close examination of the
legislative history of the Act will show that, perhaps, that result was
preordained from the start. The CRA was the product of largely
unreflective congressional debate as to the Act's purpose. In
addition, regulators' attitudes toward enforcing the Act have been,
charitably, widely vacillating since its enactment.
Yet, the actual statute giving rise to the controversy over
community investment issues has a textual modesty that innocently
belies the contentiousness it has spawned. The Act begins with
congressional findings that regulated institutions are required to
demonstrate that their deposit facilities meet the convenience and
needs of the communities, that a community's convenience and
needs include credit needs in addition to deposit needs, and that
regulated institutions have a "continuing and affirmative obligation
to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered."3 2 The CRA's stated purpose is to require the
federal financial supervisory agencies33 to use their authority to
"encourage" regulated institutions34 "to help meet the credit needs
32 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3).
3s The agency responsible for examining national banks is the Comptroller of the
Currency; for federally insured savings banks and savings and loans the agency is the
Office of Thrift Supervision; for state member banks it is the Federal Reserve; and
for federally insured state nonmember banks it is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. See § 2902(1)(A)-(D).
' "Regulated financial institutions" are insured depository institutions as defined
in the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Act (FDICA). § 2902(2). In short, any
depository institution-including national banks and state banks, trust companies,
savings banks, industrial banks, and other banking institutions-insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation is subject to the CRA. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)-(c)
(Supp. V 1993) (FDICA definitions). This leaves institutions such as mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies, and uninsured mortgage companies or brokers
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of the local communities ... consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such institutions.
"35
Despite the Act's broad findings and purposes, the CRA is
studiously vague as to enforcement. A regulated institution's
supervisory agency is to "assess the institution's record of meeting
the credit needs of its entire community, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institution." 6 The agency must complete
a written evaluation of the institution's CRA performance; this
evaluation will have both a public part and a confidential part. 7
Amendments to the Act in 1989 require the agency to rate the
institution's performance using one of four possible grades,3 8 and
require public disclosure of the public section of the institution's
CRA report.39 The Act requires an institution's CRA performance
to be "tak[en] into account" when its supervisory agency evaluates
applications related to charters, deposit insurance, branches, and
beyond the scope of the Act.
35 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
36 § 2903(a)(1).
"' See §2906. The confidential portion contains names of individuals who have
supplied information to the agency in connection with the agency's examination of
the institution and statements obtained or made by the agency that the agency deems
too sensitive or speculative to release to the public or to the financial institution. See
§ 2906(c)(1)-(2). Other than with respect to the names of persons supplying
information, the confidential portion of the CRA evaluation can be disclosed in whole
or part to the institution (but not the public) if the agency determines that disclosure
would promote the institution's compliance with the CRA. See § 29 06(c)(3).
' The four possible ratings are: (1) Outstanding, (2) Satisfactory, (3) Needs to
Improve, and (4) Substantial Noncompliance. See § 2906(b)(2). The four-tier rating
system replaced a five-tier numerical rating system developed and employed by
regulators after enactment of the CRA in 1977. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 499.
Amendments in 1994 require agencies to evaluate institutions with interstate
branches both on the entire institution's performance as well as on a state-by-state
branch basis. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, sec. 1I0(a), 108 Stat. 2338, 2364 (1994) (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 2906(d)-(e)).
31 See 12 U.S.C. § 2906. The public section of an institution's CRA report must
contain the supervisory agency's conclusions for each regulatory assessment factor,
the facts and data supporting those conclusions, and the institution's rating and a
statement of the basis for the rating. See § 2906(b)(1)(A)-(C). Minor amendments to
§ 2906(b)(1) were enacted in late 1994. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act, § 110(b). For a discussion of the evolution of the rating
procedure used by a supervisory agency, see infra text accompanying notes 134-45.
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mergers or acquisitions." Finally, the Act instructs the regulatory
agencies to publish regulations for enforcement of the CRA.4 t
The only palpable performance criteria in the text of the stat-
ute-other than the ineluctable directive that institutions are
expected to meet community credit needs-arrived in 199142 and
1992."s In its first reference to race and gender, the Act was
amended in 1991 to provide that when evaluating an institution's
performance in meeting community credit needs, consideration
should be given to any loss or contribution incurred when an
institution donates, sells on favorable terms, or makes available on
a rent-free basis a branch located in a predominantly minority
neighborhood to a minority depository institution or a women's
depository institution.44 In 1992, agencies were instructed to
consider in the CRA evaluation process majority-owned institutions'
capital investment, loan participation, and other cooperative
ventures with minority-owned and female-owned financial institu-
tions and low-income credit unions.45 Of course, such activities
40 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2). The applications that invoke agency consideration of
the institution's CRA record are: (1) applications for a national bank or federal
savings and loan charter; (2) applications for deposit insurance for a newly chartered
state bank, savings and loan, or similar institution; (3) applications to establish a
domestic branch; (4) applications to relocate a home office or a branch office; (5)
applications for mergers, consolidations, asset acquisitions, or liability assumptions
that otherwise require regulatory approval; and (6) applications to acquire shares in,
or assets of, a regulated institution that otherwise require regulatory approval. See
§ 2902(3).
41 See § 2905.
42 See Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 402(b), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1761, 1775
[hereinafter RTCRRIA] (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2907 (Supp. V 1993)).
"' See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 909, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 3672, 3874 [hereinafter HCDA] (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2903, 2907 (Supp. V 1993)).
4 See 12 U.S.C. § 2907. "Minority institutions" are those institutions "more than
50% of the ownership or control of which is held by [one] or more minority
individuals; and... more than 50% of the net profit or loss of which accrues to [one]
or more minority individuals." § 2907(b)(1). "Women's depository institutions" are
those in which at least 50% of the ownership or control in the institution is held by
one or more women, in which more than 50% of the institution's net profit or loss
accrues to one or more women, and in which women held a significant percentage
of senior management positions. § 2907(b)(2).
Originally § 2907 provided that covered minority investments "shall be treated
as" a factor in CRA performance. RTCRRIA, § 402(b), 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)
at 1775. The next year, however, the section was amended to provide only that such
activities "may be a factor." HCDA, § 909(2), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) at 3874.
45 See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(b).
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must meet the underlying purpose of serving community credit
needs in order to merit consideration in the evaluative process.4 6
In sum, the CRA is comprised of a succinct" recognition that
a community's financial needs include credit as well as deposit
needs, a purpose of "encouraging" institutions to meet those credit
needs, and finally a directive that an institution's CRA performance
be one aspect of the examination as well as a factor to be "taken
into account" when assessing the institution's applications for new
or expanded privileges. Yet, the Act's simplicity is deceptive and its
apparently innocuous recognition of the "need" for credit is in fact
politically, economically, and morally significant. Even if credit and
capital are resources that bear sufficient import to merit legislative
attention, serious institutional considerations arise from the CRA's
intervention into the affairs of private lending institutions to
facilitate the availability of credit. Credit may have a normative
dimension, but isolating only particular private institutions to
provide credit to communities and to bear the costs of that
endeavor, as the CRA does, raises equally troubling concerns.
Missing from the Act is any justification for the CRA or indication
of why only particular institutions were selected to perform the
CRA's task of meeting community credit needs.
These deficiencies have caused some to question critically the
propriety of the Act. A recent critique of the CRA, by Professors
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, 48 argues that the Act suffers
from a myriad of potential shortcomings.49 Macey and Miller note
that the Act results in a differential impact on depository institu-
tions, 50 potentially negative effects on the safety and soundness of
46 See id.
4" The remaining provisions of the Act involve relatively minor issues. See, e.g.,
§ 2902 (definitional section); § 2904 (requiring agencies to report annually to
Congress on actions taken under the CRA).
41 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 295 (noting that the Act has been turned
to purposes for which it was poorly designed and has become a tool of activist
political pressure groups). Although the critique addressed the original enforcement
regime, most of its fundamental points would remain germane to the new enforce-
ment regime.
49The conclusions drawn by Professors Macey and Miller are preliminary and
subject to verification by further empirical research. See id. at 293-94.
' See id. at 312-18. The authors point out that the CRA discriminates between
institutions covered by the CRA and those not covered, in effect taxing covered
financial institutions and placing them at a competitive disadvantage to those not
covered. See id. at 312-13; see also infra part IV.B.2. (advancing a methodology for
assessing scope of coverage). The CRA also has a differential impact among covered
institutions. See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 313-18. For example, an institution
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covered institutions,5' enormous compliance costs,52 and uncer-
tain compliance standards." With respect to the cost of the
statute, the CRA can be interpreted as a tax on covered financial
institutions and their expansion. This tax is comprised not only of
institutional compliance costs but expenses such as the costs of
delay in the application process, the costs of defending a CRA
protest raised against an application, and the costs of commitments
that an institution might make to avoid community group protests.
This tax also can include more intangible costs, such as costs
incurred when an institution refrains from pursuing an acquisition
because of vigorous CRA enforcement or because the CRA would
force the institution to spend more on CRA activities in order to
obtain regulatory approval of the acquisition.
The economic significance of this tax is intensified by the Act's
tenuous proposition that financial institutions have an obligation to
meet community credit needs. 4 Not only does the CRA impose
significant costs on lending institutions, but these costs are incurred
to further a purpose that is, at best, unexplained and, at worst,
wholly in error. Accordingly, under this critique the CRA has
evolved into a statute "designed to serve organized interest
located within a wealthy community has a less burdensome CRA obligation than one
located in a low-income area.
"' See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 318-24 (considering the impact of the CRA
on the safety and soundness of banking institutions). Until recently, evidence as to
the performance of CRA loans was largely anecdotal. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon,
Reaching Out: Under Strong Pressure, Banks Expand Loans for Inner-City Homes, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 1994, at Al (noting that the perception that poorer borrowers
necessarily carry greater risks of default is changing). However, recent empirical
research indicates that CRA loans are frequently as safe as, if not safer than,
conventional loans. See generally THE WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING LENDERS, SOUND LOANS FOR COMMUNITIES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT LOANS (1993)
(concluding from a sample of CRA loans that single-family CRA loans had
substantially lower delinquency rates than conventional loans, and multifamily CRA
loans had comparable or slightly higher delinquency rates).
52 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 324-33. Nonetheless, CRA compliance
costs under the old regime have been substantially less compared to the costs of
complying with other financial legislation. See infra note 177.
53 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 326-30 (discussing the subjectivity of CRA
compliance rating standards).
m See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing congressional findings that
preface the Act); see also Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 303-12 (rejecting the
ideology of the CRA).
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groups."55  Those groups include bank regulators,55 community
group activists,57 minority and women's groups,5 Congress it-
self,59 and small businesses and small farms.6" The benefits
accrue to these groups instead of to the public at large, including
citizens in urban areas who were the intended beneficiaries of the
CRA. 61
Two points merge in the Macey and Miller critique of the CRA,
which is the most comprehensive attack on the Act to date,62 and
5 Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 337. For background regarding how the Act
serves special interest agendas, see id. at 337-44.
5 See id. at 342.
57 See id. at 341-42.
' See id. at 337-40. Professors Macey and Miller note critically the Federal
Reserve Board's warm praise for an institution's participation in a program that was
designed to increase the supply of credit to female-owned businesses, and another
institution's donation of a house to a group promoting Chicano art, as examples of
the CRA's evolution into a statute requiring "political correctness" on the part of
covered institutions. See id.; see also Michael E. Schrader, Competition and Convenience:
The Emerging Role of Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. LJ. 331, 347-48 (1992) (arguing
that if community reinvestment's role continues to increase, a CRA record could
become the measure of an institution's political correctness).
51 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 343.
60 See id. at 342.
61 See id. at 344.
62 For other articles on various aspects of the CRA during its many stages of
development, see generally Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions:
The Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAc. L.J. 1071 (1987) (analyzing
the effects of the CRA on community groups, depository institutions, and federal
supervisory agencies); Leonard Bierman et al., The Community Reinvestment Act: A
Preliminay Empirical Analysis, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 383 (1994) (conducting an empirical
analysis of the implementation of the CRA and evaluating how these results compare
with past proposals for improving the CRA); Robert G. Boehmer, Mortgage Discrimina-
tion: Paperwork and Prohibitions Prove Insufficient-Is It Time for Simplification and
Incentives?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603 (1993) (surveying the scope of the CRA and other
mortgage discrimination statutes and proposing a legislative solution to address the
problem of continuing mortgage discrimination); Marion A. Cowell,Jr. & Monty D.
Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 83 (1992) (examining how the views of Congress, regulators, bankers,
and community groups have shaped CRA developments); Warren L. Dennis, The
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: Defining "Convenience and Needs of the Communi-
ty", 95 BANKING LJ. 693 (1978) (comparing the development of performance
evaluation criteria in other banking statutes with that of the CRA to understand what
is expected of banks under the CRA); Steven J. Eisen & Keith C. Dennen, The
Community Reinvestment Act: The Regulators Give It a New Emphasis, 107 BANKING L.J.
334 (1990) (arguing that the CRA will have an even greater impact on the banking
community in the years ahead); AllenJ. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After
Fifteen Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 293 (1993) (discussing efforts by the banking industry to curb the CRA and
the role that the CRA should take in the future); Peter F. Healey, A Banker's Guide to
the Community Reinvestment Act, 96 BANKING LJ. 705 (1979) (outlining the CRA's
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
one whose relevance increases as reforms to the CRA progress.
First, the negative effects of the CRA identified in the critique
suggest methodological problems that have arisen in implementing
and enforcing the CRA. This section will argue that the legislative
history of the Act evidences deep-seated division over the Act as
well as uncertainty over what the Act is intended to accomplish-and
why.63 Next, the section will discuss how the regulatory search for
a satisfactory enforcement mechanism for the Act has come up
short, perhaps reflecting the ambiguities in the legislative history.'
Driving the disagreement over the appropriate scope of regulatory
enforcement is the process/efforts versus performance/results
debate.65 Even assuming that there is an obligation for financial
institutions to meet community credit needs, this debate centers on
compliance requirements and explaining the actual duties imposed on banks);
Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM
URB. LJ. 165 (1993) (describing the existing CRA enforcement standards of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and proposing a framework for
community-based organizations seeking to use the CRA to increase the credit
available in their communities); Orin L. McCluskey, The Community Reinvestment Act:
Is It Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33 (1983) (explaining that, while the CRA is not
an antiredlining statute, it gives a large role to public interest groups to regulate from
below rather than implementing a regulation from above approach); Schrader, supra
note 58 (examining community reinvestment as a factor in the review of bank merger
and acquisition requests); Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the
Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993) (proposing change in CRA
enforcement to form safe harbors); Taibi, Community Economic Empowerment, supra
note 30 (taking a community empowerment perspective toward the CRA and using
this approach to suggest ways to reorient future civil rights efforts); Jonathan P.
Tomes, The "Community" in the Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in Search of a
Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225 (1991) (examining the operation of the CRA
and the changes that have made CRA compliance more critical than in the past);
White, supra note 28 (arguing that increasing competition in financial services, while
beneficial for consumers, undermines regulatory efforts); Mario Alvarado, Note,
Revisiting the Community Reinvestment Act in an Era of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 475 (1993) (detailing the history of the CRA and the initial
problems with its implementation); Mollee Bennett, Comment, Resolving the
Community Reinvestment Act Dilemma: Eliminating 'Whites Only" Mortgage Lending
While Reducing Regulatoty Red Tape, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1145 (1993) (focusing on
the history of the CRA, the problems of its enforcement, and proposed solutions for
ending discrimination); David E. Cohen, Comment, The Community Reinvestment
Act-Asset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 599 (1992) (evaluating the boundaries of the
CRA and the impact it has on the banking industry); Anne Marie Regan, Note, The
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations: AnotherAttempt to Control Redlining, 28 CATH.
U. L. REV. 635 (1979) (arguing that the CRA falls short of its goals by failing to
outlaw redlining practices).
65 See infra part I.A.
See infra part I.B.
65 See infra part I.B.2-3.
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whether the measure of compliance with the Act should be focused
on an institution's efforts to meet community credit needs or on an
institution's proof of actual success.
Yet, problems with implementing the Act would be less
troubling if a defensible purpose for the Act exists. The above
critique suggests a second and much more serious challenge to the
CRA: that the Act from the beginning was unjustified as a matter
of policy because it was grounded in an outdated "ideology of
localism."6 6 If the CRA was grounded in an ideology that, from
the start, was faulty, irrespective of the problem of enforcement, it
is questionable whether the CRA was justifiable legislation to begin
with. Part III will address that fundamental question.
A. The Problems
1. Redlining, Disinvestment, and Credit Discrimination
The CRA is the youngest of a trinity of federal banking statutes
enacted during a period of the 1970s that could be deemed the
pinnacle of federal consumer-related financial legislation.6 7
Legislative intervention was directed in general toward concerns
that the financial services industry was engaging in practices of
individual discrimination and geographic redlining, as well as
perpetuating a situation of "community disinvestment," all of which
systematically undermined the ability of persons to obtain credit on
equal terms. The potentially polarizing effects of these practices
68
spawned the CRA as well as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act69
and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act,7" each directed toward
creating a more level playing field in the market for credit.
Although discrimination in the residential real estate finance
market has been prohibited under the Fair Housing Act since
' Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 303-12.
67 See RalphJ. Rohner, Multiple Sources of Consumer Law and Enforcement (Or: "Still
in Search of a Uniform Policy"), 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 881, 884-85 (1993) (discussing
federal consumer credit legislation from 1968 to 1980).
68 See H.R. REP. No. 561, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975) ("[The practice of
redlining] increasingly has served to polarize elements of our society in a manner
wherein the dialogue has become entirely destructive, rather than constructive. As
polarization intensifies, neighborhood decline accelerates."), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2303, 2305-06.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 72-76 (discussing the Equal Credit Opportuni-
ty Act).
71 See infra text accompanying notes 77-80 (discussing the House Mortgage
Disclosure Act).
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1968,1 it was not until the enactment of the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act (ECOA)72 in 1974 that Congress addressed the issue of
discrimination in lending. A response to substantial evidence that
financial institutions were discriminating against applicants for
credit on the basis of gender or marital status,71 the ECOA original-
ly prohibited creditors from considering gender-related factors in
assessing whether to grant credit.74 Amendments to the ECOA
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, age, receipt of public assistance benefits, or the
exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act?5
followed two years later.
76
"' See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 805, 82 Stat. 81, 83-84
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988)). As originally enacted, the Fair
Housing Act's antidiscrimination rule was vaguely worded and limited in scope.
Amendments in 1988 expanded the scope of the rule to encompass virtually all
financial-services-related residential real estate transactions. See generally Warren L.
Dennis, The Fair HousingAct Amendments of 1988: A New Source of LenderLiability, 106
BANKING L.J. 405 (1989) (reviewing 1988 amendments to the Fair Housing Act and
extension of its prohibitions).
" Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691e (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
7- See generally Credit Discrimination: Hearings on H.&. 14856 and 14908 Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pts. 1-3 (1974) [hereinafter ECOA hearings] (noting the policies of many
major creditors to deny credit to creditworthy women).
74 See S. REP. No. 589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 403, 404.
7' Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
76 Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90
Stat. 255 (1976). The ECOA as amended provides in full:
(a) Activities constituting discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any appli-
cant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program; or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under
this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988). Failure to comply may result in liability for actual and
punitive damages, as well as for costs and attorneys' fees. See § 169 1e.
The ECOA interjects an "antidiscrimination" requirement into a lender's decision
whether to grant credit by making it unlawful for creditors to consider the prohibited
characteristics when acting with regard to a credit transaction. Recognition of the
antidiscrimination norm was grounded in the view that lender discrimination on the
basis of gender and race not only unjustifiably impeded access of consumers to credit,
but also constituted unprofitable and illogical business behavior:
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Although the ECOA's antidiscrimination rule has been in effect
for over fifteen years, evidence recently compiled under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA),77 the second legislative
attempt to eliminate credit discrimination, suggests that the ECOA
might have a limited ability to furnish redress to victims of credit
discrimination. 78 Data collected under the HMDA, which uses
[I]t must be established as clear national policy that no credit applicant shall
be denied the credit he or she needs and wants on the basis of characteris-
tics that have nothing to do with his or her creditworthiness. The
Committee [on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs] readily acknowledges
that irrational discrimination is not in the creditor's own best interests
because it means he is losing a potentially valuable and creditworthy
customer. But, despite this logical truth, the hearing record is replete with
examples of refusals to extend or to continue credit arrangements for
applicants falling within one or more of the categories addressed by [the
ECOA].
S. REP. No. 589, supra note 74, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 404.
77 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7 8 See Scott Ilgenfritz, The Failure of Private Actions as an ECOA Enforcement Tool:
A CallforActive Governmental Enforcement and Statutoy Reform, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 447,
449-50 (1984) (discussing the failure of ECOA enforcement); Swire, supra note 62, at
368-69 (mentioning the limited number of ECOA suits); Taibi, Community Economic
Empowerment, supra note 30, at 1474-76 (detailing the inadequate performance of the
ECOA). Efforts to buttress ECOA enforcement power were aided by a 1991
amendment to the statute that requires financial institution supervisory agencies to
notify the Justice Department "whenever the agency has reason to believe that 1 or
more creditors has engaged in a pattern or practice of discouraging or denying
applications for credit in violation [of the ECOA]." 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (Supp. V
1993). Some evidence suggests, however, that even after the 1991 amendment,
"questionable practices" under the ECOA in some instances have been handled
internally by the agencies rather than referred to the Department ofJustice. Compare
I SENATE PRINT, supra note 5, at 301 (letter from Sen. Alan Cranston) (questioning
the FDIC's failure to report questionable practices to the Department ofJustice) with
id. at 302 (letter from Andrew C. Hove,Jr., FDIC Acting Chairman) (explaining this
failure and agreeing to refer the matters to the Department ofJustice).
A federal policy of more vigorous investigation and prosecution of ECOA
violations appears to have breathed new life into the ECOA. Tile harbinger of this
new attitude toward the ECOA was a complaint filed by the Department ofJustice in
1992 against a Georgia-based savings and loan alleging, inter alia, race-based
violations of the ECOA. See United States v. Decatur Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No.
1 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. filed Sept. 17, 1992), reprinted in 1 SENATE PRINT, supra note
5, at 394-405. In a consent decree filed simultaneously with the complaint, the
institution denied all of the allegations but agreed to institute extensive marketing,
advertising, and outreach programs directed toward potential minority applicants.
See 1 SENATE PRINT, supra note 5, at 406.
Similarly, in 1994, after the Department ofJustice instituted an action against it
for FHA and ECOA violations, a Maryland-based savings and loan and its mortgage
company subsidiary agreed to invest $11,000,000 in the African-American communi-
ties around Washington, D.C. and to open branches and mortgage offices in those
communities. See Michelle Singletary, Chevy Chase Settles Case over Bias, WASH. POST,
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disclosure to address the problem of discrimination in lending,79
indicates that many minorities today have a statistically higher
chance of having their home mortgage loan applications denied
than do similarly situated whites.8" Yet, whether these statistics
Aug. 23, 1994, at Al. In effect the Chevy Chase consent decree imposed a CRA-type
remedy for an ECOA violation. See, e.g.,Jaret Seiberg, Fair Lending Law Seen as Tool
to Enforce CRA Rules, AM. BANKER, Sept. 9, 1994, at 3 (quoting a banking industry
attorney who described theJustice Department action as "using [the ECOA] as a back
door" to enforce the CRA). This Article argues that such actions are consistent with
the underlying antidiscriminatory purpose of the CRA. See infra part II.C (discussing
equality as a primejustification for community reinvestment). Regulators' treatment
of the ECOA through the CRA itself has been inconsistent. See infra note 353 and
accompanying text.
" The HMDA originally addressed the problem of geographic redlining by
requiring institutions that made federally related mortgage loans to publicly disclose
by census tract or ZIP code the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans
originated or purchased by the institution during the fiscal year that were secured by
residential real property located within the institution's standard metropolitan
statistical area. See Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200,
§§ 303-304, 89 Stat. 1124, 1125-26 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2802-2803
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) amended the HMDA to require institutions also
to disclose "the number and dollar amount of mortgage loans and completed
applications involving mortgagors or mortgage applicants grouped according to
census tract, income level, racial characteristics, and gender." Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, sec. 1211(a),
§ 304(b), 103 Stat. 183, 524 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993)). The
1989 amendments to the HMDA permitted the compilation of statistics relating to a
mortgage loan applicant's individual characteristics (rather than relating to a specific
census tract alone). This resulted, however, in a disclosure statute directed more
toward revealing patterns of individual discrimination than toward geographic
redlining.
" The first report on data compiled under the amended HMDA was published in
late 1991 (reflecting loan applications in 1990) and revealed a significant disparity in
the rate of loan application denials that tracked race. See Glenn B. Canner & Delores
S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending,
77 Fed. Res. Bull. 859, 859 (1991). While 14.4% of white applicants had their
applications for conventional home loans denied, 33.9% of black applicants, 22.4%
of American Indian/Alaskan Native applicants, and 21.4% of Hispanic applicants had
their applications denied. See id. at 870 tbl. 5. The statistical disparity in denial rates
on racial lines continued to exist even when the applicant's income was taken into
account. See id. at 872 tbl. 6 (showing that minorities suffer higher denial rates than
whites at all income levels). HMDA data released in 1992 (reflecting loan applications
in 1991) and 1993 (reflecting loan applications in 1992) again showed a significant
disparity in acceptance and rejection rates between whites and other minorities. See
Glenn B. Canner & Delores S. Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential Lending:
One Year Later, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 801, 801 (1992) (stating that the 1991 data
"continue to reflect wide differences in approval and rejection rates for minorities
and whites"); Statement to Congress of Lawrence B. Lindsey, Member of the Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 10, 10-11 (1994) (concluding
from 1992 data that "disparities between black and white approval and denial rates
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reflect flagrant and systematic biases or lending patterns that
inevitably result from wealth disparities and incomplete or imperfect
information about individual borrowers is an open question.
8 1
While the ECOA and HMDA directly address (through prohibi-
tion and disclosure) lender discrimination based upon a borrower's
individual characteristics, they only tangentially bear upon the
related practices of geographic redlining and community disinvest-
ment. The distinction between redlining and disinvestment is a
subtle one, and is often ignored. Although difficult to articulate
succinctly, and although a matter of some debate, one definition of
redlining provides that it is "the alleged bank practice of systemat-
ically denying mortgages in certain neighborhoods because of
economic conditions or racial factors not strictly related to loan loss
experience. " 82  A crucial component of redlining under this
persist).
"' See generally Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A
Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995) (analyzing the history of credit
discrimination and using economic analysis to support the argument that discrimina-
tion persists). Publication of the 1991 HMDA report generated a well-publicized
debate on the issue of discrimination in mortgage lending and a defensive response
from financial institutions. See Paulette Thomas, Federal Data Detail Pervasive Racial
Gap in Mortgage Lending, WALL ST.J., Mar. 31, 1992, at Al (summarizing the report's
findings and presenting criticisms from some members of the lending industry).
Lenders claim that the HMDA statistics, which merely reflect the overall acceptance
and denial rates for home loans, do not reflect legitimate credit risk factors such as
income, value of collateral, and job-switching. See id. at A10. A report by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, however, which extensively analyzed data from the Boston
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), concluded that even when objective credit risk
criteria were taken into account, a 'statistically significant gap" still remained between
the denial rate for minority applicants and that for white applicants in that MSA.
ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING HMDA
DATA 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992). Yet, some
have argued that the Boston Fed study fails to provide persuasive support for the
assertion that the HMDA data indicates invidious discrimination. See Peter Brimelow
& Leslie Spencer, The Hidden Clue, FORBES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 48, 48 (arguing that
because the Boston Fed study indicates equal default rates between majority and
minority applicants, application denials are based on legitimate credit risk factors).
Another recently released study supports some of the objections to the Boston
Fed study. In a study of default rates on FHA mortgage loans, black borrowers were
shown to have a higher likelihood of default than white borrowers. See James A.
Berkovec et al., Discrimination, Default, and Loss in FHA Mortgage Lending 2 (Nov.
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Yet, even federal officials
acknowledge that this more recent study is not conclusive evidence that discrimina-
tion does not exist at all,just as the Boston Fed study is not conclusive evidence that
discrimination exists and is pervasive. See Albert R. Karr, Fed Study Challenges Notion
of Bias Against Minorities in Mortgage Lending, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1995, at A16.
s Reinvestment: Public Deposits, COMP. NEWSL. (Council on Mun. Performance,
New York, N.Y.), Feb. 17, 1977, at 1, 1, reprinted in Community Credit Needs: Hearings
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definition, as well as others," is an element of intent to exclude a
particular geographic area. The decision to exclude may be rational
or irrational. Rational redlining may result from imperfect
information concerning investment opportunities in the redlined
area. Acquisition of such information would come at such a cost as
to render any investment in community X less preferable than
investment elsewhere, resulting in intentional, but rational,
exclusion of the area. 4 Alternatively, the institution's decision to
exclude a particular geographic area may be caused by irrational
individual or geographic biases entirely unrelated to credit risk or
information.
The practice of redlining, rational or irrational, is not necessari-
ly synonymous with the problem of "community disinvestment,"
which can be defined as a failure of institutions to reinvest their
deposits in the area from which those deposits were obtained.85
The hypothetical instance of a depository institution that has elected
to invest all of its deposits in areas outside of its own community
illuminates the important distinction between redlining and
disinvestment. The institution's failure to reinvest in its community
results in community disinvestment. 6 Yet, without more, the
on S. 406 Before the Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
213 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 406]; see also Art, supra note 62, at 1076-83
(discussing the elements of redlining); Alane K. Sullivan & Randall J. Pozdena,
Enforcing Anti-Redlining Policy Under the Community Reinvestment Act, ECON. REV.
(Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), Spring 1982, at 19, 24 (explaining the
debate over generating an acceptable definition of redlining).
' A similar definition of redlining is: "The identification of a specific geographic
area for the purpose of denying real estate loans or varying lending terms in a
discriminatory pattern." REDLINING TASK FORCE, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS'N OF AM.,
FINAL REPORT (1976), reprinted in Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 405, 408.
Another source similarly defines redlining as a "restriction of credit based on
geography as such, apart from any consideration of actual creditworthiness." Richard
A. Givens, The "Antiredlining" Issue: Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J.
515, 515 (1978) (footnote omitted).
' See, e.g., Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 28 (stating that rational redlining
"occurs when banks restrict lending or are less aggressive in marketing loan products
in certain neighborhoods because the costs of identifying the qualified loans are too
high to be profitable"); Sullivan & Pozdena, supra note 82, at 24 (stating that the CRA
is directed against irrational rather than rational redlining).
' Nonetheless, many authors use the terms interchangeably. See Givens, supra
note 83, at 516 n.2 ("'Often, disinvestment is used interchangeably with redlining.'")
(quoting URBAN-SUBURBAN INVESTMENT STUDY GROUP, CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES
OF THE UNIV. OF ILL., REDLINING AND DISINVESTMENT AS A DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE
IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS, PART II, at 4-5 (1977)); Sullivan & Pozdena, supra
note 82, at 24 (conflating "disinvestment" with "redlining").
" This assumes, of course, that the institution's deposits were obtained from that
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institution's practice is not redlining. For example, if the noncom-
munity investment opportunities seized by the institution are
genuinely financially superior to those available in the bank's own
community, or if there is no demand for credit in a particular
community, it is difficult to assert that redlining has occurred rather
than prudent investment judgment. In contrast, if the institution
were failing to reinvest in its own community on unfounded
perceptions about the credit risk of borrowers in low-income areas
served by the institution (unrelated to the borrower's ability or
willingness to pay or the value of the collateral) or because of
informational problems, a stronger case for deeming the practice
redlining arises.
87
As with the problem of individual discrimination in credit
decisions, redressing the effects of redlining and the problem of
disinvestment has constituted a formidable task. The HMDA
requirement of disclosing geographic mortgage lending patterns
88
was originally intended to be "the beginning of a new policy"
against redlining and disinvestment and "a new hope for our cities
and our neighborhoods." 9 Recent evidence of possibly discrimina-
tory patterns in the granting of mortgage credit, whether rational or
irrational,"0 raises the question whether the HMDA has attained its
community. See infra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of the
ACORN Study of the linkage between deposit base and lending patterns). "Disinvest-
ment" obviously cannot occur without the initial investment of members of the
community through deposits.
"' This is not to say that redlining may not in some instances be causally linked to
the occurrence of disinvestment. Assume that the institution above had previously
engaged in the practice of irrationally redlining certain low-income areas served by
it. One result of the institution's practice of failing to meet the needs of creditworthy
customers within the redlined area might be the area's decline as an economically
unsatisfactory area in which to invest. For example, real estate collateral might have
declined in value or income levels slipped further due to lack of development in the
area. Cf. 123 CONG. REC. 17,633 (1977) (statement of Sen. Tower) ("The problem
with most neighborhoods which have been redlined is that not only has adequate
mortgage credit not been available, but a number of other necessary services are also
lacking."). Even after the institution has abandoned its practice of redlining, a
situation ofdisinvestment might still exist. Disinvestment therefore in some instances
might result from a prior practice of redlining.
I See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89 H.R. REP. No. 561, supra note 68, at 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313.
Congress's rationale for selecting disclosure as the mechanism for implementing this
policy was that disclosure would facilitate identification of the areas in which
redlining and disinvestment were occurring and would inform local residents as to the
occurrence of those practices, thereby expediting public involvement in developing
reinvestment strategies. See id. at 14-15, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2315-16.
9 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing recent evidence of
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stated goal of ending the practice of redlining." Similarly, such
evidence indicates the inefficacy of the ECOA to date. Rather, the
linchpin in the effort to ameliorate the problems of discrimination,
redlining, and disinvestment was considered to be the CRA.
2. The CRA Debate
Some consensus has emerged that the CRA was intended to be
a remedy for the problem of redlining. 2 The definitional flexibili-
ty of the term "redlining,"93 however, renders such an articulation
of purpose, at best, vague. Moreover, sufficient ambiguity in the
legislative history undermines the assertion that the antiredlining (in
the sense that redlining consists of intentional geographic exclusion)
underpinnings of the CRA preclude consideration of the more
general problem of disinvestment.94 Both themes are evident in
the legislative history. At sparsely attended Senate Banking
Committee hearings on the CRA,95 evidence was submitted
indicating that depository institutions frequently ignored their local
communities' credit needs and elected to invest other than in their
own communities, 96 and that regulators often overlooked an
disparities in loan application processing).
91 See H.R. REP. No. 561, supra note 68, at 4 ("The purpose of [HMDA] is, by
providing facts, to bring to an end more than a decade of 'red-lining' charges and
counter-charges."), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2306.
' See, e.g., Art, supra note 62, at 1076 (stating that the redlining controversy led
to the enactment of the CRA); Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 298 (noting that a
"leading theme" in the CRA's legislative history was concern over redlining).
" See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing the subtle distinctions
among the various definitions of "redlining" and "community disinvestment").
' Se4 e.g., Boehmer, supra note 62, at 621-23 (explaining that the CRA was
intended to remedy disinvestment).
9' The initial senate committee hearings on what was to become the CRA were
held on March 23, 24, and 25, 1977. Three senators (Proxmire, Tower, and Heinz)
of the 15 members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
attended the first day of hearings. See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 1. On the
second day, four senators attended the hearings. See id. at 231. On the third day,
attendance fell back to three. See id. at 289.
9' See, e.g., id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (declaring that applicants for a
financial institution charter "may be interested primarily in financing their own
outside business interests" or "far flungventures" rather than "meeting the commun-
ities' credit needs"); id. at 140-46 (statement of Gale Cincotta, Chairperson, National
People's Action) (presenting data revealing a similar pattern of high suburban lending
and low city lending in Chicago, Philadelphia, and Hartford, Connecticut.); id. at 337-
61 (describing a study of Brooklyn lending patterns that revealed a common practice
of investing outside of local communities). Senator Proxmire made the following
comments regarding disinvestment:
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institution's performance in meeting the credit needs of its
community when assessing the "convenience and needs" factor in
evaluating applications filed pursuant to the Bank Holding Compa-
ny Act." Although a desire to eliminate redlining is replete
throughout the history of the original CRA, 8 disinvestment in
general was a focus of equal concern. 99
For example, in Senator Proxmire's statement introducing the
bill that eventually became the CRA, redlining is not even
mentioned.'t °  The original bill... championed by Proxmire
[W]e find many banks and many savings and loan [sic] which take money
from the community and reinvest it elsewhere, in some cases abroad, in
some cases in other parts of the country. That is fine, provided it is not
overdone. We have found many cases where these institutions have invested
virtually nothing in the local community.
123 CONG. REC. 17,603 (1977).
" See, e.g., Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 10 (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
(complaining that in granting charters to financial institutions, regulators have not
"extract[ed] any meaningful quid pro quo for the public"); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (stating the newest version of the "convenience and
needs" criteria of the Bank Holding Company Act).
9 See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 133 (statement of Gale Cincotta)
(arguing that the CRA must prohibit discriminatory application of credit conditions
and terms); id. at 150 (statement of Henry Schecter, Director, Department of Urban
Affairs, AFL-CIO) (stating that the AFL-CIO's interest in combatting redlining would
be furthered by the CRA); id. at 165 (statement of Carol Greenwald, Commissioner,
Massachusetts State Banking Department) (proposing methods of addressing redlin-
ing); id. at 330 (statement of Sen. Garn) (pondering the difficulty of solving the
redlining problem); Community Credit Needs: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Superuision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 902-03 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House
Hearings] (statement of Jeffrey Zinsmeyer, Director, Neighborhood Revitalization
Project of the Center for Community Change) (praising the CRA as a tool for
challenging redlining); 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
(describing the problem of redlining); id. at 17,855 (statement of Sen. Durkin)
(welcoming the CRA bill for giving federal authorities a way to fight redlining); id. at
17,857 (statement of Sen. Baker) (lamenting the defeat of a Senate amendment that
would have eliminated the CRA title from the larger bill because of its misguided
approach to solving the redlining problem).
" See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 2 (statement of Sen. Proxmire)
("[T]here are dozens of bankers who are either too lazy or too greedy to see the loan
demand in their own communities.... If a banker is willing to get out of the office
he will find [demand]. This bill would encourage him to do so."); 123 CONG. REC.
1958 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (introducing the bill by explaining, inter
alia, that many applicants for financial institution charters have ignored the credit
needs of their localities); id. at 17,603 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (citing as a
motivating concern in the CRA's enactment committee findings that financial
institutions were taking money from local communities and reinvesting virtually all
of it in other communities).
100 See 123 CONG. REC. 1958-59 (1977).
"I See S. 406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Hearings on S. 406, supra
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evidenced a greater congressional intent to address disinvestment
than to address redlining. Although this bill contained the same
purposes as the CRA,'0 2 the proposed legislation differed princi-
pally from the CRA with regard to its concept of "primary savings
service area" (PSSA). Institutions were to delineate their PSSA, t0 3
defined as the "compact area contiguous to a deposit facility from
which such facility obtains or expects to obtain more than one-half
of its deposit customers." °4 The bill proposed that an institution
analyze the credit and deposit needs of its PSSA, indicate the
proportion of consumer deposits obtained from depositors in its
PSSA that were earmarked for reinvestment, and demonstrate that
it was meeting the credit needs of its PSSA. t°5 The concept of
PSSA would have correlated more precisely an institution's actual
deposit base with its legal investment obligation by requiring
disclosure of the percentage of deposits reinvested in its PSSA.
Thus, as originally conceived, the CRA was intended to require a
greater demonstration of "reinvestment"-that the institution was
reinvesting its deposits back into its deposit base.
Swiftly, though, these reinvestment moorings began to crumble,
and any original purpose became lost in controversy. Not surpris-
ingly, the bill was met with strong objections both from members of
Congress and from community activist groups. Although everybody
could agree that at some level the Act's objectives were laud-
able-whether to preclude redlining or to promote community
investment°0--concerns centered first upon whether the CRA
would lead to credit allocation.' 7 Senator Morgan's objections to
note 82, at 3-8.
102 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (noting the CRA's stated
purposes).
10s See S. 406, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(1)(A) (1977) ("Each appropriate Federal
financial supervisory agency shall develop programs and procedures ... requiring
that in connection with an application for a deposit facility, the applicant delineate
the primary savings service area for the deposit facility."), reprinted in Hearings on S.
406, supra note 82, at 7.
104 Id. § 3(4), reprinted in Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 6.
105 See id. § 4(1)(B)-(D), reprinted in Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 7.
106 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 15 (statement of Robert E.
Barnett, Chairman, FDIC) (advocating a strategy to address issues including "redlining
and disinvestment"); id. at 154-55 (statement of Sen. Tower) (same); id. at 159
(statement of Sen. Heinz) (same); id. at 231 (statement of Robert Embry, Assistant
Secretary for Community Development, HUD) (same).
107 See e.g., id. at 153 (statement of Sen. Tower) (stating the belief that the CRA
proposal "would ... provide for a scheme of credit allocation [that could be]
detrimental"); id. at 315-16 (statement of A.A. Milligan, President-Elect, American
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the GRA best embody the substance of the credit allocation
concern:
In concluding, Mr. President, I would like to raise my most
serious objection [to the CRA], and that is that I feel legislation of
this nature is a significant step in the direction of credit allocation
by the Congress of the United States.
If bills of this nature are pushed to their ultimate conclusion,
then the day will come when a financial institution may be forced
to make an unsound loan in a specific location in order to meet its
quota of loans in a given locality.'
The most vociferous insistence that the CRA would not, and was
not intended to, lead to credit allocation came from Senator
Proxmire himself. Proxmire stated: "I said ... that this is not a
credit allocation bill and I certainly don't see it that way. Whatever
we can do to prevent it from being a credit allocation bill I want to
do."'0° In Proxmire's view the CRA was "mild and limited legisla-
Bankers Assoc.) (same); id. at 324 (statement of Sen. Garn) (same); SUBCOMMITTEE
ON HOUS. AND COMMUNITY DEV. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN., AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPILATION OF THE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1977, at 356 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter
CRA COMPILATION] (views of Sens. Morgan, Tower, Garn, Lugar, and Schmitt)
(expressing their dislike of the bill because of the alleged adverse effect of credit
allocation).
For a discussion of the meaning of the term "credit allocation" and its varying
forms, see Art, supra note 62, at 1083-85 (noting that the term is "ambiguous and
controversial").
108 123 CONG. REC. 17,628 (1977) (statement of Sen. Morgan). The following
forceful and colorful statement made by Senator Garn to Senator Proxmire (during
the Committee hearings on the original bill) indicates the intensity of concern over
the issue:
I don't know whether I should speak at all or not. I have had a few
moments to cool off. I would like you [Proxmire] to know there are some
members of this committee who feel that it is the banking industry and
savings and loan industry in this country who have been responsible for
building this Government and not government. Damn it to hell, we have
had 200 years of the private sector building the greatest country. There are
problems.... The answer isn't more rules and regulations. Piecemeal, we
are heading for credit allocation and Government bureaucrats sitting back
here interfering with the private sector. I'm sick and tired of the
antibusiness attitude of this committee. I think the record speaks for itself.
It is constant.
You come in here; you are insulted day after day, treated rudely, but
the [consumer activists] have their asses kissed every day and ... told how
wonderful their testimony is over and over again, while we are building up
a regulatory burden that is going to destroy the housing industry in this
country.
Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 324 (statement of Sen. Garn).
" Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 154. For other examples of Senator
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tion"" designed to provide a modest incentive for banks to get
into their local communities more aggressively than they had in the
past.
11'
Concerns over how this mild and limited legislation could be
effectively implemented and enforced paralleled the debate over the
more fundamental policy issue of credit allocation. Objections were
raised that the CRA threatened to drown regulated institutions in
paperwork.1 12 These concerns, too, were downplayed by Senator
Proxmire. 3  Community groups, testifying at length at the
hearings on the bill, voiced different objections to the implementa-
tion of the Act. Troubled over whether the CRA provided an
adequate remedy for disinvestment and redlining, activists suggested
enhancing the enforcement teeth of the bill." 4
Nonetheless, these objections fell on deaf ears. Other than with
respect to the concept of PSSA, for which the Senate substituted the
notion of "community,"" 5 the bill survived (albeit by a narrow
Proxmire's assurances that the CRA would not lead to credit allocation, see id. at 2
(stating that the CRA is not a credit allocation statute); id. at 11 (stating that the CRA
is not intended to force high-risk loans); id. at 293 (stating that the bill is not
designed to impede the flow of capital). Proxmire's steadfast insistence that the CRA
was not intended as a credit allocation statute continued long after enactment. See
Provisions Aimed at Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988)
(statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("From the beginning... I have been leery of credit
allocation schemes run by the Federal Government.").
"I Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 399; see also id. at 293 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) ("There is no question that the bill is limited and limited in its effect."); id.
at 323 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (stating that the CRA is a "mild" proposal); id.
at 328 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (stating that the CRA is "mild").
" See id. at 326 (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("I am trying to propose legislation
that would provide some mild incentive to persuade the banks to get into their local
communities more aggressively than they have in the past....").
112 See id. at 363 (statement of Morris D. Crawford,Jr., Chairman, Bowery Savings
Bank) (expressing fear of paperwork burdens); 123 CONG. REC. 17,628 (1977)
(statement of Sen. Morgan) (urging other senators to vote to "delete this burdensome
and counterproductive piece of legislation"); id. at 17,636 (statement of Sen. Schmitt)
("[T]his legislation would require a great deal of additional paperwork.... ."); CRA
COMPILATION, supra note 107, at 358 (views of Sens. Morgan, Tower, Carn, Lugar,
and Schmitt) (expressing similar concerns).
" See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 293 ("We do not have any notion that
we would impose a big paperwork burden here."); 123 CONG. REC. 17,604 (1977)
(arguing that there was no indication of an unusual paperwork burden).
14 See Hearings on S. 406, supra note 82, at 20 (statement of Ralph Nader) (urging
the allowance of standing for judicial review of agency CRA actions); id. at 222
(statement of Conrad Weiler, Chairman, Alliance for Neighborhood Government)
(urging the allowance for public hearings and citizen review); id. at 229 (statement of
Conrad Weiler) (discussing remedial mechanisms).
115 See CRA COMPILATION, supra note 107, at 92 ("The Senate provisions.., would
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seven-to-seven vote) the review of the Senate Banking Commit-
tee." 6 The Act subsequently was passed, in spite of evidence that
even the regulators who would be responsible for enforcing the
CRA opposed its enactment n 7 and in spite of spirited debate on
a proposed Senate amendment to delete the CRA from the housing
bill being considered." 8 Regulators were now presented with the
unenviable task of devising a means of enforcing the Act. This task
was complicated by the problem of taking care to avoid credit
allocation and to minimize paperwork, and the problem of further-
ing a legislative purpose that-although undeniably rhetorically
appealing-shifted like a chameleon between disinvestment and
redlining.
B. Regulatory Response
The brevity of the actual Act and the meager attempt by
Congress to articulate a purpose for the Act has rendered the bulk
of the substantive import of the law a regulatory matter. Each
federal supervisory agency has issued its own set of regulations
pursuant to the Act, but all are substantially identical." 9 This
section will first discuss regulators' initial efforts-based approach
toward enforcement and the problems and concerns that arose
under that approach and that ultimately led to demands for
overhaul of the existing enforcement regime.1 2 The section then
discusses the new enforcement regulations that have emerged from
the controversy. 2 ' Central to these regulations is a shift from
measuring an institution's CRA compliance by its efforts to
substitute consideration of the credit needs of the 'entire community' ... for the
credit needs of its 'primary service area.'"); see also supra text accompanying notes
102-05.
116 See 123 CONG. REC. 17,625 (1977).
117 See id. at 17,628-29 (statement of Garth Marston of the Fed. Home Loan Bank
Board) ("[T]he bill's possible goals are many and ill-defined and it constructs an
enforcement mechanism which is unfair [and] may well be unworkable .... ").
118 See id. at 17,625 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (urging passage of an amendment
to delete the CRA-Title IV of the act). The amendment was defeated by a vote of
40 to 31. See id. at 17,637.
"' The pre-1995 CRA regulations of the federal supervisory agencies are found
at 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1993) (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency regulations), 12
C.F.R. § 228 (1993) (Federal Reserve Board regulations), 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1993)
(FDIC regulations), and 12 C.F.R. § 563e (Office of Thrift Supervision regulations).
Because the regulations are substantially identical, for ease of citation, reference will
be made only to the Federal Reserve Board's regulations.
120 See infra part I.B.1.
121 See infra part I.B.2.
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measuring compliance by its actual performance in meeting the
credit needs of the area which it serves.' 22 Finally, the section
suggests that, although facially the new enforcement regulations
appear to be a substantial shift toward ameliorating the problems
that have been identified with the CRA, depending upon regulators'
attitudes toward enforcement there arguably may be little difference
between the two approaches to CRA enforcement, except perhaps
the potentially greater expense to financial institutions.
23
1. Original Enforcement Regulations
The original CRA enforcement regulations implemented in 1978
imposed three basic substantive requirements on regulated
institutions: community delineation, disclosure, and compliance.
The responsibility for defining the institution's community
("community delineation") was left to the institution itself. 24 The
community delineation could not exclude low- or moderate-income
areas 25 and had to include the contiguous area surrounding the
offices of the lender.
t 26
" See infra part I.B.2.a-b.
121 See infra part I.B.3.
124 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.3 (1993). Institutions that primarily served a military
clientele could determine their community without reference to geography. See
§ 228.3(c).
121 See § 228.3(a).
126 See § 228.3(b). In determining the area that constituted its community, the
institution could use (1) the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas or political
boundaries or portions thereof surrounding the offices or branches of the institution,
(2) the local lending area or areas surrounding each office or groups of offices in
which the bank made a substantial portion of its loans, and all other areas equidistant
from those areas, and (3) any other reasonably delineated local area that met the
purpose of the CRA. See § 228(b)(1)-(3). Adjustments could be made to take into
account state boundaries, significant geographical features, and extremely large or
unusual community configurations. See § 228.3(b)(1). The community delineation
was reviewed annually by the institution, see § 228.3(a), and was reviewed during the
institution's CRA examination. See § 228.5(a)-(d).
A recent Department of Justice ECQA investigation of alleged discriminatory
practices by Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association indicated a move toward
a closer review of an institution's defined "community" than perhaps existed before.
See supra note 78 (discussing the investigation, generally). In that case, evidence that
Decatur had since 1979 circumscribed its CRA lending area to exclude most black
neighborhoods in Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia provided support for charging
Decatur with violations of the ECOA and the Fair Housing Act. See 1 SENATE PRINT,
supra note 5, at 5-6 (quoting excerpts from the Decatur Federal complaint). Similarly,
in one of the few Federal Reserve Board denials of applications on CRA grounds, the
Board relied in part on the fact that the institution had unreasonably excluded a
nearby Native American reservation from its community. See First Interstate
1995] 1459
1460 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1431
The disclosure mechanism had both a notification element and
an informative element. First, an institution was required to post
a CRA Notice in its lobbies.'2 7 This Notice informed the public
about public access to information concerning the institution's CRA
performance, 1 8 about the right to submit comments on the
institution's CRA performance to the institution's regulatory agency,
and about the right to request announcement of applications
covered by the CRA with the regulatory agency.
29
The principal disclosure provisions were more substantive. As
stated above, the CRA was amended in 1989 to require more
extensive disclosure.' The institution was required to prepare,
annually review, and make available to the public a CRA State-
ment.131  The CRA Statement was to include the institution's
community delineation, a list of the specific types of credit that the
bank had committed to extend to the community, and a copy of the
institution's CRA Notice, discussed above.1 2 In addition, institu-
tions were encouraged to include in their CRA Statement descrip-
tions of efforts to ascertain and to meet its community's needs, and
a report on its record of actually meeting those community
needs.133
Since 1989, the extent of an institution's compliance with the
CRA was measured through the four-tier rating system now
contained in the statute itself.134 To arrive at an institution's CRA
rating, the examining agency would review the institution's CRA
Statement and accompanying written comments, and would
BancSystem of Montana, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007, 1007-08 (1991) (noting the
unreasonableness of excluding the Native American population from the institution's
community).
127 See 12 C.F.R. § 228.6 (1993).
121 See id. The CRA Notice included information on the public's access to the
institution's current and past CRA Statements and written comments received by the
regulatory agency. See id.
12 See id.
Seesupra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the written evaluation
portion of CRA enforcement).
I'' See 12 C.F.R. § 228.4(a) (1993).
112 See § 228.4(a). Files were to be maintained for public inspection. See § 228.5.
The files were to contain signed, written comments received by the public within the
previous two years that relate to the institution's CRA Statement or its CRA perfor-
mance, responses to these comments, CRA Statements from the previous two years,
and a copy of the public portion of the institution's most recent CRA performance
evaluation. See § 228.5.
12. See § 228.4(c).
134 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (detailing the four possible ratings
and their statutory history).
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consider a list of factors, all principally devoted to the efforts of the
institution to meet community credit needs.135 The evolution of
these factors represents the manner in which regulatory attitudes
toward GRA compliance have changed since 1977. The 1980 public
information statement of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) paid scant attention to the precise
means by which a regulated institution could comply with the
Act. 36 In contrast, the 1989 Agency Joint Policy Statement on the
Is The assessment factors with respect to state member banks were as follows:
(a) Activities conducted by the State member bank to ascertain the
credit needs of its community, including the extent of the bank's efforts to
communicate with members of its community regarding the credit services
being provided by the bank;
(b) The extent of the State member bank's marketing and special
credit-related programs to make members of the community aware of the
credit services offered by the bank;
(c) The extent of participation by the State member bank's board of
directors in formulating the bank's policies and reviewing its performance
with respect to the purposes of the Community Reinvestment Act;
(d) Any practices intended to discourage applications for types of
credit set forth in the State member bank's CRA Statement(s);
(e) The geographic distribution of the State member bank's credit
extensions, credit applications, and credit denials;
(f) Evidence of prohibited discriminatory or other illegal credit
practices;
(g) The State member bank's record of opening and closing offices
and providing services at offices;
(h) The State member bank's participation, including investments, in
local community development and redevelopment projects or programs;
(i) The State member bank's origination of residential mortgage
loans, housing rehabilitation loans, home improvement loans, and small
business or small farm loans within its community, or the purchase of such
loans originated in its community;
(j) The State member bank's participation in governmentally-
insured, guaranteed, or subsidized loan programs for housing, small
businesses or small farms;
(k) The State member bank's ability to meet various community
credit needs based on its financial condition and size, and legal impedi-
ments, local economic conditions and other factors; and
(1) Other factors that, in the Board's judgment, reasonably bear
upon the extent to which a State member bank is helping to meet the credit
needs of its entire community.
12 C.F.R. § 228.7 (1994).
"s See 45 Fed. Reg. 63,133-34 (1980) (mentioning the institutions' affirmative
obligations under the CRA). The 1980 Information Statement did little more than
briefly describe the Act's requirements and indicate that the agencies expected
institutions to comply with the Act. Activities that would constitute compliance were
articulated as vague directives. For example, the statement mentions that, in assessing
compliance, "[t]he regulatory agencies are concerned with the lender's performance
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CRA137 and the 1990 FFIEC revised rating system and final guide-
lines' 38 adopted a much more comprehensive approach to the
issue of CRA compliance and grading procedures. In the 1990
guidelines, the regulatory factors3 9 were divided into five general
categories in which the institution was evaluated to determine its
overall CRA rating: (1) Ascertainment of Community Credit
Needs, 14 (2) Marketing and Types of Credit Offered and Extend-
ed,1 4 1 (3) Geographic Distribution and Record of Opening and
Closing Offices, 142 (4) Discrimination and Other Illegal Credit
Practices, 143 and (5) Community Development. 44  Detailed dis-
cussions of the efforts required for the institution to obtain an
outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve, or substantial non-
compliance grade in each of the performance categories were
included. 
14
Despite the growing trend toward specificity and what facially
appeared to be a neutral grading system, financial institutions,
in meeting the credit needs of its local communities and with its sensitivity and
response to the needs of each neighborhood." Id. at 63,134.
" See 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (1989). The 1989 Policy Statement discussed in detail
the agencies' guidelines for developing an effective CRA process and the specific
elements of that process. See id. at 13,743-44. The statement also addressed the
agencies' views on the CRA statement, documentation, the examination process, and
the role of the CRA evaluation in the examination process. See id. at 13,745-46.
138 See 55 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1990).
' See supra note 135 (listing the regulatory factors).
140 This category addressed the institution's "employment of effective techniques
for gathering information to identify community credit needs" and subsumed
regulatory assessment factors (a) (activities to ascertain credit needs) and (c)
(participation by board of directors). 55 Fed. Reg. at 18,169.
141 This category addressed the institution's efforts to promote the credit it offers,
its product implementation, and overall delivery of credit services relative to its CRA
Statement. See id. at 18,171. The category subsumed regulatory assessment factors
(b) (marketing efforts), (i) (housing, small business, and farm loan origination), and
(j) (participation in government loan programs). See id.
142 This category addressed the reasonableness of the institution's community
delineation, geographic loan distribution, and the effects of opening and closing of
offices. See id. at 18,173. This category subsumed regulatory assessment factors (e)
(geographic distribution) and (g) (record of opening and closing offices). See id.
14 This category addressed compliance with antidiscrimination laws and subsumed
regulatory assessment factors (d) (practices that discourage applications) and (f)
(evidence of discriminatory activities). See id. at 18,174.
.. This category addressed the institution's "participation in community develop-
ment and/or other factors relating to meeting local credit needs." Id. at 18,174. The
category subsumed regulatory assessment factors (h) (participation in community
development and redevelopment projects), (k) (ability to meet credit needs), and (1)
(other factors). See id. at 18,174-75.
Us See id. at 18,169-75.
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regulators, and community groups were highly critical of the lack of
differentiation generated under the four-tier rating system mandat-
ed by the Act.146 Under that system, a substantial majority of
institutions-predominantly smaller, independent banks-were just
"Satisfactory."'47 The lack of differentiation among institutions
became more problematic when viewed in conjunction with the
heightened disclosure requirements of the CRA. Not only was
nearly every institution merely "Satisfactory," but that fact was
disclosed to a public ignorant of the intricacies and vagaries of the
CRA grading procedures. Congress, which itself had changed the
grading system from a more discriminating five-tier scale to the less
discriminating four-tier scale, blamed lax grading by regulators as
the cause of the lack of differentiation in CRA ratings.148  In
116 See A 'Better than Satisfactoiy' Grade?, AM. BANKER, June 15, 1992, at 10
(complaining that the percentage of institutions receiving a grade of "satisfactory,"
about 80%, is much too large).
147 In 1993 and 1994, respectively, 93% and 94% of institutions examined received
a "Satisfactory" grade or better. See Claudia Cummins, 93% of CRA Exams Last Year
Brought Award of 2 Top Grades, AM. BANKER, Jan. 10, 1994, at 3; Shannon Henry,
Record 94% of Ratings 'Outstanding' or 'Satisfactor y, AM. BANKERJan. 26, 1995, at 10.
This reflected a slight inflation in grades from 1992. For institutions rated from
January 1 to September 30, 1992, 13% overall received an "Outstanding," 77%
received a "Satisfactory," 9% received a "Needs to Improve," and 1% received a
"Substantial Noncompliance." See Griffith L. Garwood & Delores S. Smith, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 251,
258 tbl. 1 (1993). Smaller institutions (with assets of less than $100 million) received
more of the lower grades: 10% received "Outstanding," 80% received "Satisfactory,"
9% received "Needs to Improve," and 1% received "Substantial Noncompliance." See
id. In contrast, larger institutions (with assets of over $10 billion) cornered the
market on higher grades: 42% received "Outstanding," 58% received "Satisfactory,"
0% received "Need to Improve," and 0% received "Substantial Noncompliance." See
id.
Under the prior five-tier numerical scale, the ratings appeared to be more
differentiable. For example, in 1980 the ratings for State member banks examined
by the Federal Reserve were as follows: 1 (- outstanding): 3.5%; 2 (= good): 36.7%;
3 (= satisfactory): 56.7%; 4 (= needs improvement): 2.9%; and 5 (= unsatisfactory):
0.2%. See Glenn Canner, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Second Progress
Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 816 tbl. (1981).
148 In 1988, Senator Proxmire chastised the agencies for their lax grading:
Regulators seem to think that we're all living in Lake Woebegone. Like
the children of the fictional village, U.S. lenders are all above average.
Almost all get high ratings year after year and almost none is ever held
back.
The committee surveyed CRA rating procedures and found that more
than 97 percent of all lenders passed with flying colors.... I wish we had
graders like that when I was in school.
And I ask myself, how is it that so many neighborhoods are continuing
to fail while so many lending institutions are continuing to pass? This
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addition, Congress excoriated the lack of qualitative consistency,
both among and within the evaluating agencies, in the content and
detail of their written evaluations of institutions that received the
same overall CRA rating and those that received different rat-
ings.
149
In addition to the claimed deficiencies in the CRA rating
process, regulators' implementation of the Act's modest enforce-
ment provisions generated controversy. For institutions that
remained unaffected by negative publicity and that had no desire to
expand, public disclosure of CRA ratings provided little incentive
to attempt to get a better rating.1 5' Although regulators had gone
to the extreme of issuing cease-and-desist orders against institutions
on CRA grounds, they did so only on two occasions. 5 ' Accord-
ingly, other than with respect to blatant noncompliance, the primary
carrot-or stick-that ensured CRA performance was consideration
of the performance in evaluating applications to the agencies for
expanded privileges.' 52 The scrutiny to which an institution's
CRA record would be subject in the application process was an
evolving matter. Prior to 1989, CRA compliance in the evaluation
of merger applications was not an insurmountable hurdle. Few
applications were protested by community groups 153 and those
record, needless to say, raises questions about whether the examination
process has succeeded. This record fails the nudge test which for me is an
essential measure of progress under CRA.
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 7-8 (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Sharp
criticism in the same vein continued through 1992. See 1 SENATE PRINT, supra note
5, at 6 (criticizing regulators' "poor enforcement record").
1'9 See 2 SENATE PRINT, supra note 5, app. A at 86-144 (providing examples of
inconsistent written evaluations within groups of institutions given the same CRA
rating). For example, the evaluations varied widely as to the specificity of the
evaluation and as to regulators' guidance on exactly how an institution could improve
its performance. While some institutions received a detailed analysis of the reasons
for their rating under a particular category, others did not, and were given little
guidance as to how to improve the rating given. See id.
150 See, e.g., Bill Atkinson, A Bank that Won't Bend to Meet CRA Standards, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 22, 1991, at 6 (noting that a bank that received a "substantial noncom-
pliance" rating "isn't budging to change tle rating").
"' See Kenneth H. Thomas, Is CRA Enforcement Consistent?, AM. BANKER, May 1,
1992, at 4 (noting that the 1992 Farmers and Merchants Bank cease-and-desist order
was the second such order issued).
152 See supra text accompanying note 40 (listing a number of privileges, the
granting of which may be affected by an institution's low CRA performance).
... See 1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 216 (statement of Martha R. Seger,
member, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (noting protested applications
from 1978-1987); see also Canner, supra note 147, at 816 (noting that few applications
by low-rated institutions were ever protested).
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that were protested were easily resolved through negotiations and
a promise of future commitments by the institution to improve its
CRA performance.15 4  While CRA protests were not unheard
of,'55 and while those protests could lead to substantial delays in
approval of the protested application, 156 approval seemed assured,
regardless of the institution's CRA rating.
Two events in 1989 acted to check growing perceptions of a lazy
regulatory attitude toward CRA compliance. First, the 1989 Agency
Joint Policy Statement 5 indicated a more invigorated attitude of
regulators toward CRA evaluations. 5 In addition, the Federal
Reserve Board rejected the application of Continental Bank
Corporation and Continental Illinois Bancorp to acquire an Arizona
bank."' While the denial was partially on the grounds that
Continental was still controlled by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 60 Continental's CRA-deficient performance was also
a determining factor.' 61  Continental had recently elected to
change its long-term business strategy by becoming a wholesale
banking institution and had therefore withdrawn from consumer
154 See; e.g., Canner, supra note 147, at 816-17 (suggesting that most protested
applications are eventually approved upon the taking of remedial action or the
promise of future commitments); Glenn Canner &Joe M. Cleaver, The Community
Reinvestment Act: A Progress Report, 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 87,91-95 (1980) (discussing
the resolution of protested applications).
1-5 Protests to applications showed dramatic increases in 1985 and in 1987. See
1988 Senate Hearings, supra note 5, at 216 (noting that between 1984 and 1985,
protested applications rose from 3 to 19, and that they rose from 20 to 36 between
1986 and 1987).
"s See id. at 13 (statement of ACORN) (discussing the eight-month delay in the
application of Hibernia National Bank to acquire a bank, "the longest delay in the
history of CRA challenges").
' See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
'
54 See Garwood & Smith, supra note 147, at 254 (discussing the 1989 policy
statement, which "added specificity about the responsibilities of institutions under the
CRA, the manner in which the agencies would assess performance, and some of the
elements found in effective programs").
'" See Continental Bank Corp., Order Denying Acquisition of a Bank, 75 Fed. Res.
Bull. 304 (1989) (denying the corporation's application for approval to buy the Grand
Canyon State Bank).
160 See id. at 306 (stating that denial of the application was partially based on "the
adverse effects on competition resulting from the continued government ownership
of [the] Bank").
16 See id. (noting that the decision to deny the application was in part "based upon
[the] Bank's inadequate CRA performance"). Among other things, Continental had
only recently implemented a formal CRA program, had CRA Statements that were
"substantially inaccurate," and had made little effort to market its products or
participate in community development projects. Id. at 305.
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credit and retail banking services.' The Board commented that
the CRA nonetheless required Continental to implement an active
CRA program consistent with that business objective, 163 and
refused to consider any commitments of Continental to improve its
CRA performance in the future.
6 4
Post-Continental, the CRA was transformed into a requirement
that an institution had to take seriously or face the real possibility
of denial of its application.' 6 An institution's CRA record there-
fore emerged as a principal point of contention in evaluating its
application for expansion. Although only between one and two
percent of applications filed with the Federal Reserve have been
protested on CRA grounds since 1988,166 and denials of applica-
tion on GRA grounds were-and still are-rare, 67 the CRA became
162 See Robert Reed, Why Theobald Strategy for Cont'l Faces Hurdles, CRAIN'S
CHICAGO BUS., Nov. 2, 1987, at 2, 2 (announcing Continental's strategic plan).
16 See Continental Bank Coip., supra note 159, at 304-05 (stating that "[a]lthough
the CRA was not intended to limit an institution's discretion to develop the types of
products and services it believes are best suited to its expertise and business objec-
tives .... the institution's program must meet the objectives of the CRA").
Continental could, in the Board's view, comply with the CRA without contravening
its business structure by
lending to inner-city revitalization efforts, supporting state and local govern-
mental financing efforts, lending to small or minority-owned businesses,
lending support for low-income multi-family rehabilitation and new
construction projects, lending to or otherwise financing non-profit
developers of low-income housing and small business development, or
financing major upgrades and/or expansion of industrial plants that would
otherwise relocate outside of the city served by the bank.
Id.
" See id. at 305 ("The Board does not believe that commitments by themselves
can serve as a substitute for the established record of CRA performance required by
the statute.").
165 Some commentators erroneously have suggested that it was the 1989 FIRREA
amendments to CRA that finally put teeth into enforcement. See Macey & Miller,
supra note 27, at 292-93 (discussing the enhanced impact of the CRA as a result of
the 1989 changes); see also supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
1989 amendments). Although the hearings that preceded FIRREA and their sharp
criticisms of regulatory enforcement efforts to date might have incited regulators to
crack down on CRA compliance, the text of the 1989 amendments-heightened
disclosure and the four-tier grading system-does not by itself dramatically invigorate
the CRA. In addition, as stated earlier, consumer group protests of applications had
already begun to rise prior to 1989. See supra note 155.
166 See Garwood & Smith, supra note 147, at 259. The limited number of protests
might be a misleading indicator of the efficacy of CRA enforcement. Even in the
absence of a formal protest, CRA compliance might become an issue in the
application process because of deficiencies in the applications revealed during the
CRA examination process. See id.
167 See 1 SENATE PRINT, supra note 5, at 184 (setting forth Federal Reserve Board
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an issue of almost overwhelming proportions in larger transactions.
For example, in BankAmerica Corporation's application to acquire
Security Pacific, the Federal Reserve Board conducted public
hearings in four cities and heard the testimony of approximately
175 witnesses, 16 even though Bank of America, BankAmerica's
lead bank, had received "outstanding" CRA ratings in 1990 and
Security Pacific's subsidiary national banks consistently had received
"satisfactory" CRA ratings.'69 Although the merger ultimately was
approved, 170 community groups, during the hearing process, were
able to extract from BankAmerica commitments amounting to $12
billion in community-based lending after the merger.1 7' NCNB's
acquisition of C&S/Sovran 172 and Chemical Bank's merger with
Manufacturers Hanover 17 3 generated similar CRA scrutiny17 4 and
application dispositions). Only one of 27 CRA-protested applications accepted in
1990 by the Federal Reserve Board was denied. See id. That denial involved the
application of First Interstate BancSystem to merge with Commerce BancShares of
Wyoming. See First Interstate BancSystem of Montana, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007,
1007 (1991). The Board found that First Interstate's banking subsidiary serving the
Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation had "made no effort to ascertain the credit
and banking needs of this community," "failed to offer and market credit-related
services to this community," and "unreasonably delineated its service area to exclude
this community." Id. In three out of five CRA performance categories, the bank had
received a "needs to improve" rating. Id. at 1008 n.7.
All in all, denials on CRA grounds have been infrequent. Until 1993, the Federal
Reserve Board had denied applications to merge only four times on CRA grounds.
See Robert B. Cox, First Colonial's Plan to Buy Banks Rejected by Fed on CRA Grounds,
AM. BANKER, May 20, 1993, at 6. Yet, some indicators have evidenced a harder line
being taken by regulators in the last few years. In early 1994, the Office of Thrift
Supervision denied on CRA grounds the applications of four thrifts for charter
changes. See Robyn Meredith, OTS Cites Poor CRA Grades in Blocking Four Charter
Flips, AM. BANKER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 4. Each of the thrifts, who sought to become
state-chartered savings banks, had received a "needs to improve" CRA rating. See id.
'6 See Garwood & Smith, supra note 147, at 259-60.
169 See BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 338, 347 & nn.48-49 (1992).
170 See id. at 359.
' See id. at 356-57. Specifically, BankAmerica committed $750 million for lower-
income and minority home mortgage loans, $150 million for low-income rental
housing construction, $200 million for conventional small business loans, $100
million for government-backed small business loans, and $12 million for lower-income
consumer credit. See id. at 356.
172 See Statement by the Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Regarding
the Application by NCNB Corp. to Acquire C&S/Sovran Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 141
(1992) [hereinafter NCNB].
173 See Chemical Banking Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 74-75 (1992) [hereinafter
Chemical].
174 See NCNB, supra note 172, at 147-57 (summarizing the public meetings and
written comments regarding NCNB's acquisition application); Chemical, supra note
173, at 78-82 (discussing Chemical's performance record as analyzed by the Board in
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resulted in expansive commitments from the institutions.
175
The increased scrutiny of CRA performance in the application
process generated an avalanche of complaints from the financial
community. First, the added emphasis on the CRA, and the real
(albeit remote) possibility of denial of an application, arguably
prevented some institutions with a low rating from pursuing an
application. 176 Those that did file applications (irrespective of
their GRA rating) now could expect lengthy delays, exhaustive
public hearings, and pressure from community groups for future
commitments to ensure that the deal went through. Financial
institutions also alleged that, contrary to the intent expressed in the
debate, the agencies required extensive paperwork at the expense
of actual CRA results. 177  Congress, too, levied criticisms at
regulators for exalting process-and paperwork-over results.
17
assessing its application). In the evaluation of NCNB, the Board held three days of
hearings in four cities. See NCNB, supra note 172, at 147.
75 SeeNCNB,supra note 172, at 157 (describing NationsBank's $10 billion lending
program); Chemical, supra note 173, at 81-82 (discussing the banks' commitment to
provide $750 million in additional lending for low- and moderate-income communi-
ties).
'76 See, e.g., Ed Dillon, Scuttled Deal in the West Illustrates Impact of CRA, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 8, 1992, at 9 (discussing Harris Bankcorp's election not to pursue
application for acquisition after receiving a "needs to improve" rating).
'77 See, e.g., Bill Atkinson, Despite Good Grades, Banks Say CRA Exams Were Not a
Pushover, AM. BANKER, Apr. 22, 1991, at 1 (noting that regulators look for extensive
documentation and form); Linda Corman, Study Finds Documentation Biggest Factor in
CRA Rating, AM. BANKER,June 3, 1991, at 7 (expressing one bank's opinion that large
banks receive better ratings as a result of their capacity to document CRA perfor-
mance elaborately); Foreman & Brunson, supra note 3, at 35 (acknowledging the
opinion that the excessive emphasis on documentation may result in the industry
missing its mark).
Despite these complaints, the old CRA could be viewed as a relatively inexpensive
regulation with which to comply. An Office of Management and Budget review of
estimates of the time and cost of compliance for the CRA under the old regime found
that state member banks regulated by the Federal Reserve spent 6137 hours and
$306,850 on CRA compliance. See Bill Atkinson, Complyingwith Regulations: A Costly
and Growing Burden, AM. BANKER, June 24, 1991, at 1, 10. In contrast, compliance
with Truth-in-Lending required 1.9 million hours and $7.3 million. See id.; see also
infra note 379 (suggesting that claims of compliance costs and burdens are
exaggerated).
'78 See 1 SENATE PRINT, supra note 5, at 11-13 (recommending that regulators shift
emphasis from paperwork to actual performance).
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2. The Turn Toward Results
Acting against the backdrop of these complaints, in December
of 1993 the regulatory agencies published for comment their initial
proposed revisions to the CRA regulations.17 ' After regulators
were inundated with comments on that proposal, 8 ' a substantially
revised set of proposals emerged in October of 1994, and final rules
were approved by regulators in late April of 1995.181 Although
the public disclosure requirements remain largely the same, 8 2 the
new regulations abandon the efforts/process-based enforcement
standard that had been in effect since 1978. The regulations
advance an evaluative procedure that is based, at least initially, upon
actual results, including loans, investments, and services to an
institution's "assessment area."183
a. Compliance and Enforcement
Most significant in the new regulations are the abandonment of
the prior subjective, efforts-based criteria for assessing whether an
institution is meeting community credit needs and the substitution
of what at least facially seems a more quantitative evaluation
procedure designed to measure actual results in meeting the credit
needs of the institution's service area. Under the performance
standards for large, retail institutions, three tests are conducted to
generate raw ratings that are then used to compute an institution's
composite CRA rating.'84
17 9 See December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11. For a general
discussion of the 1993 revised regulations, see supra notes 9-15 and accompanying
text.
'a See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
's' See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (joint final rules) [hereinafter Final
Regulations]; Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1994)
(proposed Oct. 7, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Proposed Regulations]. For a general
discussion of the 1994 proposed revisions, see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Again, each of the four regulatory agencies involved issued substantially the same
regulations. Further citations will make reference to C.F.R. sections of the final
Federal Reserve Board regulations. See Final Regulations, supra (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 228.11-.51).
182 Covered institutions must maintain files for public inspection including
information on its CRA performance, see Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.43(a)-(b)), and public notice that CRA information is
available. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.44 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. B).
..s The concept of "assessment area" replaces the old "community" requirement.
See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.41).
" Although each individual test for large retail institutions now has a five-tiered
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Under the "Lending Test," the institution's performance in
meeting community credit needs is evaluated by measuring the
institution's home mortgage lending, small business and small farm
lending, community development lending,185 and, if consumer
lending constitutes a substantial majority of the institution's
business, consumer lending. 8 The rating under the Lending Test
hinges on the institution's responsiveness to the credit needs of its
assessment area,1 7 the degree of lending in its assessment ar-
ea,18 the geographic distribution of loans throughout its assess-
ment area and among individuals of different income levels and
businesses, 189 its record in meeting the credit needs of highly
rating system-a response to complaints over the lack of differentiation in ratings-the
overall rating is one of the four required by the statute. See id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 228.28(a) and 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A); see also supra note 38 and
accompanying text (discussing the four-tier rating system).
" "Community development loans," generally, are loans that have as their
primary purpose "community development." Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(i)). "Community development" focuses on activities
in low- and moderate-income geographies and includes affordable housing (including
multifamily rental housing), community services, and revitalization efforts. Id. (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(h)). Such loans must benefit the institution's
assessment area or a broader regional or statewide area that includes the assessment
area. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(i)(2)(ii)).
" See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a)(1)). When assessing the
institution's overall lending performance in home mortgage lending, small business
lending, and small farm lending, the evaluator must consider the institution's lending
activity, see id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(1)), the geographic distribution
of the institution's lending patterns, see id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(2)),
the characteristics of the individual borrowers, see id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.22(b)(3)), which encompasses an assessment of the distribution of lending to
individuals by income group and to small farms and small businesses, see id. (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(3)(i)-(iv)), and the institution's use of innovative or
flexible lending practices. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(b)(5)).
'8' See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A). Although an institution
does not need to meet every aspect of each rating profile, see id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (a)(2)), for an "Outstanding" (0) under the Lending Test, the
institution must generally have "excellent responsiveness" in this category; for a "high
satisfactory" (HS), "good responsiveness"; for a "low satisfactory" (LS), "adequate
responsiveness"; for a "needs to improve" (NI), "poor responsiveness"; and for a
"substantial noncompliance" (SN), "very poor responsiveness." Id. (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(A), (ii)(A), (iii)(A), (iv)(A), (v)(A)).
" For an 0 under the Lending Test a "substantial majority" of the institution's
loans must be in its assessment area; for an HS, a "high percentage"; for an LS, an
"adequate percentage"; for an NI, a "small percentage"; and for an SN, a "very small
percentage." Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(B), (ii)(B),
(iii)(B), (iv)(B), (v)(B)).
" The distribution must be "excellent" for an 0, "good" for an HS, "adequate"
for an LS, "poor" for an NI, and "very poor" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(C)-(D), (ii)(C)-(D), (iii)(C)-(D), (iv)(C)-(D), (v)(C)-(D)).
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economically disadvantaged areas of its assessment area, of low
income individuals, or of businesses, 90 its use of innovative or
flexible lending practices in a safe and sound manner to meet the
credit needs of low- or moderate-income individuals and geogra-
phies,19 1 and its leadership position in community development
lending. 92  Institutions with assets over $250 million 9 ' must
report information on loans covered under the HMDA, on their
origination and purchase of small farm and small business loans,
and on community development loans originated or purchased.'94
Like the Lending Test, the "Investment Test" also is intended to
reflect the actual deployment of institutional resources into an
institution's assessment area. An institution's rating under the
Investment Test depends on the amount of "qualified invest-
ments"'95 made by the institution,19 6 the innovativeness and
'9 The record must be "excellent" for an 0, "good" for an HS, "adequate" for an
IS, "poor" for a NI, and "very poor" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(E), (ii)(E), (iii)(E), (iv)(E), (v)(E)).
19! "Extensive use" is required for an 0, mere "use" for an HS, "limited use" for
an LS, "little use" for an NI, and "no use" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt . 228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(F), (ii)(F), (iii)(F), (iv)(F), (v)(F)).
" An institution must be a "leader" in community development lending for an
0, or make a "relatively high level of community development loans" for an HS, "an
adequate level" for an LS, "a low level" for an NI, and "few, if any" for an SN. Id. (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(1)(i)(G), (ii)(G), (iii)(G), (iv)(G), (v)(G)).
'9 Small institutions that elect to be evaluated under the Lending Test also must
report such information. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text; see also Final
Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(a)(3)) (describing
assessment standards for small banks).
"9 See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.42).
Reporting on consumer loans is required if the institution wishes consumer loans to
factor into the Lending Test. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.42(c)(1)).
Regulators abandoned at the last moment a highly controversial requirement that
institutions report data on the race and gender of small business and small farm
borrowers. See 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 181, at 51,282 (proposed app.
C). While the costs of complying with the new reporting requirements are at this
time a matter of speculation, the new reporting requirements are similar to those
imposed under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, but encompass a far greater
number of types of loans. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing
reporting requirements under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1974).
19- "Qualified investments" are lawful investments, deposits, membership shares,
or grants that have community development as their primary purpose. See Final
Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(s)). In addition, any
branch that is donated, or sold on favorable terms, or made available on a rent-free
basis to certain minority- and female-owned institutions is considered under the
Investment Test. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.23(d)).
1' The level of qualified investments must be "excellent" with the institution
"often in a leadership position" to merit an 0, "significant" and "occasionally in a
leadership position" for an HS, "adequate" but "rarely in a leadership position" for
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complexity of the institution's investments,1 97 and its responsive-
ness to community credit and community development needs.
198
Finally, the "Service Test" "evaluates ... the availability and
effectiveness of a bank's systems for delivering retail banking
services and the extent and innovativeness of its community
development services." 9 9 Under this test the evaluator assesses
the institution's distribution of branches among the geographies it
serves, its record of opening and closing branches, the extent to
which it makes available alternative systems for delivering banking
services to low- and moderate-income geographies and individuals,
and the range of the services offered."' In addition, consider-
ation is given to the extent, innovativeness, and responsiveness of
the institution's community development services. 20 ' The insti-
tution's rating under the Service Test hinges upon the accessibility
of its services to geographies and individuals in its assessment
area,20 2 its record of improving the accessibility of its services
(particularly to low- and moderate-income geographies and
individuals) by opening and closing branches,20 1 the tailoring of
an LS, "poor" for an NI, and "very poor" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 228, app. A (b)(2)(i)(A), (ii)(A), (iii)(A), (iv)(A), (v)(A)). Particular consideration
is given investments not routinely provided by private investors. See id. (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.25(c)(2).
"" The innovativeness and complexity of the use of qualified investments must be
.extensive" to merit an 0, "significant" for an HS, "occasional" for an LS, "rare" for
an NI, and no use whatsoever results in an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
288, app. A (b)(2)(i)(B), (ii)(B), (iii)(B), (iv)(B), (v)(B)).
'98 The responsiveness must be "excellent" to merit an 0, "good" for an HS,
"adequate" for an LS, "poor" for an NI, and "very poor" for an SN. Id. (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(2)(i)(C), (ii)(C), (iii)(C), (iv)(C), (v)(C)).
"' Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.24(a)).
20 See id. (to be codified at § 228.24(d)).
201 See id. (to be codified at § 228.24(e)). "Community development services" are
those services that have community development as their primary purpose, that are
related to the provision of financial services, and that are not otherwise considered
under the Service Test. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.120)).
202 Service delivery systems must be "readily accessible" to merit an 0, "accessible"
for an HS, "reasonably accessible" for an LS, "unreasonably inaccessible to portions"
of the assessment area for an NI, and "unreasonably inaccessible to significant
portions," particularly low- and moderate-income geographies or individuals, for an
SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(3)(i)(A), (ii)(A), (iii)(A), (iv)(A),
(v)(A)).
20 An "improvement" in accessibility must occur to merit an 0, while the
institution's record must not have "adversely affected" accessibility for an HS, have
"generally not adversely affected" accessibility for an LS, have "adversely affected"
accessibility for an NI, and have "significantly adversely affected" accessibility for an
SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(3)(i)(B), (ii)(B), (iii)(B), (iv)(B),
(v)(B)).
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its services to the convenience and needs of its assessment areas,
particularly to low- and moderate-income geographies and individu-
als, 20 4 and its leadership position in providing community develop-
ment services.
20 5
After evaluation under each of the tests, determination of the
institution's composite CRA rating occurs. To arrive at an institu-
tion's overall CRA rating under the four ratings required by the
statute, the evaluator applies a point system,20 6 giving the greatest
weight to the institution's performance under the Lending Test.
207
Wholesale and limited purpose institutions20 8 generally are not
evaluated under the Lending, Investment, and Service Tests.
Rather, these institutions must first request such status in writing
from their regulator. 209  After being designated a wholesale or
limited purpose institution, the institution is evaluated under the
"Community Development Test," which is intended to evaluate the
institution's record in making qualified investments, in community
development lending, and in providing community development
204 Services must be "tailored" to the needs of the assessment area to merit an 0,
and must "not vary in a way that inconveniences its assessment area(s), particularly
low- and moderate-income geographies and low- and moderate-income individuals"
for a rating of HS or LS, depending upon the institution's rating with regard to other
service criteria. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(3)(i)(C), (ii)(C),
(iii)(C)). Services that "vary in a way that inconveniences its assessment area(s),
particularly low- or moderate-income geographies or low- or moderate-income
individuals" will result in an NI rating, and services that "vary in a way that
significantly inconveniences its assessment area(s), particularly low- or moderate-
income geographies or low- or moderate-income individuals" will result in an SN
rating. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(3)(iv)(C), (v)(C)).
205 The institution must be a "leader" in providing community development
services to merit an 0, must provide a "relatively high level" of such services for an
HS, "an adequate level" for an LS, "a limited level" for an NI, and "few, if any"
services for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (b)(3)(i)(D), (ii)(D),
(iii)(D)), (iv)(D), (v)(D)).
206 See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,169-70 (1995) (describing in "supplementary information"
the procedures used to determine an institution's "composite rating").
207 See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(b)).
An 0 on the Lending Test will result in at least a "satisfactory" overall rating. An 0
on both the Service and Investment Tests with at least an HS on the Lending Test
also will result in an 0 overall rating. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(b)
(1)-(2)). A minimum of an LS on the Lending Test is required to receive an overall
rating of "satisfactory." Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(b)(3)).
27' "Wholesale" institutions are those that are "not in the business of extending
home mortgage, small business, small farm, or consumer loans to retail customers."
Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(w)). "Limited purpose" institutions are those
that offer "only a narrow product line (such as credit card or motor vehicle loans) to
a regional or broader market." Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(o)).
21 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.12(o), 228.12(w), 228.25(b)).
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services. 210  Factors that bear on this determination are the
number and amount of such investments, loans, and services
provided by the institution, 21 1 the complexity and innovativeness
of those investments, loans, and services, 212 and the institution's
responsiveness to community credit and community development
needs.
2 13
It is debatable whether the enforcement provisions that
accompany the new performance assessment standards are any more
stringent than those previously applied. In addition, the final rules
evidence a substantial retreat from the enforcement provisions
originally proposed in December of 1993. Evidence of discrimina-
tion or illegal credit practices will adversely affect the evaluation of
an institution's performance, although the effect of such evidence
is left vague. 21 4  The regulations are not specific as to how an
210 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.25(a)); see also supra note 185 (defining
community development loans); supra note 195 (defining qualified investments);.supra
note 201 (defining community development services).
211 See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.25(c)(1)). The level of investments, loans, and services must be "high" for an
0, "adequate" for an S, 'poor" for an NI, and "few" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i), (c)(3)(i), (c)(4)(i)).
212 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.25(c)(2)). Particular attention is given
to investments not routinely provided by private investors. Id. The institution must
make "extensive use of innovative or complex" investments, loans, or services for an
0, "occasional use" for an S, 'rare use" for an NI, and "no use" for an SN. Id. (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (c)(1)(ii), (c)(2)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(4)(ii)).
211 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.25(c)(3)). The institution's responsive-
ness must be "excellent" for an 0, "adequate" for an S, "poor" for an NI, and "very
poor" for an SN. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (c)(1)(iii), (c)(2)(iii),
(c)(3)(iii), (c)(4)(iii)).
214 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(c)). Under the final regulations,
considerations that come to bear on the institution's rating include the "nature and
extent of the evidence, the policies and procedures ... in place to prevent
discriminatory or other illegal credit practices," corrective actions the institution has
taken or committed to take, and other "relevant information." Id. In contrast, the
December 1993 proposals arguably had a much higher threshold for discriminatory
practices that would affect an institution's rating. Under that proposal, "evidence that
an institution had engaged in illegal discrimination could affect the [institution's]
rating," only where an institution had "(1) [e]ngaged in a pattern or practice of illegal
discrimination that it has not corrected fully; or (2) [c]ommitted an isolated act of
illegal discrimination of which it has knowledge and that it has not corrected fully or
is not in the process of correcting fully." December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra
note 11, at 67,490 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.10(b)). The final rules, then,
clearly expand the relevant criteria to include considerations other than "illegal
discrimination" as relevant information.
The December 1993 proposal did, however, give discriminatory practices greater
effect in the assessment process than do the final rules. In 1993, regulators proposed
that any institution that engaged in illegal discrimination and failed to correct the
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institution's rating will factor into the application process.
215
Attempts of the agencies to enhance their enforcement powers
through a provision that an institution receiving an overall rating of
"substantial noncompliance" would be subject to enforcement
proceedings were found by the Justice Department to be beyond
regulators' legal authority and consequently were scrapped late in
the revision process.216 Also dropped late in the debate was the
regulatory equivalent of the "three strikes, you're out" rule, under
which an institution that received a "needs to improve" for two
consecutive examinations would have received a "substantial
noncompliance" rating if its next evaluation resulted in a composite
rating of "needs to improve."
217
situation was to receive a rating of less than Satisfactory regardless of its performance
on the other tests. See id. The effect of discriminatory practices on the institution's
rating has been drastically undercut in the final rules, because the actual effect of
such activity upon the institution's rating is not specified.
215 See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.29)
(stating that the institution's rating will be taken into account along with other factors
in considering various applications). In contrast, the December 1993 proposals
provided concrete standards for the effect that the overall rating would have had on
an institution's application:
(i) An "outstanding" rating generally will result in a finding that the
CRA aspect of the application is consistent with approval of the
application and will receive extra weight in reviewing the applica-
tion.
(ii) A "satisfactory" rating generally will result in a finding that the
CRA aspect of the application is consistent with approval of the
application.
(iii) A "needs to improve" rating generally will be an adverse factor in
the CRA aspect of the application, and absent demonstrated im-
provement in the bank's CRA performance or other countervailing
factors, generally will result in denial or conditional approval of
the application.
(iv) A "substantial noncompliance" rating generally will be so adverse
a finding on the CRA aspect of the application as to result in
denial of the application.
December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11, at 67,493 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 228.17(b)(1)).
216 SeeJaret Seiberg, Agencies Back Off Broadening of CRA Enforcement Powers, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 16, 1994, at 1; see also 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 181, at
51,274 (providing that a bank receiving a rating of "substantial noncompliance" shall
be subject to enforcement orders). Agencies under the old regime had sparingly used
the cease and desist order in cases of blatant noncompliance with the CRA, but
neither the CRA itself nor the old regulations provide for such an enforcement
mechanism, calling into question the propriety of such regulatory action. See supra
text accompanying note 151 (discussing rare use of cease and desist orders).
217 See 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 181, at 51,274 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 228.28(d)).
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b. Some (Almost) Exemptions
Regulators faced a difficult situation when presented with
requests for relief from the CRA process. Given that the text of the
statute offers no leeway to exempt particular types of institutions
from the Act, exemptions would be problematic from an administra-
tive standpoint.21 8 Regulators also concluded that exemptions
might result in neglect of the credit needs of communities that were
served by exempted institutions.219 Nonetheless, regulators have
allowed two "quasi" exemptions from the general evaluation
processes discussed above.
Small retail institutions,220 unless they elect to be evaluated
under another test, are evaluated by a less stringent method than
that discussed above for large institutions. 221 Under the "Small
Institution Performance Standards," the evaluator considers the
institution's loan-to-deposit ratio and other lending-related activi-
ties, 222 the percentage of loans and lending-related activities in its
assessment area, 223 its record of lending and engaging in lending-
related activities to borrowers of different income levels and to
businesses and farms of different sizes,22 1 the geographic distribu-
tion of its loans,225 and its record of taking action on written
211 See December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11, at 67,472 (discussing
regulators' beliefs that exemptions are not permitted by the statute).
219 See id.
220 "Small" institutions are those institutions with assets of less than $250 million
that either are independent or are affiliates of a holding company with total assets of
less than $1 billion. Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.12(t)). It is estimated that perhaps up to 85% of the financial institutions
covered under the CRA fall in this class. See Cummins, supra note 19, at 3.
22' See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.2 1(a)(3)) (establishing methods for evaluating small banks).
See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.26(a)(1)). An institution will receive
an S rating if the ratio is "reasonable" viewed in light of the institution's size, financial
condition, and the credit needs in its assessment area. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 228, app. A (d)(1)(i)).
222 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.26(a)(2)). An institution will receive
an S rating if a majority of the institution's loans and activities are in its assessment
area. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A. (d)(1)(ii)).
224 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.26(a)(3)). An institution will receive
an S rating if the distribution of loans and activities among income levels and among
businesses and farms of different sizes is "reasonable" given the demographics of the
institution's assessment area. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A
(d)(1)(iii)).
22 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.26(a)(4)). For an S the geographic
distribution must be "reasonable." Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A
(d)C1)(v)).
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complaints about its performance in meeting community credit
needs.22 If the institution meets all and exceeds some of the
standards for a Satisfactory rating, the institution may earn an
Outstanding rating.22 7 Failure to meet the standards results in the
possibility of a rating lower than Satisfactory.2 Most significant-
ly, small institutions are exempted from loan reporting require-
ments applicable to other institutions and, accordingly, the costs
associated therewith.229 Like the tests for retail and wholesale
institutions, evidence of discriminatory or illegal practices will
adversely affect the rating of the small institution's per-
formance.
230
Any institution-whether small, large, wholesale, or limited pur-
pose-may opt out of the evaluation procedures otherwise applicable
to the institution by submitting a strategic plan for meeting its CRA
obligations.23' The strategic plan must specify measurable goals
for meeting community credit needs through lending, investments,
and services, particularly the needs of low- and moderate-income
geographies and individuals.232 The plan must set forth measur-
able goals that constitute a Satisfactory performance and may set
forth goals that will constitute an Outstanding performance.
233 If
the plan is approved,234 the institution's performance will be
22 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.26(a)(5) and at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app.
A (d)(1)(iv)).
" See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (d)(2)). The small
institution's qualified investments and service may be considered. See id.
" See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (d)(3)). Whether an NI
(needs to improve) or SN (substantial noncompliance) is given depends on the degree
to which the small institution's performance fails to meet the criteria required for a
satisfactory rating. See id.
See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.42(a)).
220 See id. (to be codified at § 228.28(c)); see also supra note 214 and accompanying
text (discussing the import of discriminatory practices on the ratings of other
institutions).
2, See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at §§ 228.21(a)(4), 228.27).
The plan may not have a term of longer than five years, and multi-year plans must
include annual interim measurable goals for assessing performance under the plan.
See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(c)(1)).
22 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(f(1)(i)). Each institution's plan
must address all three performance categories (lending, investment, and service), but
retail institutions must emphasize their plans' proposed lending and lending-related
activities. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(f)(1)(ii)). However, a variation
in emphasis may be acceptable depending upon community characteristics and credit
needs, as well as the institution's capacity, constraints, product offerings, and business
strategy. See id.
2-s See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(f)(3)).
2' The institution first must seek both informally and formally public suggestions
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measured by whether the institution has substantially met or
exceeded the plan's goals.2 5  Failure to meet substantially the
plan's goals for satisfactory performance will result either in a less
than satisfactory grade23 6 or in evaluation under the regulatory
assessment standards otherwise applicable to the institution.
23 7
Election of evaluation under a strategic plan does not exempt the
institution from data- reporting requirements to which it is
otherwise subject. 2 8 And, again, evidence of discriminatory or
illegal practices will adversely affect an institution's rating under the
strategic plan option.3 9
Thus, although no institution will be truly "exempt" from the
CRA evaluation process, some leeway exists for institutions to be
evaluated by a less rigorous procedure. The number of institutions
that might consider such an election can only be a matter of
conjecture until the final rules are fully in effect and the regulatory
attitudes toward the new evaluative procedures are capable of being
assessed. Quite obviously, smaller institutions have an incentive to
remain with the extremely lenient small institution performance
standards. Given that retail, wholesale, or limited purpose institu-
tions that elect the strategic plan option obtain no cost savings
and comments on the plan. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(d)). The
plan then must be submitted to the institution's regulator at least three months prior
to the plan's proposed effective date, together with comments received from the
public. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(e)). In evaluating the plan's
goals, regulators are to consider public involvement in formulating the plan and, as
appropriate, (i) the extent and breadth of lending and lending-related activities, (ii)
the amount, innovativeness, complexity, and responsiveness of qualified investments,
(iii) the effectiveness and availability of the institution's services, and (iv) the extent
and innovativeness of the institution's community development services. See id. (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 22 8 .27 (g)(2)-(3)). Overall, the plan's measurable goals shall
be considered Satisfactory if the goals "adequately help" meet community credit
needs and shall be considered Outstanding if the goals "substantially exceed" the
levels approved as satisfactory. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (e)(1)-
(2)).
235 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (e)(3)(i)-(ii)). An Outstand-
ing rating is available under the strategic plan option only if the plan contains goals
for both Satisfactory and Outstanding ratings. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.27(f)(3)).
236 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A (e)(3)(iii)).
2_1 See id. The institution must elect to be evaluated under the method otherwise
available to it at the time the institution submits its initial plan for regulatory approv-
al. See id.
2-s See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(b)).
219 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(c)); see also supra note 214 and
accompanying text (discussing the effect of discriminatory practices in the tests
otherwise applicable to the institutions).
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through reduced reporting requirements, the incentive to adopt a
plan would vary among institutions. Those with less than outstand-
ing records and expansion aims, for example, have a great incentive
to adopt a plan, particularly if regulators indicate a willingness to
approve plans without extensive scrutiny of the plan's content.
Compliance with the plan might undermine community group
protests at the application stage. In addition, the plan option might
be a more effective means of securing a high CRA rating than
lending, investments, services, or community development lending
under the standard tests. Finally, the certainty generated through
evaluation under a plan provides a modest incentive for plan
adoption irrespective of an institution's rating.
3. Change... or More of the Same?
While the criteria under the new performance tests appear at
first glance to be much more objective and quantifiable than the
efforts-based enforcement regime, the revised evaluative process can
be viewed nonetheless as a potential source of arbitrary evalua-
tions-the precise complaint levied against the old regime.
240
Although enforcement now clearly focuses on the types of activities
that merit CRA credit, the overall rating process still evokes a great
deal of regulatory discretion. For example, given that a large
institution's CRA rating hinges upon an evaluator's determination
that the institution's performance under the myriad of factors
directed by the Lending, Investment, and Service Tests is "excel-
lent," "good," "adequate," "reasonable," "poor," or some other
qualitative determination, 241 a great deal of subjectivity still
threatens to enter into, if not control, evaluations. In addition, the
regulations provide that all assessments of performance are to be
made in "context," focusing on safety and soundness considerations
and the individual institution's assessment area, business focus, and
capacities. 212 Finally, in spite of the evaluation procedures' initial
240 Of course, until the new enforcement regime is fully implemented, it is
impossible to tell with any certainty how consistent regulators will be with their
examination process.
241 See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app.
A). 42 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(b)). The tests and standards are
to be applied in the context of the following information:
(1) Demographic data on median income levels, distribution of household
income, nature of housing stock, housing costs, and other relevant data
pertaining to [an institution's] assessment area(s);
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focus on actual lending, investments, and service, regulators have
indicated that the CRA does not require an institution to abandon
safety and soundness in the name of actual results.24
When an institution ,is "good" or "innovative" given the
"context," when an institution is a "leader" in the cause of commu-
nity development given the "context," or when safety and soundness
considerations warrant overlooking otherwise poor results are ques-
tions that remain unanswered. It is hard to see how such determi-
nations can be made other than subjectively. The textual vagueness
of the rating provisions and the discretion vested in agencies to
assess the performance in the proper context caution an institution
both actively to engage in, and to maintain detailed records of, its
outreach and marketing efforts to its community, particularly in
low- and moderate-income geographies, in the event that its
evaluation, if based upon actual loans made or not made, were to
point toward a poor rating. Such records would help to prove that
the institution had actively searched and examined its relevant
market and found demand or the opportunity to make suitable, safe
loans lacking. Accordingly, the new evaluative procedures hazard
the same inconsistencies and subjectivity of the old regime, and any
shift from efforts to results is a rather deceptive one.
Nor can the move toward results be said to reduce substantially
the paperwork burden imposed on regulated institutions or the
(2) Any information about lending, investment, and service opportunities
in the [institution's] assessment area(s) maintained by the [institution]
or obtained from community organizations, state, local, and tribal
governments, economic development agencies, or other sources;
(3) The [institution's] product offerings and business strategy as deter-
mined from data provided by the [institution];
(4) Institutional capacity and constraints, including the size and financial
condition of the [institution], the economic climate (national, regional,
and local), safety and soundness limitations, and any other factors that
significantly affect the [institution's] ability to provide lending,
investments, or services in its assessment area(s);
(5) The [institution's] past performance and the performance of similarly
situated lenders;
(6) The [institution's] public file... and any written comments about the
[institution's] CRA performance submitted to the [institution] or [the
regulator]; and
(7) Any other information deemed relevant by [the regulator].
Id.
"' See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(d)) (indicating that these
regulations "and the CRA do not require a[n institution] to make loans or
investments or to provide services that are inconsistent with safe and sound
operations").
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costs of compliance with the CRA, two principal concerns under the
efforts-based regime. Rather, a results-based regime may in fact
bring significant enforcement costs. Institutions subject to the new
data reporting requirements face new compliance costs. Regulatory
enforcement costs are sure to rise to accommodate the data
reporting requirements. 244  Moreover, as stated above, even
further paperwork and record-keeping is advisable to ensure
adequate information that bears on the "context" of the institution's
business and local market. Finally, the new regulations fail in any
meaningful respect to strengthen regulators' ability to enforce
compliance with the Act.
Admittedly, any assessment of the efficacy of a results-based
regime must await full implementation and an empirical evaluation
of the regime's costs and benefits. It is questionable, though,
whether the new evaluation and enforcement procedures based
upon results will substantially reduce paperwork, evoke consistent
or more differentiating ratings, or, given the malleability of the
evaluation procedures, even lead to increased community lending
overall. Arguably, gains, if any, in actual lending under the Lending
Test for larger institutions may be offset by the leniency given to
small institutions under the Small Institution Performance Stan-
dards. The much-anticipated call to move away from efforts and
toward results might very well accomplish little in curing the
problems that have plagued the CRA since its enactment. It seems
patent that the more we seek to change the CRA, the more its
claimed deficiencies stay the same, and perhaps even flourish. The
struggle to achieve the basics of CRA implementation 245 still
continues.
Accordingly, irrespective of whether the debate is framed in
terms of efforts or results, much of the critique that was discussed
at the beginning of this section 246 seems at least superficially to
ring true. The CRA substantially intervenes in the affairs of covered
institutions and imposes substantial costs on those institutions. Yet,
whether it jutfiably does so is another question entirely. It is not
this Article's purpose to decry the flawed process that begot the
CRA247 or to examine the practical and theoretical political
244 Costs of implementation include training of examiners and assembling and
synthesizing of data generated under the new regime.
245 See supra text accompanying note 1.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 48-66.
2147 For a discussion of the flawed legislative methodology in the context of the
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implications of the CRA as it now stands or has developed. Rather,
this Article turns to a somewhat more mundane, yet prescriptive,
issue: refining and resolving the issues that the legislative debate,
the years of CRA enforcement, and the proposals to revise the
means of enforcement have failed to address satisfactorily. The
next Part addresses whether the CRA is even warranted. If it is not,
the CRA experiment set forth above-however socially admirable or
politically appealing-should be abandoned.
II. JUSTIFYING "COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT"
The core of the CRA debate lies in the Act's somewhat blithe
assertion that regulated financial institutions have an obligation to
meet community credit needs. Current dialogue about whether the
CRA has ajustifiable purpose seeks either to reject this premise or
to champion it. Accordingly, the defense or critique of the CRA
rages at two sharply divergent poles, with little room for reconcilia-
tion between the two. On the one hand, the banner of "anti-
localism" has been raised to reject the essential precept of the CRA
that institutions have some sort of obligation to their local commu-
nities.248 In contrast, an emerging communitarian, "community
rights" perspective on the Act and on financial institution regulation
seeks to establish a framework for critiquing the CRA's effectiveness
based upon community.
249
As will be argued in this section, both the antilocalist and
communitarian positions are unpersuasive. Continued dialogue
between these poles is misguided and threatens only to perpetuate
the CRA's failings. In place of the conceptually flawed debate
between antilocalism and communitarianism, then, the following
discussion draws upon the antiredlining underpinnings of the CRA
to advance a theory of equality of access and opportunity that
defends the Act.
2 0
Truth-in-Lending Act, see Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessonsfrom
the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. LJ. 233, 233-34 (1991) (arguing that the failure of
the Truth-in-Lending Act to achieve its declared goals was due to the lack of an
effective methodology for the design of regulatory legislation).
248 See infra part II.A.
249 See infra part II.B.
250 See infra part II.C.
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A. The Antilocalism Challenge
The antilocalism critique of the CRA asserts that the Act
erroneously embodies "the proposition that depository institutions
owe special obligations to their local communities."2 51 The notion
that localism reflects an "outdated" ideology252 of banking law
rests on three underlying, assertedly flawed, propositions: that
banking is a local industry, that banks drain credit out of local
communities, and that "banks owe special duties to their local
communities."21s According to Professors Macey and Miller:
A basic theme underlying the ideology of the CRA is the proposi-
tion that banks are fundamentally local institutions: they take
deposits from the local community and return those funds to the
community in the form of loans. Alternatively, the proposition is
that banks should be local institutions, even if they sometimes
behave as if they are not.
254
Although the notion of community banking and community bankers
might have had a ring of truth to it earlier in history-fueled by
"American folklore"255-the evolution and growth of banking insti-
tutions into national financial institutions have undermined the
local character of banking institutions. 256  Not only does the
"fundamentally local" articulation of the banking industry fail to
adequately describe the current system of banking law under the
antilocalist critique, it fails on normative grounds as well.257 The
2"1 Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 303. Localism as an underlying theme in
banking law is also reflected in several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See id. & n.43
(citing Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,38 (1980) and Northeast Bancorp
v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 177 (1985)).
-
2 Id. at 303.
2
1s Id. at 304. For a fuller discussion of these propositions, see id. at 303-12.
254 Id. at 304.
255 Id. In attempting to distinguish fact from fiction, and law from film, this
Article will not analyze the CRA and its underpinnings by a debate over the aesthetics
and accuracy of Frank Capra's film It's A Wonderful Lfre. Cf Macey & Miller, supra
note 27, at 304 (suggesting that George Bailey, the building and loan president in It's
A Wonderful Life, is a rhetorical part of American folklore); Taibi, Communitarianism
and Banking Regulation, supra note 30, at 1109 (mourning the demise of community-
based institutions like the Bailey Building & Loan Association in It's A Wonderful Life).
One questions whether a post-War fable-albeit a Christmastime classic-provides
support for government intervention into the affairs of regulated financial
institutions.
' See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 304-07 (describing how the movement of
banks away from localism has weakened the ties that connect banks with their
immediate local communities).
257 See id. at 307 (indicating that it is difficult tojustify a normative preference for
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economic benefits that have accrued to consumers and to the
financial health of banks as a result of the delocalization of banks
render any claim for a return to banking as a local industry
indefensible "on persuasive normative terms."258 Economic argu-
ments, therefore, compel a regulatory policy that will move the
financial services industry away from its antiquated localist begin-
nings. Those arguments overshadow any other normative justifica-
tions for the GRA. According to Professors Macey and Miller,
however, the CRA compels precisely that return to localism.
The full parameters of the antilocalist objections to the CRA
merit explication. The commercial banks259 and other institutions
regulated under the CRA are a key, but small, segment of the
variety of financial institutions in our society.26 Historically,
institutions covered by the CRA have had a more geographically
localized presence than other institutions, and, therefore, provided
the principal source of capital to their communities. Banks and
other regulated institutions act, in economic terms, as financial
intermediaries. Commercial banks, for example, fulfill a channeling
function for capital by taking deposits from investors and reinvest-
ing those deposits in commercial loans. High transaction costs and
imperfect information often prevent the direct flow of capital from
one investor to another. 261  Intermediation acts to reduce these
costs and informational deficiencies by substituting otherwise
prohibitive direct investment with the financial institution's
expertise in identifying and broadening investment opportunities.
Financial intermediation, so conceived, has both defined-at
least historically-the market of commercial banks and also inured
to the benefit of both local depositors as well as borrowers. Banks
acquired a comparative market advantage through their expertise in
assessing the credit risk of their borrowers and, therefore, lowered
the potential risk associated with an investment opportunity.
26 2
localism, because the movement away from localism has generally benefitted consum-
ers).258 Id.
259 Because commercial banks are the most significant type of entity regulated
under the CRA, the following discussion will generally refer to banks.
26' For example, the CRA does not cover insurance companies, investment
banking or securities firms, mutual funds, or pension funds, all of which are "financial
institutions." See supra note 34 (discussing the scope of the CRA).
261 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The
Origins and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 770 (1991) (stating that
intermediaries between investors are important to an economy that exists in a world
with imperfect information and nonmarginal transaction costs).
262 See Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 28 (noting that "[t]he extent to which [the]
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Because most depositors lack either the information or the desire
to make this risk assessment on their own behalf, they are able to
employ the bank to identify profitable investment opportunities.
263
Similarly, depositors may take advantage of the investment opportu-
nities presented in larger commercial loans by combining their
funds with other banks and other depositors. They therefore obtain
the benefits of larger investments than they would have been able
to make on their own, while retaining the liquidity of their invest-
ment.264 Depositors also benefit from the bank's expertise in loan
monitoring and portfolio diversification. Bank monitoring of
individual loans reduces the default risk associated with any one
particular borrower.265  The institution's ability to diversify its
portfolio and thereby offset the inherent default risks of individual
loans in the overall portfolio also reduces the overall risk assumed
by any one individual depositor.
266
Banks' expertise in assessing credit risk historically benefited
potential borrowers as well. Not only do banks offer borrowers a
source of capital but, more importantly, they are also able to value
otherwise illiquid assets owned by borrowers and make loans
collateralized by those assets. 267 Borrowers, therefore, are able to
convert their otherwise illiquid assets into liquid assets.268  In
addition, institutional expertise in monitoring facilitates borrowing
by reducing the default risk associated with any particular loan.
monitoring [of creditworthiness] is not performed easily or as efficiently by other
participants in the credit markets determines the market share of banking relative to
direct placement activity"); Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 770-72 (stating that
"[b]anks' ability to sell their skill at valuing assets, their ability to allow investors and
borrowers to realize economies of scale in investing, and their ability to convert
illiquid investments into liquid investments all explain why banks have survived and
prospered").
26 See Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 771 (recognizing that "[bly placing their
money in a bank, depositors in effect hire the bank to use its know-how in identifying
good investment opportunities").
"' See id. (noting that "banks allow depositors to take advantage of economies of
scale that otherwise would place many good investment opportunities out of the grasp
of ordinary investors").265 See Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 28 (noting that bank monitoring "ensure[s]
prudent behavior on the part of borrowers").
266 See id. (stating that banks can reduce default risks by diversifying their
portfolios, and noting that such portfolios are generally less risky than undiversified
ones).
211 See Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 771 (stating that "banks improve the
operation of the economy by investing in portfolios of illiquid assets and by offering
depositors liquid claims (deposits) on the banks' own assets").26 See id. at 772.
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The extent to which this depiction accurately describes the
modern lending institution is becoming more and more question-
able due to developments in financial markets and technology, as
well to the increasingly national and international scope of our
economy." 9 Such changes have undermined not only any deposit
monopoly that the traditional local depository institution may have
once had in its service area,27 but also the competitiveness of
some of the products offered by that institution. For example,
commercial banks now face a greater amount of competition from
other financial institutions such as pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds.27 ' Such institutions not only attract
funds from depositors that, in the past, might have gone to the local
bank or thrift, but also offer credit products that compete with the
larger commercial bank loan. The expanding debt and equity
security markets compound the problem of an eroding deposit base
by attracting borrowers away from commercial banks as a source of
capital.2 72 Similarly, asset securitization, some have claimed, has
threatened a significant portion of commercial banks' traditional
lending market.273 Securitization not only has superior ability in
26
9 See e.g.,JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING 79-87 (1991) (explaining
how banks are becoming less "banklike" and more like other purveyors of financial
services in response to a changing financial environment); Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving
the Safety Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 123, 130-36 (1992) (discussing the ways in which technology and
advances in financial markets have contributed to homogenization of the U.S.
financial markets); Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for
Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 414-42 (1984)
(discussing the evolution of the commercial bank);Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability
of Universal Banking, 19 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 203, 206-11 (1993) (discussing the effect
that technology change has had on the competitiveness of commercial banks); Macey
& Miller, supra note 261, at 772-81 (discussing the decline in the commercial banks'
role as a financial mediator).
270 See Fisher, supra note 269, at 130 (noting the banks' and thrifts' historic
monopoly on deposit-taking and commercial and mortgage loans); Macey & Miller,
supra note 261, at 774 (discussing the eroding market share of the commercial bank).
271 See, e.g., Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund Industry, 79 Fed.
Res. Bull. 1001, 1001 (1993) (addressing the diversion of bank deposits to the mutual
fund industry).
272 See PIERCE, supra note 269, at 83 (noting that banks' role as position-taking
intermediaries is diminishing due to the technological improvements and increased
financial education that have made it far easier for other types of institutions to lend
money directly); Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 772-73 (noting that the "develop-
ment of robust capital markets for equity and debt securities" reduces the need to use
banks as financial intermediaries).
27 See Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 774 (noting that "[r]ore efficient market
segments have been able to securitize themselves and thereby avoid more costly
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providing liquidity to otherwise illiquid assets,2 74 but also results
in substantially lower monitoring costs than commercial lend-
ing.
2 75
The increasing competition that regulated financial institutions
face in attracting depositors and in providing competitive products
to borrowers is enhanced by, and interrelated with, technological
developments and an increasingly national network of financial
service providers. For example, although informational constraints
might once have limited depositors largely to their local bank or
thrift, depositors now have sufficient information to invest their
funds in a mutual fund in another part of the country-a fund that
most likely offers some of the same, and perhaps more attractive,
services as the local hometown bank.7 6  Increased access to
information has also enabled some individual and many corporate
borrowers to identify nonlocal sources of capital that, as mentioned
above, are frequently less costly than loans from a nearby bank or
thrift. Technological advances reduce the inconveniences that may
arise from dealing with geographically distant financial institutions.
Thus, increased competition, decreased information costs, and
the emerging national market for financial services have encouraged
an antilocalist call for recasting our approach toward regulating
traditional depository institutions.2 7 7 That the CRA forces institu-
commercial loan markets"). For a discussion of the emerging field of asset securitiza-
tion, see Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1369 (1991). Banks and thrifts have
been able to engage in a number of types of securitization transactions. See, e.g., id.
at 1388-96 (addressing the reasons for and results of the securitization of assets by
banks and thrifts); see also PIERCE, supra note 269, at 84-87 (describing generally the
process of securitization by banks).
A number of legal impediments, however, principal among them the Glass-
Steagall Act, impede depository institutions' ability to compete effectively with other
financial institutions in the field of asset securitization and in the underwriting of
debt and equity securities. See Shenker & Colletta, supra, at 1413-21.
214 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 273, at 1374-75 (noting that securitization
ensures greater liquidity than traditional lending).
275 See Macey & Miller, supra note 261, at 775 (noting that the monitoring costs
involved in securitization are lower than those in the banking industry); Shenker &
Colletta, supra note 273, at 1394-95 (noting that securitization permits a bank or thrift
to reallocate its credit risk exposure with respect to the securitized asset, thereby
reducing the need for continuous monitoring after the credit is granted).
216 See PIERCE, supra note 269, at 83 (noting that technological improvements have
lowered the costs of information and transactions and thus caused a change in
investment patterns); Mack, supra note 271, at 1001 (noting that "as intermediaries
competing with banks and thrift institutions, mutual funds have contributed to the
reduction of the role of these depositories as providers of credit").
27 See generally supra note 269 (citing sources that question the localist conception
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tions to remain to some extent local industries renders the Act
unwarranted and bad policy. Nonetheless, a great deal of evidence
suggests that at least with respect to most ordinary consumers and
small- and medium-sized businesses, the traditional depository
institution still plays an important role in its local service area.
Most households still rely predominantly upon local financial
depository institutions such as commercial banks, savings and loans,
and credit unions for the provision of financial services.
27 8
Although the market for consumer mortgage credit has become
increasingly less geographically local, more than three-quarters of
household mortgages are at local institutions. 27 9 As suppliers of
both credit and deposit services to households, local financial
intermediaries still maintain their traditional role.
280
Local commercial banks are also the predominant supplier of
financial services to small- and medium-sized businesses.
2 81
Although nonlocal, nonbank financial intermediaries have acquired
some of the market for particular credit services such as leasing,
28 2
local commercial banks remain a major source of credit for small-
and medium-sized businesses.8 3 Furthermore, these are not one-
shot transactions. Rather, the local institution is the primary




278 See Gregory E. Elliehausen &John D. Wolken, Banking Markets and the Use
of Financial Services by Households, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 169, 173 (1992) (noting that
"depository institutions provide 83 percent of the accounts used by households [and
that] the overwhelming majority of these accounts are obtained locally").
279 See id. at 176 (reporting that for checking and savings accounts, IRAs, bank
credit cards and mortgages, among other financial services, "the median distance to
offices of financial institutions is ten miles or less").
280 See id. at 174, 176 (noting that local financial institutions are the primary
suppliers of household deposit and credit services); see also Arthur B. Kennickell &
Martha Starr-McCluer, Changes in Family Finances from 1989 to 1992: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 861, 879 tbl. 12 (1994)
(noting that commercial banks remain the largest supplier of consumer debtor
services).
281 See Gregory E. Elliehausen &John D. Wolken, Banking Markets and the Use
of Financial Services by Small- and Medium-Sized Businesses, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 801,
808 (1990) (noting that small- and medium-sized firms use commercial banks as their
primary financial institution).
282 See id. at 810 tbl. 7 (providing survey results indicating the types of financial
institutions used by small- and medium-sized firms, and the extent to which the firms
use the institutions).
283 See id.
284 See id. at 808. Evidence indicates generally that nonbank or nonlocal suppliers
are tapped infrequently and usually only for a single financial service. See id.
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Accordingly, a tension exists between the antilocalists' claim that
the local depository institution is an emerging anachronism and the
accumulated evidence that illuminates those institutions' profound
role even today in meeting local credit needs. Increased competi-
tion posed to local institutions by nonlocal or nonbank financial
intermediaries may very well have significantly transformed the
market for credit services provided to large firms. Evidence also
suggests that nonbank mutual funds have diverted significant
household, business, and government deposits away from banks.
285
Yet, that households and small- and medium-sized firms still rely
significantly on local depository institutions for their deposit and
credit needs indicates that such a transformation has yet to emerge
in all areas. At least with respect to households and small and
medium-sized businesses, the costs that would be incurred in
identifying nonlocal providers of financial services and products
render the local institution the predominant supplier of financial
services.
286
Although the economic account of financial intermediation and
the antilocalist critique of the CRA suggest a shift in regulatory
policy away from the traditional conceptualization of the local
depository institution, reliance upon the account as support for
repeal of the CRA evokes two related hazards. First, given that
most households and small and medium-sized businesses obtain
their financial services from local institutions, much of the descrip-
tive power of antilocalist argument against the CRA falters. It is
difficult to think of the CRA as mandating a "return" to local
banking when most institutions have yet to leave their local niche.
Any shift, then, is overstated or at least premature. Advocating
285 See Kennickell & Starr-McCluer, supra note 280, at 867 (stating that data on
family finances "show a large decrease in [families'] ownership of certificates of
deposit... along with a strong offsetting rise in ownership of mutual funds"); Mack,
supra note 271, at 1012 (stating that mutual funds challenge the traditional role of
banks by offering "an important investment option for household savings and an
important funding source for corporations and state and local governments").
Federal law significantly restricts, but does not entirely preclude, bank participation
in the mutual fund industry. See id. at 1009-11.
2"8 See Elliehausen & Wolken, supra note 278, at 174 (noting that "[t]he high
percentage of local institutions [used] for the [household] main checking account
suggests that transaction costs may indeed make nonlocal institutions imperfect
substitutes for at least some financial services"); Elliehausen & Wolken, supra note
281, at 805 (noting that search costs are one factor that leads to small, rather than
large, firms to use services provided by local institutions).
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repeal of the CRA by reference to the assertedly nonlocal character
of the modern financial institution is a highly debatable claim.
Beyond the descriptive shortcomings of the antilocalist argu-
ment against the CRA lies a more fundamental weakness. Even to
the extent that the shift from a local to a national character
adequately depicts today's financial services industry,
reconceptualizing the nature and extent of legal intervention on the
basis of such a shift has significant social and cultural implications
that the economic account of intermediation fails to address. The
antilocalist, economic argument against the CRA assumes that local
areas will somehow effectively be served in the absence of the CRA,
most probably through the market, and thus implicitly recognizes
and validates the normative importance of access to financial
services. The vitality of this assumption is problematic when viewed
historically. The premise that, absent the CRA, areas with demand
for credit or deposit services will be served by existing institutions
or by other forms of institutions that will step in to fill the gap is
contingent upon the existence of a freely functioning market
unaffected by biases or other informational constraints. Yet, the
tortured history of the effort to check credit discrimination suggests
that this condition has not been present historically, and recent
evidence strongly compels the view that it does not exist today."'
Given this, the antilocalist argument against the CRA, in addition
to being descriptively questionable, fails on prescriptive grounds as
well. Although implicitly recognizing the importance of access to
credit, its necessary precondition of a market to provide universal
access is an invention out of touch with historical reality.
This is not to say that the economic, antilocalist critique of the
CRA lacks merit or, more mildly, is not instructive. Credit
discrimination in many cases results from unintentional biases or
other kinds of imperfect or incomplete information rather than
from intentional, invidious discrimination.2 8 The costs to the
27 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing data collected under the
HMDA and showing racial disparities in loan denial rates).
2ss See, e.g., SUSAN E. RODBURG & RICHARD C. WALKER, III, FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF BOSTON, CLOSING THE GAP: A GUIDE TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LENDING
(1993) ("Overt discrimination in mortgage lending is rarely seen today. Discrimina-
tion is more likely to be subtle, reflected in the failure to market loan products to
potential minority customers and the failure of lenders to hire and promote staff
."); ef Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 634 (1993) ("Small initial
discriminations, even if entirely rational, can easily lead to a situation wherein severe
discrimination is rampant[,] ... without any extra-market assumptions or dark
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financial services industry under the CRA and the anticompetitive
effects that government intervention may have are certainly factors
that should weigh into the calculus of the appropriate scope of
legislative intervention. Rather, the economic antilocalist argument
does not by itself persuasively dictate repeal of the CRA.
B. A Communitarian Defense
The name of the Act itself-Community Reinvestment-suggests
a perspective on the CRA based upon community, community
rights, or community empowerment that is subtly grounded in com-
munitarian theory," 9 although the full scope of the communitar-
ian position remains, as yet, vague. As a matter of general political
theory, communitarianism substitutes the liberal emphasis on the
individual with a focus upon community, presumably as the basis for
determining the proper scope of legal rights and duties. 290  A
defense of, or critique of, communitarian theory and the communi-
tarian state is beyond the scope of this Article. While as yet not
fully developed, a communitarian perspective on the CRA would
seek to normatively justify the CRA and, more importantly, would
provide a framework for advancing an enforcement scheme for the
CRA or for critiquing existing enforcement efforts. However, the
communitarian position has a number of flaws that call into
question its validity as ajustification for regulatory intervention.
Communitarian theory applied to financial institution regulation
attempts to positively reconstruct the antilocalist critique discussed
in the previous section. 291  The very general communitarian
conclusions about human nature.").
219 See generally Taibi, Community Economic Empowerment, supra note 30 (examining
the structure of the financial system from a community empowerment viewpoint);
Taibi, Communitarianism and Banking Regulation, supra note 30, at 1107, 1114-17
(same).
I See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, The Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law
Reform for African-Americans, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1217-22 (1994) (discussing
competing visions of communitarianism and of a communitarian state); Allen E.
Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852, 855-61
(1989) (discussing pillars of communitarianism); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law,
Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 687 (1992) ("[W]hat it
means to be a communitarian in the law remains extremely opaque.").
"1 Claims of community frequently are met with the rather pejorative rejoinder
of "localism." See, e.g.,Joseph L. Sax, Do Communities Have Rights? The National Parks
as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 500-01 (1984) ("[Our notion of
community is strongly tied to localism, and the chips are strongly stacked against
localism in American law.").
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position on the CRA might begin:
Local communities ought to receive special treatment from local
financial institutions in the provision of credit because those
institutions have an obligation to serve the needs of their commu-
nity. Financial institutions are not (or should not be viewed as)
autonomous, self-interested actors responsive solely to the vagaries
of the market. Rather, they are cultural, social and political
participants in community life. The recognition by Congress in
the preamble to the CRA that institutions "have [a] continuing and
affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered"292 not only incorpo-
rates this position but also is correct.
The debate over "disinvestment" which led to enactment of the CRA
embodies the communitarian premise that communities have a right
to ample credit from their local financial institution.293 A require-
ment of "reinvestment" by local institutions subtly supports the
communitarian notion that communities should be serviced in some
special sense by their local financial institutions. Yet, this position
relies upon two interrelated assumptions about the character and
desires of communities and financial institutions, both of which are
erroneous when pushed to the point that the communitarian
position advocates.
Disinvestment first presumes that all, or at least a substantial
majority of, communities of depositors desire to receive from their
investments returns related to goals other than profit maximization
and safety. Assume that a financial institution located in community
X has a choice between two investment opportunities, one a loan to
an individual X in community X and one a loan to an individual Y
in community Y. The choice between investment opportunities
would hinge on which investment would bring the institution and
its investors the highest yield, given considerations of risk.
Therefore, absent intervention in the institution's decision, the
institution would make the loan in X when that loan is more
profitable than one in Y.
' 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (1988); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text
(discussing the congressional findings memorialized in the CRA, particularly the
requirement that regulated institutions meet the "convenience" and "needs" of their
communities).
293 Nonetheless, a congressional intent to check "disinvestment" through the CRA
is substantially debatable given the rejection of the concept of PSSA prior to
enactment of the CRA. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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The disinvestmentjustification for the CRA would posit that the
institution's initial decision for some reason should be affected by
the fact that the institution is geographically situated in community
X. In other words, the institution should make the loan to X even
if a loan to community Y might be more profitable, given consider-
ations of risk. Most frequently, the institution's alleged obligation
is grounded in the claim that the institution receives its deposits
from investors in community X rather than from other communities:
hence the terms disinvestment and reinvestment. This assertion
relies upon two assumptions: first, that the institution in fact
receives its deposits from community X and, second, that those
investors from community X would prefer the community invest-
ment irrespective of profit and risk. Whether institutional deposit
bases have remained predominantly local, a precondition to the
occurrence of "disinvestment," is a debatable point.294  Even
assuming that the institution receives its funds for investment from
its local community, the disinvestment rationale for intervention
fails for another reason. It relies upon an inexplicable proposition
that, if a loan to community Ywould be better than one to commu-
nity X, depositors in community X nonetheless would prefer a lower
yielding or less secure investment in community X rather than the
more profitable or safer one elsewhere. Yet, whether local
communities would prefer the less profitable or riskier investment
remains debatable.29 5 There is no evidence that investors from
any specific community wish to sacrifice the profit or security from
I Intuitively, the assumption of a local deposit base seems accurate, given the
local service area of many depository institutions. Seesupra text accompanying notes
278-83 (discussing the extent to which banks have retained important roles in their
local service areas). Little empirical work has been done to address this point.
However, a 1992 report by the Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now ("ACORN") that utilized publicly available deposit information did seek to tie
institutions' deposit bases to their lending patterns. See ACORN, TAKE THE MONEY
AND RUN: THE SIPHONING OF DEPOSITS FROM MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS IN 14
CITIES (1992) [hereinafter ACORN STUDY], reprinted in 2 SENATE PRINT, supra note
5, at 159. The ACORN Study concluded that only four cents of every dollar on
deposit in predominantly minority neighborhoods were "reinvested" in those
communities, while in predominantly white neighborhoods, nearly eight cents of
every dollar on deposit were reinvested. See id. at 160. As with other similar studies,
however, the ACORN Study did not correlate amounts on deposit in neighborhood
institutions with the residence of the depositor. See id. at 167. Thus, whether the
deposits actually came from residents within the specific community is a matter of
conjecture.
" See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 309-10 ("[Ilt is difficult to see why
communities in general suffer a net harm when funds are transferred between them
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their investment to subsidize reinvestment in their own communi-
ty." Yet, that is what the reinvestment view of the CRA at its
extreme would dictate.
In addition to speculating erroneously that communities of
depositors as a general matter desire their deposits to be placed in
investments other than those that are the most profitable or secure,
the reinvestment position assumes also that the financial institutions
regulated under the CRA should themselves seek objectives other
than to maximize their own economic advantage. Under this view
of financial institutions, institutions should make lending decisions
on grounds other than credit risk,2 9 7 such as perhaps an altruistic
desire to "support" their community. Even if certain depositors do
have a desire to see their funds put to use in the community-an
"altruistic community"-it is inexplicable to transform the entire
financial services industry through the CRA to accommodate those
particular depositors.
A recent communitarian perspective on the CRA attempted to
transcend the limitations of the communitarian reinvestment
position by creating a new paradigm for financial institution
regulation based upon "community empowerment." 298 Under this
view, the underlying focus for financial institution-related policy and
government initiatives, as well as the context by which the CRA is
to be understood and reformed, would be whether local communi-
ties are empowered. 299 From this general principle, the communi-
2' This is not as individualist and anticommunity as it initially may sound, for
particular groups of people may have a desire for income over growth, depending
upon their particular needs. For example, the elderly often might prefer income over
growth. Similarly, a geographic area may value the higher income over modest
infrastructure improvement.
"" Cf Taibi, Community Economic Empowerment, supra note 30, at 1479 (deeming
the assessment of credit risk or creditworthiness "a cultural, meritocratic 'thing'").
Taibi grossly misconstrues the concept of credit risk, incorrectly rejecting the
possibility of consensus on any neutral, objective standards of credit risk and
therefore improperly reducing the whole of the business of banking to gut-level
intuitions leading to a handshake and a character loan. See id. at 1514. Clearly
consensus can be reached as to some objective standards. For example, an individual
whose monthly income is less than the amount required to service the debt is a poor
credit risk. While cultural factors can and do bear, often invidiously, on what
constitutes "income," certainly the underlying objective "creditworthiness" test is
conceptually sound.
See id. at 1541 (advocating paradigm shift).
The specifics of the "community empowerment" paradigm are intentionally left
vague. See id. One specific articulation of the proper regulatory approach would be
the following government statement to local communities: Here are the tools, go do
it yourself. See id. at 1543.
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tarian agenda would seek to protect local communities from
disinvestment and encourage investment in local communities,
3 0 0
to establish local control of financial institutions, 30 and to resist
the nationalization, if not globalization, of the financial services
industry. 2
By focusing on community economic needs rather than on
reinvestment of community deposits, the empowerment position
superficially seems to evade the conceptual limitations of the notion
of "reinvestment." Yet, the funds which are to be used to "empow-
er" the community would come from the depositors themselves,
presumably members of the community. It is difficult to see how
the arguments undercutting the reinvestment position do not
equally apply to the community empowerment perspective. In
essence, the empowerment model would allow the local community
to extract profits from its own individual members. Whether, as a
matter of regulatory policy, the community commonweal should
universally prevail over individual member interests is questionable.
Even if one accepts the proposition that individuals are constructed
at least to some degree through their communal associations, the
proposition that the local community good always should supervene
over individual interests whenever the two collide in lending or
investment decisions is inexplicable, if not an alarming challenge to
personal autonomy and dignity. Reversion to vague ideological
rhetoric about "empowering communities," without more, scarcely
can allay such concerns.
It is therefore a highly debatable move to view the Act, in spite
of its name, as reflecting an underlying ideal of community
empowerment, community development, or community reinvest-
ment. Its failure to bring about that ideal should not be seen as a
failure in the Act or its enforcement. 303 Perhaps as a reflection of
'o See id. at 1466-68 (suggesting that community "investment" and "disinvestment"
are normatively relevant).
See id. at 1469 (advocating creation and reinforcement of "financial institutions
that are community specific in their control, whether in the form of a broad-based
community organization or simply a local business elite focused on profits but
informed by a sense of its cultural roots").
"2 See id. at 1517-20.
s' See id. at 1511-14 (criticizing the narrowness of CRA vision). Indeed,
communitarian proposals for modifications of the CRA reveal the inconsistencies of
the community empowerment model of the CRA. For example, Tony Taibi argues
in favor of "a determinate requirement that institutions invest a set portion of their
funds in approved investments." Id. at 1504, 1507-09. Because the CRA covers both
large, nationally based institutions as well as small, local institutions, such an
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the shortcomings of the communitarian position, the CRA in the
past did little to validate it. Even assuming that depositors in the
hypothetical community X should in fact prefer investment in their
own community regardless of wealth maximization or safety,
whether for altruistic reasons or because of a desire to subsidize
development in community X, the CRA enforcement regime (prior
to the most recent revisions) fell far short of accommodating that
preference. The CRA clearly was not intended to allocate credit by
requiring the institution to make the loan to community X when
substantially more profitable investments exist elsewhere.3 0 4 It is
therefore not surprising that loans made under the original CRA
regime have been found to be as profitable as non-CRA loans, if not
more profitable.30 5
The initiative to modify CRA enforcement from its original
effort-based focus toward one focusing on actual lending threatens
to take the CRA closer to the extreme communitarian position,
which itself relies upon a mistaken articulation of community
desires and institutional structure. Basing an institution's rating at
least presumptively on actual loans made provides a great incentive
for institutions to make community loans for the sake of communi-
ty, rather than on the basis of safe and sound banking principles.
The express emphasis on community development loans, invest-
ments, and services also hints at a regulatory move toward the
communitarian position. At the same time, consumer lending has
been given short shrift, at least when compared to community
development types of lending. Yet, the picture that the community
rights position on the CRA paints of all communities being
interested in community development lending rather than profit
and risk is erroneous.
approach threatens smaller institutions, the precise institutions the modifications wish
to protect. Yet, Taibi gives only brief mention to possible exemptions from the
mandatory investment requirement. See id. at 1508 (suggesting in passing that "small
independent community banks" might receive an exemption). At the same time, it
is hard to conceive that federal regulatory definition of "approved community invest-
ments" for the entire country will either result in reduced bureaucracy or the commu-
nity empowerment end to which Taibi's vision of the financial services industry
points.
304 Seesupra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (discussing the initial controversy
over whether the CRA would lead to credit allocation and the vociferous congressio-
nal refutation of such fears).
" See supra note 51 (discussing recent evidence indicating that CRA loans are not
only "safe" but even profitable).
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Altruistic communities of depositors do in fact exist. At the
same time, financial institutions do not rigidly order their sense of
moral obligations toward community solely on the basis of a balance
sheet. The risk posed by moving the GRA toward results, if
enforced in the name of community rights, is that the community
model will be imposed with broad strokes upon depositors,
communities, and institutions who do not wish to see local invest-
ment occurring at the expense of profit or safety. While altruistic
investors need to be linked to altruistic institutions,"0 6 transform-
ing the entire financial services industry to accommodate those
preferences denies other communities, individuals, and institutions
the ability to pursue their own desires. In sum, primary reliance
upon a strong notion 0 7 of "community" to critique or justify the
CRA or to develop a model for CRA enforcement is misplaced. The
communitarian position begins with the tenuous premise that the
institution is investing the community's funds, and mistakenly
considers all depositors to be primarily altruistic, desiring reinvest-
ment over profit or safety. At the same time, financial institutions
are required to play a role which they simply are functionally unable
to play and which also acts to the detriment of many communities.
To the extent that the new CRA enforcement regime is interpreted
to move us closer to "community," it is a wrong step, in the wrong
direction.
C. Equality
The flawed dialectic of antilocalism and community that has
driven the CRA to date has not only served to hinder significantly
any meaningful maturation of the Act but also to mask the sense of
equality that surrounded its enactment. Regard for equality can be
' See infra part IV.C (discussing the role of community development corporations
and community development financial institutions in promoting altruistic investment
in local communities).
087 A softer communitarian argument in favor of the CRA might provide that, if
all things otherwise are exactly equal between investments in community X and
community Y, the institution's own community should have a superior claim for
investment. This softer approach would avoid the problem that the more aggressive
communitarian position invokes in advocating community investment largely
irrespective of yield or risk. In addition, soft communitarianism renders the
institution's safety and soundness a less relevant concern. Thus, under this view a
community consciousness to lending is manifested at little cost to the financial
institution. In reality, though, it is hard to imagine conditions under which
investment opportunities could attain such identity as to warrant this decision
between X and Y.
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seen, albeit only subtly, in the references to the practice of redlining
in the legislative history of the CRA. 0 8 Recent data that reveal
significantly disparate lending patterns based upon race 0 9 (regard-
less of how rational the practice that those patterns reflect may be)
have begun to clarify the connection between equality and the law
of financial institutions.
Is credit a significant enough resource that we should care in
any meaningful sense about inequalities involving the provision of
credit? As the principal suppliers of credit to consumers and
smaller businesses, local depository institutions play an important
social, as well as economic, role. Affordable access to those
financial services has dramatic ramifications for the quality of lives.
The example of the home mortgage finance industry illustrates the
intersection of the economic and social dimensions of banking.
Private home ownership in our society largely is attained through
incurrence of debt.3 1 An individual may desire the opportunity
to conduct her life in a private home because she values the
freedoms associated with private home ownership in our soci-
ety.31 ' Assume that persons X and Y prefer to reside in privately
owned homes. IfX is granted the opportunity (X obtains mortgage
financing) to acquire the home and Y is not (Y does not obtain
mortgage financing), X has been given the desired benefits of home
ownership while Y has been denied.
While the role of banks and other traditionally local lending
institutions in facilitating individual home ownership provides the
most salient example of this social dimension of banking, access to
other financial products traditionally provided by those institutions
has a profound effect on the ability of individuals and firms to
conduct their personal or business lives, as the case may be. For
example, low-income consumers' access to payment services,
through a checking account or otherwise, recently has become a
matter of concern.31 2 To the extent that we exclude individuals
311 See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
antiredlining theory, and divestment in general, in the development of the CRA).
o See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
310 Generally, the high cost of real estate makes acquisition financing essential to
its purchase. Even if the buyer of a home has sufficient liquid capital to purchase the
home outright, the tax benefits of home mortgage loans, as well as the lost
opportunity costs of investing the funds elsewhere, make debt acquisition highly
attractive.
51 See generally Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 295 (1991) (examining the relationship between homelessness, freedom, and the
rules of private and public property).31 2 See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline Banking Controversy: Putting
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from the payment system either through lack of access to a provider
of payment services or access only at unaffordable cost or unaccept-
able risk,"'3 it becomes an issue of social equity. Similarly, the
cost at which small businesses are able to obtain access to credit
products directly affects those businesses' abilities to compete and
to expand.
The point is not that credit and other financial products are as
essential for survival as food and shelter. We have been trans-
formed culturally, though, to accept a general ethic of debt.
Accordingly, the ability of borrowers, whether individual consumers
or firms, to obtain credit and other financial services and products
does have a moral dimension. Access to capital allows borrowers to
exploit their assets and facilitates transformation of individual
desires into concrete reality-a house, an education, a business, a
livelihood. Denial of any one of these ultimate objects, itself, on
other than warranted grounds, is certainly cause for a clamor.
Therefore, denial of the conventional means to acquire the same
object-credit-should raise equally vociferous objections." 4
Deregulation to Workfor the Low-Income Consumer, 67 IND. LJ. 213 (1992) (arguing that
lifeline banking proposals can be strengthened and made more accessible to low-
income consumers by deregulating the financial services industry).
'" The real problem is not one of exclusion from the payment system, but rather
one of cost and safety. When traditional depository institutions withdraw from areas,
other enterprises jump in to serve the demand for payment services. However, some
evidence suggests that these substitutes are both more expensive and riskier:
A basic bank account costs less than cashing two paychecks a month and
buying five money orders to pay bills. Check cashing businesses also do not
provide a safe place to keep money, opportunities to earn interest, or access
to credit. Further, money order vendors that do business with check
cashing establishments are not insured or protected as banks are. Last year
[1991], two L.A. money order companies went bankrupt and as a result the
money orders that low-income people had purchased with cash to pay rent
and utility bills simply bounced.
1992 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 115 (testimony of Gilda Haas, Communities for
Accountable Reinvestment).
Access to payment services appears to track wealth and race. Fewer lower-
income and minority families maintain checking accounts than higher-income and
white families. Preliminary data indicate that in 1992 an average of 87.5% of families
had some sort of transaction account, in contrast to only 63.7% of families with
incomes lower than $10,000 per year. See Kennickell & Starr-McCluer, supra note
280, at 869 tbl. 5. Similarly, although 93.1% of white families maintained a
transaction account, only 67.5% of nonwhite and Hispanic families did. See id. The
data from 1992 indicate that the percentage of nonwhite, low-income families that
have a transaction account has increased slightly from 1989. See id. at 868-69 tbl. 5.
s4 Cf McCaffery, supra note 288, at 649 ("Where individuals are blocked by
market failures from pursuing their life plans, efficiency talk loses much of its
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If equality matters in the provision of credit (and it does and
should), legislatively reconciling the aims of equality with the
institutional function of financial institutions is a difficult task. One
need not venture far into political philosophy and constitutional
theory to discover that the meaning of "equality" and intervention
on the basis of equality is widely debated. 15 Moved into the more
concrete arena of financial institution regulation, the more precise
issue might be posed as one of differential treatment of individuals
by institutions whose very existence is based upon the ability to
differentiate-or discriminate-between good borrowers and bad
borrowers. Legislative intervention in the name of equality that too
heavily intercedes with this differentiating role of institutions in the
granting of credit threatens the essential economic nature of those
institutions. It is precisely this economic function that must be
exercised to distribute capital and financial services to all who need
them. Equality and the differentiating role of financial institutions
therefore are inherently always in tension. Excessive intervention
into otherwise private credit decisions in the name of equality may
ultimately weaken the form of institution that provides credit and,
with it, the ability of borrowers to obtain credit. Failure to inter-
vene in the face of disparate treatment, though, risks contravening
our social commitment to the principle of equality.
This uneasy alliance between preserving the institutional
providers of credit and ensuring equality provides an underlying
guide for assessing proposals for regulating bank lending decisions.
It particularly illuminates the improvidence of a broad, redistribu-
tive model for intervening into the affairs of banks and other
financial institutions. Those institutions are designed to exploit the
inequalities between potential borrowers, and their economic
existence is predicated upon making decisions based upon assessing
the relative risk of any borrower. Intervention that aggressively
pursues redistributive goals irrespective of any concomitant
efficiency losses is perilous. Accomplishing a wholesale redistribu-
tion of resources through financial institution regulation ultimately
can come only through transforming financial institutions from
normative appeal.").
315 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974);JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (discussing equality in the context of antidiscrimination
laws).
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assessors of risk to conduits for redistribution. Yet, it is the ability
of these institutions to assess risk that makes them socially and
economically valuable. Even if a wholesale redistribution of
resources in the name of equality were viewed as warranted as a
general social matter, designating the financial institutions that
provide credit to bear the costs of such a result conflicts directly
with the very reason why we want these institutions to exist,
resulting in great social cost to all.
Although ensuring equality in credit through legislative
intervention into a bank's decision should not mean in any strong
sense that X and Y, above, have an equal right to receive credit from
any particular institution, some might argue at the other extreme
against intervention entirely. Under this view, the market would
provide the best solution to the documented problems of rational
or irrational credit discrimination.3 16  Whether redistribution
should be through other means would be an issue wholly separate
from the anti-intervention stance on financial institutions law. Yet
a full commitment to the moral importance of credit and the ability
of persons and firms to compete freely in the market for credit
make it hard to stand for such an extreme market-based posi-
tion,3 1 7 particularly if a modest intervention that satisfactorily
balances the institutional function of credit-providers with the social
goal of equal treatment can be found.
That more modest position between the extremes of aggressive
redistribution and anti-intervention does exist. The dimension of
social equality intersects with the economic risk assessment function
of financial institutions at two general points. First, the economic
function of financial intermediation creates the need for equality of
access to the services provided. Once a niche in the provision of
financial services has been developed, inequalities that merit
intervention may emerge if access to financial intermediaries is
barred or made more costly. Barring potential borrowers' access to
a commercial bank's expertise in valuing assets, for example,
renders those borrowers unable to liquidate those assets in an
" See McCaffery, supra note 288, at 635 (describing the anti-interventionist
position on employment discrimination laws as the view that "markets are apt to work
their way to a better answer, even in the presence of market failures, than govern-
ment intervention can provide"); Swire, supra note 81 (describing economists' views
on the market).
"17 Cf McCaffery, supra note 288, at 654 ("No normatively powerful concept of
efficiency should compel society to accept the distortions wrought by decades, even
centuries, of discrimination.").
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economically advantageous manner. Access only at higher cost or
risk raises the costs incurred in capitalizing on the value of those
assets. Ensuring equality of access at this very basic conceptual level
does not conflict with the economic function of the institution in
the strong manner that the broad redistributive argument, above,
does.
3 18
The second point at which equality and the differentiating
function of financial institutions can coexist is with respect to
equality of opportunity. In this area, though, the economic function
of financial intermediaries threatens to conflict with the need for
equality of opportunity. Even when equality of access exists, the
economic function of financial intermediaries dictates broad
discretion for institutions in pricing financial services and in setting
the conditions under which those services are to be provided. As
discussed above, commercial banks have developed an expertise in
assessing the credit risk of potential borrowers due to their skill in
valuing assets or other means of assessing the default risk associated
with a particular loan. 19 Legal intervention into this area of
expertise particularly threatens the differentiating and risk assess-
ment role of institutions. Yet, failure to intervene when the
evaluative techniques are inconsistently applied to particular
borrowers or classes of borrowers permits equally troubling
differential treatment of borrowers.
Ensuring equality of opportunity therefore risks a conflict with
an essential function-discrimination-of lending institutions. As an
example of the uneasy coexistence of equality of opportunity and
the function of financial institutions in providing credit, reconsider
the instance of X and Y applying for a home acquisition mortgage
at the same financial institution, with X's application being
approved and Y's being denied. As an initial matter, a generic
inequality of opportunity exists-X has the opportunity to purchase
a home and Y does not, absent independent means of purchasing
the property or a successful loan application elsewhere. The more
problematic question is what equality of opportunity should require
with regard to intervention in this differential treatment.
s18 The costs born by institutions in ensuring equal access, however, are indeed
relevant. See infra part III.A.1-2. (discussing the search costs involved in disseminat-
ing information within the institution's community and identifying potentially good
investments therein).
"
9 Seesupra text accompanying notes 259-68 (discussing the traditional conception
of banks as intermediaries in the provision of credit, through their role as assessors
of credit risk).
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Disparity between these two individuals in mortgage treatment
may arise for a myriad of reasons. First, X may simply have easy
geographic access to a source for mortgage finance and Y either
does not or only does at a high cost.3 20 X's purchase, given X's
financial position, credit history, and collateral may constitute a
better credit risk than Y's. If X and Y are in an unequal financial
position or have offered different collateral, the economic nature of
lending dictates that an institution have broad discretion in
evaluating the loan application. If X has sufficient income to service
the debt and Y does not, 21 intervention into the bank's decision
to approve X's loan application and to deny I's-in effect overruling
the independent credit assessment of the institution-intrudes into
the institution's ability to assess credit risk. A similar intrusion
occurs if the bank's decision was based upon a determination that
X's collateral created a less risky investment for its depositors.
Excessive intervention into the bank's discretion in determining
which borrowers constitute good investments and which constitute
bad investments would overrule the institution's expertise in assess-
ing investments and in diversifying its portfolio to maximize the
returns to its investors within an acceptable level of risk. Regulatory
limitations in pursuit of equality of opportunity that either preclude
institutions from making investments that they would otherwise
make, or compel institutions to make investments that they
otherwise would not make, hazard diminished returns to investors
and, consequently, undermine the competitive position of financial
institutions. In this regard, equality of access may be undermined
when equality of opportunity is pursued too aggressively.
In some cases inequalities may result from differential treatment
of X and Y not based on legitimate factors of credit risk. The
ECOA's imposition of the antidiscrimination norm3 22 into credit
520 For example, X may live in a community that has a number of easily accessible
bank branches that engage in mortgage loan origination, whereas Ymay have to travel
to another area to apply for a loan and incur the cost of investigating the unfamiliar
mortgage lender.
s2' Financial institutions use a statistical practice of credit scoring in assessing
whether or not to grant a loan. See generally CREDIT SCORING AND CREDIT CONTROL
(L.L. Thomas et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter CREDIT SCORING]. While income
sufficient to service the debt is predictive of good credit, other predictive variables
include employment status and category, past delinquencies, and years at present
address. See J.N. Crook et al., A Comparison of Discriminators Under Alternative
Definitions of Credit Default, in CREDIT SCORING, supra, at 203, 218 tbl. 1.
" See supra note 76 (discussing the ECOA's provisions against discrimination in
lending).
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decisions is the most obvious reflection of our commitment to the
principle of equality of opportunity as it applies to credit decisions.
The imposition of the antidiscrimination norm through the CRA,
however, has generated much objection. 28 While not denying
that discrimination in lending is an issue of tremendous social
implications, these critics argue either that Congress did not intend
the CRA to be an antidiscrimination statute,3 24 or that what is
needed is stronger enforcement of the ECOA to ensure equality of
opportunity (rather than incorporation of equality of opportunity
within the CRA). 25
The attention in the CRA debates and hearings to the problem
of redlining-which can be related to irrational, discriminatory
practices-makes it plain that Congress was aware of the interrela-
tionship between the CRA, credit needs, and discrimination.3
26
The absence of an express antidiscrimination intent for the CRA
therefore is not as problematic as these critics would assert and is
consistent with the legislative history of the Act.
27
323 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 298-99 (finding no indication in the
legislative history of the CRA that Congress intended to mandate a general
prohibition on discrimination in lending); id. at 337-40 (criticizing enforcement of the
antidiscrimination norm); White, supra note 28, at 290 (arguing that the
antidiscrimination norm is not justifiably part of the CRA, but rather is part of the
ECOA).
"24 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 299 & n.20 (arguing that the CRA was
intended to shape lending patterns to benefit communities, rather than to remedy
racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination).
325 See White, supra note 28, at 290 (arguing that discrimination in lending would
be better handled by vigorous enforcement of the ECOA rather than by less direct
regulatory methods offered by the CRA).
s'6 See supra text accompanying notes 92-105 (discussing evidence that the CRA
was initially aimed at both redlining and disinvestment).
127 Macey and Miller state, "[a]s the title of the statute indicates, the focus of the
legislation was on the problem of depository institutions shipping funds outside the
areas in which the funds were obtained." Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 299. The
authors conclude from this language (and from other legislative history that is equally
unpersuasive) that there is no persuasive indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended to combat discrimination. See id.
This author does not find the absence of an antidiscrimination norm in the title
of the CRA troubling from a perspective of legislative intent. Selection of a rhetori-
cally appealing name that has little to do with the substance of the legislation is a
time-honored legislative tradition. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 247, at 247 (naming
Truth-in-Lending "a public relations masterstroke"); id. at 283-84 (deriding invocation
of"Truth" as a goal of Truth-in-Lending Act). In addition, the statement in the Act
that institutions have an obligation to meet community credit needs has sufficient
textual flexibility to admit virtually any underlying justification for that obligation.
It is questionable, given the rejection of the PSSA, that any strong disinvestment
rationale survived enactment. See supra text accompanying notes 102-16 (discussing
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The second objection to incorporating an antidiscrimination
intent into the CRA is that the ECOA alone should be sufficient to
redress problems of credit discrimination. The ECOA, however, has
proven to be an extremely ineffective means of ameliorating
discrimination in credit decisions. 328 Even assuming that more
vigorous enforcement of the ECOA has begun, its prohibitory
mechanism in policing discrimination comes up short as a complete
solution to the problems of access and opportunity. Given the
subtlety with which most discrimination in lending now occurs,
"examiners can be expected to uncover only the most flagrant
abuses." 2 ' Hence, reliance upon the ECOA's prohibitions as the
cure to the problem of equality of opportunity in lending is
misplaced. Moreover, the ECOA fails to address the problem of
equality of access in any significant respect. Even if opportunity
were to be ensured through the ECOA-and the statute's efficacy in
providing such insurance is dubious-access remains unaddressed by
the ECOA. Something more is needed to ensure equality of
opportunity and equality of access, and that should be the CRA.
A commitment to equality and the subsidiary principles of access
and opportunity provide the best justification for the CRA's
intervention into a financial institution's decision to grant credit.
These principles are reflected in the ECOA and, unlike community
or localism, provide the most defensible construction of the largely
ambiguous legislative history of the CRA. Accordingly, the fashion-
able debate over localism versus community, which has served only
to stifle the CRA to date, should be rejected and the CRA recon-
structed as a proper (at least initially) and justified legislative
attempt to secure equality of access and opportunity. The question
then arises of how the CRA should be implemented and enforced
to meet the demands of equality of access and opportunity.
the proposal for PSSA and its ultimate rejection). Although the original Act did not
initially mention race and gender, subsequent amendments to the Act expressly
mention race and gender as factors meriting CRA consideration. See supra text
accompanying notes 42-46 (discussing the 1991 and 1992 amendments).
528 See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms and studies of
the effectiveness of the ECOA).
5
2 MUNNELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 4.
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III. ASSESSING THE CRA
As discussed in the previous section, the CRA is best viewed as
an antidiscrimination statute evidencing an intent to ensure equality
of access and equality of opportunity in the granting of credit. Yet,
those bare principles provide little guidance for properly construct-
ing a CRA that accommodates that end. This Part will first address
the scope of the principle of equality of access and the means by
which the old and new enforcement schemes accommodate, or fail
to accommodate, that principle. A discussion of how the CRA
should further equality of opportunity follows. Finally, the
enforcement role of consumer groups under the CRA will be
addressed.
A. Access
Any meaningful construction of the principle of equality of
access should begin with ensuring individuals geographic access to
financial institutions. Yet, "access" also has a more subtle connota-
tion based not solely upon geographic access, but also upon access
to information about the financial institution and the services and
products that it provides. Geographic access and informational
access will be discussed in turn.
1. Geographic Access
Geographic access to financial institutions should simply be a
result of demand. If profitable investments could be made in any
particular area, then geographic access ipso facto is served.3 0
Conversely, when that area does not present profitable investment
opportunities, creating access is superfluous, not to mention costly.
Under this view, regulation that requires institutions to provide
access countermands the natural operation of the market and,
therefore, is unwarranted. Intervention to remedy the economic
marginalization of geographic areas also would be rejected: the area
as a whole either provides no profitable investment opportunities
(compared to others available), or the costs of identifying potentially
good investments within the area are so high as to render any
... See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 308-09 (questioning why local
institutions are not exploiting local investment opportunities "if there are good profit
opportunities available locally and readily identifiable at low cost"); Swire, supra note
81 (discussing economic views on incentives for exploiting profit opportunities).
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investment there undesirable. Accordingly, the CRA-either by
mandating loans in otherwise less profitable ventures or by
requiring institutions to incur search costs for investments that they
otherwise would not make-unjustifiably interferes with the market
in creating access.
Yet, once again, this argument assumes a market for credit far
out of touch with historical reality. That CRA loans (at least until
now) have proven to be as creditworthy and profitable as non-CRA
loans33 1 undermines the claims that demand adequately would be
met absent intervention and the claim that the CRA (at least as
originally enforced) required an institution to make less-profitable
investments than it otherwise would have made. The successes of
the CRA provide evidence that at least some institutions were in fact
failing to address demand in their own neighborhoods. Ensuring
geographic access to financial service providers therefore raises the
issue of to what extent, and how, the CRA should be structured to
encourage institutions to serve areas in which access is limited.
Under the initial regulatory enforcement regime, the CRA in
fact required institutions to incur search costs that they otherwise
would not have expended, absent intervention."3 2 Yet, that regime
did not require institutions to make investments that they otherwise
would not have made in the exercise of business judgment. These
enforcement efforts did not compromise-and in fact they respect-
ed-the institutional function of financial institutions while facilitat-
ing access at largely nominal cost.
333
Instead of focusing on how to reduce the costs of facilitating
access to credit, the new enforcement scheme shifts from measuring
access by efforts to measuring access by results in actual lending.
33 4
The Lending Test, which measures certain loans actually made and
which is given the greatest weight in an institution's overall CRA
rating,3 5 as well as the Service Test33 6 appear to be attempts to
measure how well an institution creates geographic access. The
3"1 See supra note 51 (discussing evidence of the performance of CRA loans).
... See Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 36 (recognizing search costs imposed on
lending institutions by the CRA).
"' See supra note 177 (citing evidence that the old CRA enforcement regime
required relatively minimal costs of compliance).
334 See supra part I.B.2.a (explaining how recently proposed revisions to the CRA
regulations seek to evaluate financial institutions based on actual results in meeting
community credit needs rather than on effort expended).
s3- Seesupra text accompanying notes 185-94,206-07 (discussing the LendingTest
and its role in an institution's overall CRA rating).
336 See supra text accompanying notes 199-205 (discussing the Service Test).
1995] 1507
1508 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1431
results of access being provided admittedly are a more reliable
indicator of access than are data on efforts. Money out the door
surely means that there is access to credit. Yet, a results test is still
an ill-tailored indicator of the existence of actual access. Consider
the example of a low- and moderate-income geography that is
presently served by a small institution and a branch of a larger
institution. If demand is being met in the area, under the Lending
Test, the larger institution has the incentive to co-opt a share of
loans from the smaller institution. 37 Yet, access in fact was not
a problem in that particular geography. Results therefore can be a
meaningless, and overbroad, predictor of unmet demand.
If demand is not being met in the geography, it is hard to see
how measuring access through efforts is less satisfactory than using
results. The efforts-based standard led to actual results that were
consistent with safe and sound lending principles. 3 8 At the same
time, unmet demand can adequately be accommodated within any
efforts-based evaluation process. In addition to being an ill-tailored
monitor of demand, results may turn out to be more costly to
monitor, should the new regime lead to higher reporting and
enforcement costs. Moreover, emphasis on results gives institutions
an incentive either to abandon the criteria of safety and soundness
for the sake of a loan made, or to gerrymander assessment areas to
ensure adequate results.
True, regulators have indicated that problems of demand will be
factored into the results-based test.3 9 Presumably, therefore, an
institution will not be required to "buy" results from other institu-
tions or to make unsafe loans for the sake of community invest-
ment. Yet, with respect to geographic access, what might be
deemed a shifting of presumptions from efforts to results is a
dangerous move. The focus on efforts provided a reliable indicator
of access at what might be shown to be less cost than results, while
avoiding the overbreadth and expenses of the results-based test.
"' This incentive to "buy" CRA loans from other institutions has the curious, and
presumably unintended, effect of forcing smaller institutions into a competitively
disadvantageous position vis-4-vis larger institutions that wish to obtain a greater
number of loans for CRA evaluation purposes. See Claudia Cummins, Bankers Attack
CRA Plan as Unfair and Unworkable, AM. BANKER, Feb. 3, 1994, at 1, 3 (noting the
predatory effect of the December 1993 proposed Lending Test).
s" See supra note 51 (discussing recent data showing that CRA loans under the
efforts-based regime were frequently as safe or safer than conventional loans).
" See Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(b))
(stating the context in which the Federal Reserve Board should apply the proposed
tests and standards).
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One compelling argument raised against the CRA is that it
compels institutions to refrain from entry into communities that
have limited access to financial institutions. 4 According to this
argument, the CRA therefore contravenes its purpose to increase
access. Much of this point is overstated. First, the institution's
record of opening and closing branches was, and still is, proposed
to be part of the CRA evaluation process. 4 1 Accordingly, any
flight from, or reluctance to enter, underserved communities will
have negative effects on the institution's CRA rating and any
expansion plans that the institution may have in the future.
In addition to regulating bank entry into and exit from
underserved areas, the CRA, properly interpreted, acts subtly to
encourage branching in those areas. Branching in an area is a
highly effective means of acquiring information about potential
investments in that area. 42 Branching, therefore, might in some
instances be a way for the institution to reduce the CRA informa-
tion tax. Assume that an institution's service area includes
neighborhood Y. Under the old enforcement regime, the costs of
searching for information about creditworthy borrowers in
neighborhood Yin effect was imposed upon the institution. Under
the new regime, the goal of making loans without compromising
safety and soundness provides an incentive to acquire information
about potential borrowers in the area. If the costs of establishing
a branch in the neighborhood are less than the costs of indepen-
dently searching for information about potential borrowers in that
neighborhood, the institution would have an incentive to establish
the branch, and so viewed, the CRA actually encourages bank
branches in underserved areas.
Similarly, the Act discourages bank exit because exit is advisable
only when the costs of maintaining the branch to perform the
neighborhood's search function exceed the costs of conducting the
search absent a branch. Even if an institution were in fact to close
a branch, if the institution's service area still includes the area in
which the branch was located, the effort required by the CRA in
acquiring information about the neighborhood still exists. Accord-
" See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 314-15, 340-41 (arguing that the CRA
impedes entry into underserved communities).
341 See supra note 135 (discussing the assessment factors used to determine an
institution's CRA rating); supra note 203 (discussing the importance of an institution's
accessibility, based upon its record of opening and closing branches).
342 See, e.g., Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 29 (discussing the information-
gathering function of branches).
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ingly, even in the absence of a branch, potential borrowers in the
area are assured of some access to bank services through the search
efforts of the institution.
4
2. Information Access
Under the old regime, institutions were evaluated as to their
efforts to engage in dissemination of information concerning their
products. 44 Through these requirements, potential borrowers
were informed as to products available from that institution. There
may be a bank branch on every corner, but absent information
concerning products available to potential customers in the area,
the CRA's goals of equality of access are unmet. This is particularly
so for individuals who historically have been denied access to
credit.
3 45
The recent changes to CRA enforcement constitute a shift away
from ensuring informational access. Instead of focusing on how to
reduce the costs of information dissemination under the CRA, the
new regulations significantly abandon the information requirements
of the old regime. Some informational criteria may be considered
as factors under the Service Test.3 46 Even if the Service Test is
interpreted to encompass informational services, however, the
nominal weight that the Service Test carries in the overall rating
347
14' The entry/exit concern has its greatest validity when an institution is consider-
ing entry into an area that was previously not part of its CRA assessment area. If the
new regime is interpreted to require lending, entry into the area would result in
mandatory lending in that area, rendering the entry less profitable. Exit, which would
result in narrowing of the institution's CRA assessment area, is less problematic
because the exit would be considered in the CRA evaluation process.
-44 See supra notes 135 (listing the assessment factors used to determine an
institution's CRA rating), 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing the CRA rating
categories "ascertainment of community credit needs" and "marketing and types of
credit offered and extended").
" See supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting that, despite the ECOA,
evidence exists to show continued lending discrimination). A 1993 survey concerning
the ability of African-American business owners to raise capital found that "being
snubbed.., is pretty much the norm." Eugene Carlson, Turned Down, WALL ST.J.,
Feb. 19, 1993, at RI. Lack of information on sources of capital was cited as one
reason for the difficulties in raising capital. See id. at R5.
346 See, e.g., Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 228.120)) (defining community development services). The December 1993
proposal more explicitly accommodated information when it allowed an upward
adjustment in an institution's Service Test rating for credit support and counseling
services. See December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11, at 67,490 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.9(c)(2)).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 206-07 (stating how an institution's overall
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unjustifiably deemphasizes information. The shift to results under
the Lending Test also presumes that actual loans indicate adequate
provision of information to potential borrowers. Yet, as with
geographic access, results are an ill-tailored indicator of whether
information is in fact being provided. A loan may or may not
indicate successful information dissemination to borrowers.
In sum, with respect to geographic access and informational
access, the new turn to a results-based CRA may prove to be
excessive and unfortunate. The old efforts-based regime attempted
to create access while minimizing cost to the financial institution.
Results might be a reliable indicator of access to financial institu-
tions, but they may, as enforced, turn out to be overbroad and come
only at increased compliance and enforcement costs s48 The
emphasis on results might also compromise safety and soundness,
and might create an illusion of access where none really exists. At
its best, measuring CRA performance through results may only
accomplish the same end as an efforts-based regime, ultimately at
higher costs.
B. Opportunity
As stated above, ensuring equality of opportunity justifies the
incorporation of the antidiscrimination norm into the CRA.34 9
Some proposed reforms handle the antidiscrimination norm much
more effectively and directly than the prior regime did (in contrast
to their respective handlings of the equality of access norm
proposed by this Article). The old CRA assessment factors that
incorporated the antidiscrimination norm into the examination
process did provide some check on discriminatory practices beyond
that of the ECOA. The CRA thereby allowed a "second look" at an
institution's practices that resulted in denial of equal opportunity.
The problem with the old regime's approach to the
antidiscrimination norm was one of relative weight. Under the old
assessment factors, evidence of prohibited discrimination was
weighed equally with the other factors.35 Under this approach,
CRA rating is determined).
S48 See supra text accompanying notes 240-44 (arguing that the new enforcement
regime has these problems).
3'9 Seesupra text accompanying notes 319-29 (arguing that one of the foundations
of the CRA should be equality of opportunity).
s See supra notes 135 (stating the assessment factors used to determine an
institution's CRA rating), 143 (discussing the antidiscrimination factor, in particular).
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an institution that had engaged in illegal discrimination conceivably
could receive a "satisfactory" grade.
Yet, it seems clear that an institution that discriminates in the
manner that the ECOA prohibits has contravened the principle of
equality of opportunity, and therefore has transgressed the CRA.
Perhaps in recognition of the antidiscriminatory underpinnings of
the CRA, the revised enforcement regime properly attempts to
move away from the original enforcement approach. Under the
new regime, evidence of discrimination or other illegal practices will
factor into an institution's overall CRA rating.3 "5 The weighting
of the norm thus appears to have been strengthened somewhat to
enforce the antidiscrimination factor more effectively.
While this enhancement of the CRA's antidiscrimination norm
is a justifiable move toward ensuring equality of opportunity, the
full scope of the antidiscrimination norm and its relationship to the
eRA enforcement process are more problematic issues left unre-
solved by regulators. Certainly a legal finding of discrimination
should not be the only consideration related to credit discrimination
that factors into the CRA evaluation process. Evidence of discrimi-
nation, other than a legal finding of discrimination, accordingly
should bear significantly on the evaluation process. On the other
hand, an institution that has been found to have engaged in illegal
discrimination should merit a less than satisfactory rating, as
regulators first proposed in December 1993.352 Although the
3-1 Seesupra text accompanying notes 214,230,239 (discussing antidiscrimination
provisions applicable to all institutions, small institutions, and institutions' strategic
plans, respectively).
352 Under the December 1993 proposal, a finding of discrimination would have per
se resulted in a less than satisfactory grade. See December 1993 Proposed
Regulations, supra note 11, at 67,490 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.10(b)). The
proper burden of proof necessary to show discrimination that would have resulted
in this downgrading became an issue of controversy. The December 1993 proposals
suggested that the rating be downgraded only where an institution had "[e]ngaged in
a pattern or practice of illegal discrimination that it has not corrected fully" or where
it had "[c]ommitted an isolated act of illegal discrimination of which it has knowledge
and that it has not corrected fully or is not in the process of correcting fully." Id.
While this test surely encompassed disparate treatment on grounds prohibited by the
ECOA, consumer activists demanded that the test include situations of disparate
impact. See ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY REORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM Now
(ACORN), ANALYSIS OF THE NEW COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT (CRA) REGULA-
TIONS 25 (Jan. 1994) (unpublished briefing paper, on file with author). The provision
in the October proposal that "evidence" of discrimination would be an independent
consideration that would adversely affect the institution's overall CRA rating was the
resulting compromise. See 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 181, at 51,274 (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.28(c)).
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antidiscrimination norm properly seems to have been given greater
emphasis in the new enforcement scheme, the reservation of
substantial regulatory flexibility in determining the effect of
evidence of discrimination on an institution's rating and on applica-
tions subject to the CRA is disconcerting. This is especially true
given regulators' often inconsistent attitudes toward the ECOA in
reviewing recent applications of institutions charged with fair
lending violations.
35 3
The relationship between equality of opportunity and the CRA
has generated divergent views on the extent to which the opportuni-
ty principle should be implemented through the CRA. For example,
some have suggested that the CRA does, or should be interpreted
to, mandate affirmative, targeted lending programs for previously
underserved borrowers. 354 Even though the legislative history of
the CRA is often ambiguous, one thing that is clear is Congress's
intent not to implement a credit allocation system through the
CRA." It is hard to see how requiring private lending institu-
tions affirmatively to engage in targeted lending programs does not
contravene this intent.
More fundamentally, it is difficult to reconcile targeted lending
programs as a general CRA policy with equality of access and
equality of opportunity. Consider a program under which an
institution agrees to lend a specified total sum to low-income
"55 Compare Shawmut Nat'l Corp., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 47 (1994) (denying an
application, by a narrow majority, principally on the basis that the applicant was
under investigation for ECOA violations) with Barnett Banks, Inc., 80 Fed. Res. Bull.
1012 (1994) and Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, et al., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 1033
(1994) (approving applications even though applicants were under investigation for
ECOA violations). In each of the Barnett orders, the Board cited the Justice
Department's failure to provide information concerning the investigation. See 80 Fed.
Res. Bull. at 1013, 1037.
" See generally Taibi, Community Economic Empowerment, supra note 30 (reviewing
various economic views on the CRA). The December 1993 proposals moved toward
the affirmative action concept of lending, in that the proposed Lending Test,
Investment Test, and Service Test targeted for consideration the institution's market
share of loans in, investments that benefited, and services to, low- and moderate-
income geographies. See December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11, at
67,487-90 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 228.7-.9); see also supra note 14 (discussing
the proposed market share component of the Lending Test).
3.- See supra text accompanying notes 106-11 (discussing the initial concerns, and
congressional denial, that the CRA would lead to credit allocation). The claim that
"credit allocation" contravenes the history of the CRA should not be interpreted as
a rejection of credit allocation as a general policy matter. Rather, a credit allocation
purpose for the CRA was specifically rejected in the debates surrounding enactment
of the CRA.
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borrowers within a particular area for the purchase of housing.
Even if all targeted borrowers are victims of prior lack of access to
the institution and/or prior discriminatory practices by the
institution, the program does little to address or remedy any
existing lack of access and opportunity."' While the targeted
borrowers in effect receive redress for the practices, mandated
private affirmative lending programs only serve to mask any
underlying problems with access and opportunity.
This is not to say that past institutional practices and a history
of social and economic marginalization that have contributed to
inequalities in access to credit do not merit active government
intervention, that the ECOA should not be vigorously enforced to
remedy credit discrimination, or that targeted lending programs
constitute questionable policy. Development of affirmative lending
programs is necessary, and creative underwriting to reach under-
served borrowers should be encouraged. But it is indefensible to
assert that, through the CRA, private institutions should bear the
risk for such programs. The turn to results therefore threatens to
emerge as a bureaucrat-administered lending program that self-
servingly places any losses that ultimately ensue on private institu-
tions. Accompanying those losses is the blame for the ineffective-
ness of the CRA in solving all of the problems of urban decline,
community disintegration, and violence. 5 7  These problems,
however, are, at a basic level, the responsibility of government
rather than the bank on the corner. While an incentive for
institutions to participate meaningfully in government-sponsored
lending programs and in development of lending programs in the
community is crucial,"' the CRA should not be a broad-stroke
mandate that certain private institutions bear the whole cost for
remedying a dismal social situation that is the role, and responsibili-
ty, of government.
s56 Cf McCaffery, supra note 288, at 651 (arguing that redistribution "compen-
sate[s] the victims of market failure without curing the market failure" and may
actually "aggravate market failure").
117 See supra note 25 (noting examples of expressed intent that the CRA be used
to improve communities by, for example, preventing altercations like the Los Angeles
riots).
" The provisions of the new regime that give consideration to innovative and
flexible creative underwriting and investment strategies properly further this goal.
See supra notes 191, 197 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that
institutions use innovative or flexible lending practices).
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C. The Role of Community Groups
A myriad of views have arisen concerning the proper role of
community groups under the CRA. The current perspective
assumes that community groups should enforce the Act. For
example, the recent amendments to the CRA which have enhanced
public disclosure of an institution's CRA performance 59 operate
on the principle that disclosure provides an additional enforcement
mechanism for the Act.360  Community activists themselves view
their role as that of enforcers rather than facilitators.
3 6 1
Uncritical acceptance of consumer groups as enforcers of the
CRA is problematic for several reasons. The consumer group
enforcement mechanism allows groups and individuals who have
little, if any, political accountability to enforce a law that substantial-
ly taxes highly regulated financial institutions. This lack of
accountability provides a breeding ground for corruption and self-
interested behavior on the part of the enforcer.
3 62
Another problem with viewing community organizations solely
in an enforcement role is that it myopically detracts attention from
their legitimate and necessary informational role. Community
organizations do play a crucial role in effective implementation of
the CRA. Community groups are essential not to influence
3" See supra text accompanying note 39 (noting that public disclosure of an
institution's CRA report has been required since 1989).
360 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1989) (stating that the
intent of the disclosure provisions "was to promote enforcement of CRA by allowing
the public to know what regulatory agencies are telling depository institutions and
what the community reinvestment records of particular depository institutions are"),
rep)inted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 499.
361 See e.g., Marsico, supra note 62, at 171-72 (stating that community groups have
taken the lead in enforcement of the CRA).
'62 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 335-37 (discussing the self-interested
behavior of certain activists). When a lending institution is challenged by an activist
group, it will often yield to pressure and fund the project that is being promoted by
that group. The result is an uneven approach to community development.
Additionally, some political and community leaders may attempt to establish their
own enterprise and then use their leverage under the CRA to force the depositing
institution to treat them favorably. See id.
This is not to say that consumer pressure and disclosure cannot in certain
instances be an effective means of ensuring compliance with the CRA and a valuable
source of information. Rather, in the case of the CRA, focusing solely on the
enforcement role of consumer activists threatens to supplant entirely enforcement of
the law by a politically accountable governmental entity. If there is a problem with
enforcement of the CRA, the answer is not merely to create a posse of consumer
watchdogs but also to examine problems in the underlying law and the existing
enforcement mechanism.
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otherwise recalcitrant financial institutions toward the good, as the
enforcement model of consumer activism suggests, but rather
because they serve a crucial informational function. First, commu-
nity groups can reduce the cost of CRA compliance which would
otherwise be borne by the institutions. Any particular institution
covered by the CRA is effectively taxed in an amount equal to the
cost of their GRA outreach efforts. Properly construed, this tax
consists of the extra search costs incurred in attempting to identify
creditworthy potential borrowers in the institution's community.
Community groups often have superior knowledge or access to
information about these borrowers and can perform part of the
search function at no cost to the institutions, and at a lower cost
than the institutions would themselves incur. 3 ' Second, given the
community group's superior knowledge of the community and its
borrowers, as well as the financial institution and its products, the
potential for actual lender and borrower interaction is increased,
resulting in a corresponding increased potential for actual CRA
loans to be made. Finally, community groups can perform a
valuable educational function in the community, which increases the
potential for actual results. For example, community groups might
offer programs in debt education. In this sense, community groups
and activists should principally function as an informational
intermediary between banks, their community, and borrowers.
This informational perspective on the role of community groups
illuminates the shortcomings of excessive focus on the enforcement
paradigm of community activism. In their growing role of enforcers
and watchdogs of the GRA, community groups avoid costs that
normally would be borne by them. By shifting their information
function largely back to the financial institution, the institution is
left with higher search costs than otherwise would be incurred if
community groups performed part of the GRA search function.
While this point would need to be empirically verified, when the
institution's higher search costs are added to the costs associated
with the community group enforcement mechanism and the cost of
the exorbitant commitments that community groups extract in the
application process, 64 the narrow use of community groups in the
363 See, e.g., Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 39 (discussing how some banks allow
nonprofit community groups to perform the initial applicant screening for CRA-
related loans and arguing that such an approach shifts search and monitoring costs
to community groups). By hypothesis, community groups might have lower search
costs because they are more familiar with the neighborhood. See id. at 40.
s6 Seesupra text accompanying notes 168-75 (discussing expansive commitments
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CRA process might prove ultimately to have escalated dramatically
the costs of implementing the Act.
Calls for reform do at times encourage the proper role of
community groups. In December of 1993 regulators proposed to
give CRA credit under the Lending Test to institutions that
provided a second-look program for denied applications, with more
credit for programs in which community groups participate, 65
appropriately reflecting the value of the informational function of
such groups. In addition, credit would have been given for
adjustments for partnerships involved with community groups under
the proposed Investment Test3 66 and Service Test. 67 Finally, the
December proposal to establish standards for the effect of a CRA
rating in the application process1 68 effectively undercut the lever-
age that consumer groups previously enjoyed at the application
stage. 69 In a complete reversal, the October 1994 proposals and
the final rules eliminated these provisions and, concomitantly,
implicitly returned to the consumer enforcement model.370 Until
agencies summon the strength to withstand the pressure of
community organizations to remain as enforcers (and only enforc-
ers) of the Act, which they are apparently unwilling or unable to do
at this time, the information function that such groups should
perform will fail to reach its true effectiveness.
In sum, the new enforcement regulations dance around, but do
not directly address, the problems of access and opportunity. While
the antidiscrimination norm has been invigorated, the treatment of
access comes up short. Results presumably are intended to reflect
access. Reliance upon results is overbroad, and perhaps as, if not
more, costly than the old regime. Moreover, results are subject to
the erroneous interpretation as a mandate for forced lending, most
extracted from applicant institutions by community groups).
" See December 1993 Proposed Regulations, supra note 11, at 67,488 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.7(d)(1)).
'3 See id. at 67,489 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.8(i)(1)).
367 See id. at 67,490 (to be codified at § 228.9(c)(2)).
"~ See supra note 215 (quoting the December proposal for weighting CRA ratings
in the application process).
s6 Seesupra note 362 (discussing how activist community groups might improperly
use their leverage under the CRA to force lending institutions to fund their pet
projects).
s70 See 1994 Proposed Regulations, supra note 181, at 51,274 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R § 228.29) (indicating that a CRA rating will be only one of several factors taken
into account in considering applications); Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.29).
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particularly by the consumer groups that have co-opted for them-
selves the role of monitors of institutional compliance with the Act.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
The universal consensus is that we share the vision of communi-
ty investment; the CRA should be one modest step toward that goal
by creating access and opportunity. Properly construed, the Act is
that limited, but dignifiedly so. If we are devoted to the idea of
maintaining thriving communities, rather than of forcing all urban
ills under the grand umbrella of the CRA, we should accept the
limits on what the CRA can accomplish and then move on from
there. This move will open several avenues of reform to both
regulation of existing institutions and to other means of ensuring
community investment. Rather than being empty rhetoric regarding
enforcement of a statute that was intended to be-and is-a substan-
tial nudge in the right direction, reforms of these types offer a
greater potential toward ultimately ameliorating the problems
previously lumped under the banner of the CRA.
A. Interpreting The New Enforcement Regulations
As discussed in the previous section, the new CRA enforcement
regime is a positive step forward and a potentially dangerous step
back from the underlying purpose of the Act. Initially, regulators
have employed an efforts-based enforcement regime that rated an
institution based upon its outreach efforts in its locality.3 7" '
Despite the criticisms of this regime,37 2 its underlying conceptual
approach was fundamentally sound. As an initial matter, the efforts-
based enforcement regime was most consistent with the legislative
history of the CRA, particularly with the express congressional
intent not to have the CRA devolve into a credit allocation stat-
ute."' We should then be wary of the battle cry of "results" over
"efforts" that drives the debate over the CRA. Certainly it is an
essential concern that laws should lead to results, and that laws
fulfill their purposes. Yet, with respect to the CRA, the express
371 See supra text accompanying notes 134-45 (discussing the standards used to
measure compliance with the CRA).
31 See supra notes 3-5 (discussing the general dissatisfaction with enforcement of
the CRA).
" See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text (discussing the concern that the
CRA would lead to credit allocation, and congressional assurances to the contrary).
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rejection of credit allocation renders wholesale regulatory imple-
mentation of a results-based enforcement regime a dubious move.
Other than with regard to the heightened antidiscrimination
norm, the move toward results might become an unfortunate step
toward a government-run lending program that gradually might
supersede the market for credit. Should this become the case, the
nightmare foretold by Senator Morgan in the CRA floor debates
7 4
will unfold. Accordingly, under the new results-based performance
standards, institutions should be allotted a substantial amount of
leeway in providing information concerning demand in their
assessment areas and concerning safety and soundness issues to
provide the context in which their results are to be assessed."7 5
Congress, of course, could amend the CRA to require results
over efforts, and, in effect, overrule its opposition to credit
allocation expressed in 1977. Such a move would be undesirable,
and is fortunately unlikely. An aggressive results-based CRA simply
will fail to accomplish what should be its long-term goals: increased
access and opportunity in lending. A results-based CRA might offer
a short-term remedy for isolated problems of equality of access and
equality of opportunity. Forcing results, for example by requiring
institutions to commit a specified sum toward inner-city lending,
would give the recipients of loans access to capital and even greater
opportunity of consideration than other similarly situated borrow-
ers. From the short-term perspective, access and opportunity are at
least superficially served. However, because the goals of the CRA
are to create an environment of real equality of access and real
equality of opportunity for those borrowers, settling for short-term
results does not facilitate those goals effectively.
Some might question the wisdom of continuing to measure CRA
compliance largely through efforts, since the enforcement standards
in effect since enactment of the CRA in 1977 led to only modest
results. The fact that efforts did not lead to ideal results, however,
may be the consequence of factors wholly independent of institu-
tional and regulatory shirking of CRA responsibilities. The CRA
was never intended to be a cure for every modern woe. The lack of
consensus over what the CRA was intended to accomplish, and
4 See supra text accompanying note 108 (expressing the fear that financial
institutions may be forced to make unsound loans in a particular location in order to
meet a quota of loans in that locality).
s'- See supra text accompanying notes 241-43 (discussing subjective elements in
CRA results-based standards).
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especially the misguided debate of localism and community, have
impeded advances in the area of community lending. Acceptance
of the nature of the CRA as a limited step toward equality, rather
than a cure for every social ill, makes way for progress.
B. Safe Harbors and Exemptions
The issue of exempting institutions from the CRA or of
providing "safe harbors" to particular institutions in the application
process has been a significant feature in the debate over the new
enforcement regulations. 76  As we move toward measuring
compliance by results, the pressure for exemptions and safe harbors
is certain to intensify.
1. Size- and Performance-Based Safe Harbors and Exemptions
Institution size is one major theme in the debate over exemp-
tions and safe harbors. For example, under the new regulations,
smaller institutions, unless they otherwise elect, are evaluated under
substantially less stringent compliance standards than larger
institutions.177  In addition, a number of proposals to exempt
smaller institutions from the CRA entirely have been introduced
into Congress, although unsuccessfully to date. 378 The principal
376 See supra text accompanying notes 218-19 (discussing regulators' initial
opposition to exemptions, but noting the proposal of certain apparent exemptions).
A "safe harbor" arises when institutions that have complied with certain specified
criteria receive favorable treatment, such as immunity from protests, at the
application stage. "Exemptions," on the other hand, would exclude an institution
from provisions otherwise applicable to it. For a general discussion of safe harbors
in the context of the CRA, see Swire, supra note 62.
s77 See supra text accompanying notes 220-30 (discussing compliance tests for small
institutions).
See e.g., H.R. 1362, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 122 (1995) (proposing an
exemption for institutions with assets of less than $100 million in communities of less
than 30,000), available in LEXIS, Legis library, Bills file; H.R. 317, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 810 (1995) (proposing an exemption for institutions with assets of less than
$100 million in communities of less than 25,000), available in LEXIS, Legis library,
Bills file; 138 Cong. Rec. H11,354 (1992) (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (reporting the
House proposal to exempt banks with less than $150 million in assets and in
communities of less than 30,000); 138 Cong. Rec. S9815 (daily ed. July 2, 1992)
(reporting the Senate bill to partially exempt from the CRA examination process
institutions with no ECOA violations for the past five years, an outstanding or
satisfactory CRA rating, assets of less than $100 million, and located in communities
of less than 20,000); 138 Cong. Rec. S7354 (daily ed.June 2, 1992) (reporting Senate
bill to exempt from CRA examination process institutions with assets of less than
$100 million in communities of less than 20,000); 138 Cong. Rec. S4655 (daily ed.
Apr. 1, 1992) (reporting Senate bill to exempt from CRA examination process
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argument raised in favor of such size-based exemptions is based on
the relative costs that smaller institutions bear in complying with the
CRA. 79 Community groups have argued in response to these
claims for exemptions that smaller institutions receive many of the
lower CRA ratings and that discrimination in rural areas served by
smaller institutions is not uncommon.
380
In some respects, some special treatment for smaller institutions
is justified. Given the potential greater complexity of the new
regulations and the new data reporting requirements, the cost factor
has become an increasingly valid concern. The small institution
performance standards are an economic necessity. In addition, the
standards to which smaller institutions are nonetheless held"'
adequately check any egregious behavior that might concern
community groups. Objections to the more lenient evaluation
procedures for smaller institutions are, therefore, hard to sustain.
The size of an institution, however, whether gauged by the size
of the community served or the assets of the institution, should not
institutions with assets of less than $75 million and half of their deposits in loans in
communities of less than 15,000).
Provisions to exempt institutions from the CRA entirely must come through
legislative amendment to the Act. Given the current text of the CRA, which applies
to all regulated institutions, and its purpose to encourage all covered institutions to
meet the credit needs of their communities, the existing legislation does not give
regulators the authority to exempt classes of institutions from their mandated CRA
activities.
-17 See, e.g., Foreman & Brunson, supra note 3, at 40 (stating that small banks incur
greater CRA compliance costs); Barbara A. Rehm, Activists Warn Banks that Campaign
to Ease CRA Rules Might Backfire, AM. BANKER, June 29, 1992, at 1, 6 (noting that
small banks claim they are "overburdened with paperwork"). Some evidence suggests
that the complaints of smaller institutions might be exaggerated. For example, after
receiving a "needs to improve" CRA rating, a small $56 million-asset California
institution embarked upon a "massive effort" to improve its rating. See Dean M.
Nielsen, Top Rating a Team Effort for Bank of Commerce, AM. BANKER, July 7, 1993, at
8. Bank of Commerce implemented a written CRA program, engaged in extensive
training of all employees including evenjanitors, and stepped up its outreach efforts
in its community. See id. The program cost about $50,000 to overhaul, but according
to the president and chief executive of Commerce, "'It's been a profitable program
for the bank.'" Id. (quotingJohn Briner, president and Chief Executive of Bank of
Commerce). The institution received an "outstanding" rating after implementing the
program. See id.
'o See Rehm, supra note 379, at 6 (discussing a community activist's belief that
discrimination in rural areas "is a serious problem" and a general concern among
activists that "current regulatory rules are not being adhered to or enforced"); see also
supra note 147 (comparing ratings for smaller and larger institutions and finding that
the former are lower).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 220-30 (discussing the proposed exemptions
for small institutions).
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be a relevant consideration in exempting such institutions from the
CRA entirely, as some proposals have suggested. Smaller institutions
by their very nature are frequently best situated to provide access
and opportunity. 8 2  Accordingly, because a complete small
institution exemption would directly contravene the underlying
purposes of the CRA, small institutions should be subject to at least
some CRA requirements.
The other general theme in proposals to amend the CRA is
providing exemptions or safe harbors based upon an institution's
past CRA performance."' 3 Regulators specifically rejected a total
exemption when revising the enforcement regulations, citing both
administrative and policy grounds.
38 4
The agencies' perceptions that performance-based exemptions
from the entire CRA constitute questionable policy are correct and
support the rejection of legislative amendments to exempt "good"
institutions from the CRA. Performance-based exemptions rely
upon an underlying notion that institutions that have performed
well in the past will continue to perform as well, even in the absence
of any regulation. Little evidence, however, exists to support this
assertion. Moreover, under the new enforcement standards, the
possibility exists that institutions may "buy" a superior rating
through purchase of results or by making substantial qualified
investments under the Investment Test. Allowing an entire exemp-
tion from the Act would therefore allow an institution to buy its way
entirely out of the Act, with the concomitant possibility of its service
area not having access to credit in the future.
Performance-based exemptions from examination and perfor-
mance-based advantages when an institution's CRA record becomes
germane to the application process stand on a different footing
from entire exemptions from the Act. Assume that an institution
received an outstanding rating on its last two CRA exams. Leniency
in the evaluation process does not seriously undermine access and
opportunity as would entire exemptions from the Act. The
institution is still subject to the Act, and any future noncompliance
presumably would be detected in later exams. Similarly, preferences
"82 Smaller institutions may appear less imposing to consumer borrowers. In
addition, the lack of bureaucracy and centralized control of credit decisions may tend
to allow credit to be granted other than on standardized credit risk criteria.
' See, e.g., supra note 378 (citing an exemption proposal placing emphasis on past
CRA performance).
384 Seesupra text accompanying notes 218-19 (noting regulators' initial opposition
to exemptions from the CRA).
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based upon performance provide an incentive for institutions to
step up their community outreach efforts. Whether the institution
cynically "bought" its rating or is truly committed in some deeper
sense to community-based lending should be irrelevant: the
incentive to shirk is not significantly increased by preferential
treatment, and the incentive to perform most likely would be
increased. Consider, then, regulators' December 1993 proposal to
give "outstanding" institutions a safe harbor in the application
process.1 5 Given that the institution would still have been subject
to the CRA irrespective of approval of the application, it is hard to
see how such a safe harbor would be objectionable.
2. Alternative Financial Institutions
Because the CRA only covers a limited number of specific types
of institutions, 8 financial entities not subject to the CRA in effect
have received an exemption from the Act. Regulated institutions
therefore must bear the costs of the CRA while unregulated
institutions escape the CRA tax. Institutions not currently regulated
by the CRA have recently embarked upon a well-publicized effort to
avoid becoming subject to the CRA.38 7 At the same time, because
the limited scope of the CRA renders regulated institutions in a
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis unregulated institutions,
38 8
bankers have called for an increase in the scope of the CRA to
encompass the entire financial services industry.8 9 If the CRA is
here to stay, under this view everyone should bear the cost.
A commitment to access and opportunity compels a more
functional analysis of the reasons for these types of exemptions.
3 90
' See supra note 215 (detailing the December 1993 proposal to weigh an
institution's CRA rating in the application process).
R See supra note 34 (defining "regulated financial institutions," the institutions
that are covered by the Act).
"87 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting lobbying efforts by institutions
not currently subject to the CRA).
' See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 312-13 (arguing that the CRA imposes a
tax on banks and savings institutions, thereby weakening them in relation to other
financial institutions).
9 See BankAmerica's Arguments for Putting Nonbanks Under CRA, supra note 24, at
12 (noting BankAmerica chairman's view that the CRA should be extended to cover
the entire financial services industry, partly because nonbanking services already
benefit from banking regulations).
31 Most frequently, claims for or against these types of exemptions are couched
in terms of disinvestment, geographic base, government charter, or government insur-
ance. See, e.g., Gullo, supra note 24, at 4 (presenting the finance companies' argument
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If the form of institution is such that, as a matter of equality, access
and opportunity should be ensured, then the regulation of those
institutions under the CRA should be seriously considered. Take,
for example, proposals to include credit unions within the CRA.
The basic organizational form of credit unions highlights the
improvidence of requiring them to comply with the CRA. In
essence, credit unions are the ultimate "community reinvesters."
Deposits are reinvested with members rather than with non-
depositors."' Therefore, with respect to credit unions, there is no
justifiable reason supporting a duty to ensure access and opportuni-
ty to the geographic community at large. The institutional form of
the credit union allows depositors to form their own community;
imposing extracommunity obligations would only conflict with that
function.
In contrast, strong arguments favor the inclusion of finance and
mortgage companies within the CRA. Finance companies are
substantially engaged in the extension of credit to the general
public, such that the need to ensure access and opportunity through
legislation like the CRA becomes more compelling in this case. The
current exemption for mortgage companies presents an even more
persuasive case for expanding the coverage of the CRA to encom-
pass those entities. In addition to being a significant source of
consumer credit, mortgage companies are heavily involved in the
residential real estate finance market, thus supplying strong reasons
for bringing those entities within the CRA. Recently, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reiterated its
commitment to the goal of "'a decent home and a suitable living
environment' for every American." 92 Ensuring access to acquisi-
tion finance for individual private home ownership, therefore,
becomes not only a matter of credit policy, but also intersects with
federal housing policy.
for not being regulated under the CRA: unlike banks, finance companies "do not
accept deposits, borrow funds from the Federal Reserve, or have charters to serve
communities"); Snigdha Prakash, Lenders up in Arms over OTS Proposal, AM. BANKER,
July 26,1994, at 10 (reporting mortgage companies' claim that the CRA was designed
only for deposit institutions). These claims attempt to resurrect the ill-conceived
localism-community debate.
"I If the aim of the CRA is, as some have claimed, to mandate reinvestment,
credit unions by their inherent nature have fulfilled that goal already. The goal under
a reinvestment rationale for the CRA would be to transform all institutions into credit
unions.
39 PRIORTY: HOME! THE FEDERAL PLAN TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF HOMELESSNESS
3 (1994).
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The mortgage company exemption is even more troubling in
light of evidence which suggests that some of those institutions
frequently avoid African-American neighborhoods."' 3 Although
a recent agreement between the Mortgage Bankers Association of
America (MBA) and HUD indicates some commitment on the part
of mortgage bankers to take their responsibilities toward low- and
moderate-income areas seriously, 94 the HUD agreement should
not be viewed as a substitute for regulation of mortgage bankers
under the CRA. That one of the principal players in the housing
finance industry could so easily shirk the CRA through what the
MBA sanctimoniously calls "bold and innovative" efforts 95 is
astonishing. The mortgage bank exemption from the CRA is
indefensible, and the CRA should be amended expeditiously to
include within its scope mortgage banks, as well as finance compa-
nies.
C. CDCs and CDFIs
Community development corporations (CDCs) and community
development financial institutions (CDFIs) should play a crucial role
in facilitating greater investment in local communities. A CDC or
CDFI, roughly defined, is an institution that is devoted principally
to community-development activities or to community-based lending
and other financial services."9 ' CDCs and CDFIs enhance equality
of access and opportunity in a number of ways. First, from the
standpoint of providing geographic and informational access, CDCs
and CDFIs provide a mechanism through which search costs for
... See Ralph T. King, Jr., Some Mortgage Firms Neglect Black Areas More than Banks
Do, WALL ST.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at A1, A6.
'" See Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., Mortgage Banking Industry Announces
Fair Lending Agreement with Clinton Administration (Sept. 14, 1994) (news release,
on file with author). Under the HUD/MBA agreement, the MBA agreed to
encourage its members to step up their outreach efforts in minority and low-income
areas as well as to develop self-testing programs to police discrimination. See id. at
1. The agreement sets forth a model "best practices" agreement designed to increase
home ownership opportunities, check credit discrimination, and increase minority
representation in the mortgage banking industry. See id. at 2. The MBA has agreed
to support HUD in reaching voluntary agreements with individual MBA members.
See id. at 1.
S95 Id. at 1.
s See The Community Development Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1993:
Hearing on H.R. 2666 Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1993) (hearings on CDFI- and CDC-related legislation)
[hereinafter CDC House Hearings].
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qualified borrowers in any particular area may be reduced. Assume,
for example, that five separate financial institutions serve a
particular community. Each of those institutions would be required
to incur the costs of identifying potential borrowers in the area and
of processing information related to those borrowers. If, however,
the institutions were to pool their resources to establish a CDC or
CDFI dedicated solely to information gathering and processing in
the area, economic data suggest that each institution's costs would
be reduced, as would each institution's risk exposure. 9 7 Second,
through continued contact with community borrowers, a CDC or
CDFI reduces the possibility of invalid biases against borrowers
affecting lending decisions. Given the greater ability of CDCs and
CDFIs to gather information about borrowers, discrimination
related to inability to gather information or imperfections in
information about credit risk becomes less likely. Finally, CDCs and
CDFIs present an investment opportunity for the altruistic investor,
with minimal search costs.
9 8
Accordingly, CDCs and CDFIs invaluably advance access to and
opportunity in the market for financial services. Yet, in spite of
their obvious value, regulation of CDCs and CDFIs has been less
than satisfactory, if not misguided. Under the CRA, an institution's
participation and investment in community development (CD)
programs and CDCs 99 are factors that only marginally bear on an
397 See Gruben et al., supra note 26, at 39 ("Since these same individual institutions
perform many other types of loan functions in-house, it is clear... that the establish-
ment of such consortia serves the purposes of lowering per-institution costs of
information and of spreading risk in a lending process where such costs and risks are
relatively high.").
"8 See supra text accompanying note 296 (discussing the unlikelihood that many
depositors would be altruistic in the sense that they would wish to deposit their funds
in a socially-conscious financial intermediary).
.. The new CRA regulations still require that all investments must be otherwise
lawful investments for the institution, see Final Regulations, supra note 181 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(s)), which therefore warrants reexamination of the
limits that other laws place on institutional investment in CDCs and CDFIs. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) developed a more expansive
attitude toward insured institutions' investments in CDCs when it finalized a proposal
to encourage national bank investment in CDCs and community development
projects. See Community Development Corporation and Project Investments, 12
C.F.R. § 24 (1994). The OCC rule allows a national bank to make CDC and CD
project investments of up to 5% of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus at the
time of investment, and with approval of the OCC, up to 10%. See § 24.4(b). Smaller
national banks (holdingless than $250 million in assets) may make specified CDC and
CD project investments of up to 5% of capital without prior OCC approval, thus
simplifying the process involved in the decision to make such investments. See
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institution's CRA rating."' Thus, the CRA does not actively
encourage insured institutions to invest in CDCs and CDFIs.
401
Given their potential for creating an environment of access and
opportunity, as well as for reducing the costs of complying with the
CRA, encouraging the development of CDCs and CDFIs through the
CRA warrants a much more aggressive policy than has previously
been applied or proposed.
Apart from CRA enforcement, the seeming lack of a legislative
and regulatory initiative toward encouraging traditional financial
institutions' participation in CDCs and CDFIs is evidenced by the
sharp debate that ensued following the Clinton administration's
announcement of its community development bank initiative.
40 2
§ 24.11(b)(1)(iii). For larger institutions, investments of up to 2% of capital or $10
million can be made without approval. See § 24.11(b)(1)(ii).
40 See supra notes 135 (listing the assessment factors that dictate an institution's
CRA rating), 185 (discussing the factors involved in rating under the Lending Test),
195 (discussing the "qualified investments" relevant to assessment under the
Investment Test), 201 (naming the relevant factors under the Service Test) and
accompanying text.
401 The Investment Test largely incorporates the new regime's treatment of
investment in CDCs and CDFIs. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text
(discussing the factors relevant to the Investment Test). All investments must first be
lawful, highlighting the importance of expanding institutional powers to invest in
CDCs, such as the new OCC rules attempt to do. Yet, for retail institutions,
investments in CDCs are unjustifiably underweighted in the CRA evaluative process,
given their value. The Lending Test gives only nominal recognition for CDC-related
activities. See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text (describing the Lending
Test). Yet, it constitutes a retail institution's primary rating. Actual investments
under the Investment Test have the potential to raise the base rating of the Lending
Test only marginally. Actual direct lending is thus encouraged over lending through
CDCs or capital investments in CDCs, although investments in and lending through
CDCs are, in many cases, equally as valuable as, if not more valuable than, direct
lending, not to mention less costly in many circumstances.
Community organizations object to allowing institutions to meet their CRA
obligations through investment rather than through direct lending. See Gary M.
Swidler, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 387, 412-13
& n.194 (1994) (explaining objections that investment allows banks to avoid direct
lending to local communities and that community organizations often cannot satisfy
the full range of local community credit needs). Yet, these objections ignore the
long-term benefits that such investments promise. Institutions certainly should not
be able to shirk the CRA with nominal contributions to entities not actively engaged
in local lending or development. Regulations, however, easily could be tailored to
avoid such a result.
4 See, e.g., CDC House Hearings, supra note 396, at 27-28 (exchange between
Representative Vento and Bob Nash, Under Secretary for Rural Development), 36-38
(exchange between Representatives Rush and Bob Nash). The initial bill advanced
by the Clinton Administration was introduced as the Community Development
Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1993, H.R. 2666, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), reprinted in id., at 77-101.
1995] 1527
1528 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143: 1431
As recently enacted, the Community Development Banking and
Financial Institutions Act of 199403 provides CDFIs with fund-
matching financial assistance to support creation of CDCs and to
finance community development projects. °4 The Act properly
recognizes the barriers that existing traditional financial institutions
face in attempting to serve the credit needs of underserved
communities. Creation and support of specialized institutions to
help serve those needs is therefore certainly a step in the right
direction. As originally proposed, however, traditional financial
institutions were inexplicably ineligible to receive funds under the
program.0 5 Ultimately, the final bill did include these institu-
tions.4 6 This inclusion was proper, given that, if community in-
vestment is the desired goal, few reasons exist to exclude institu-
tions who wish to involve themselves toward that end from
government support in that effort.
D. Minority-Owned Institutions
Finally, from the perspective of equality of access and equality
of opportunity, encouraging the development of minority-owned
financial institutions is fundamentally important. Yet, this goal has
been largely ignored in the debate over the CRA.4 0 7 The current
dialogue over the CRA presumes that, once properly regulated, the
403 Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 101-158, 108 Stat. 2161 [hereinafter CDBFIA].
404 See CDBFIA §§ 108(b)(1), (e)(1) (specifying authorized uses of financial
assistance and conditions of receipt of fund-matching aid).
" Funding under the original bill was only available for CDFIs. Traditional
insured financial institutions-those that did not have as their "primary mission"
community development-did not qualify for CDFI status. See H.R. 2666, supra note
402, § 3(b), reprinted in CDC House Hearings, supra note 396, at 78-79, § 3(b). A
holding company could qualify for CDFI status only if it and each of its subsidiaries
met the criteria for a CDFI. See id.
Some raised concerns that inclusion of traditional lending institutions in any
CDC or CDFI proposal would allow those institutions to evade their duties under the
CRA. See CDC House Hearings, supra note 396, at 39 (statement of Sen. Watt). Yet,
as long as no "double counting" occurs with an institution's CDBFIA activities and its
CRA activities, it is hard to see why this concern should persist.
" See CDBFIA, § 103(6) (defining "community partner" as a "person ... that
provides loans, equity investments, or development services"); § 114 (describing
financial incentives for depository institution participation); § 121(a)(4) (reserving
one-third of funding for depository institution incentives under § 114).
40 A glimmer of recognition of the importance of investment in minority- and
female-owned institutions can be seen in the 1991 and 1992 amendments to the CRA,
which directed regulators to consider such investments in the evaluation process. See
supra text accompanying notes 42-46 (explaining the importance placed on contribu-
tions to predominantly minority- or female-owned institutions).
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existing majority-owned system of financial institutions can cure the
problems lumped under the banner of the CRA. This vision bears
some troublesome implications.
Many minority-owned institutions presumably do not suffer
from the biases to which majority-owned institutions may be prone.
Minority-owned institutions often have cheaper or more reliable
access to information about borrowers in minority communities.
Similarly, minority borrowers may, if only through perception, find
greater potential for fair consideration in minority-owned institu-
tions."' Finally, discouraging minority-owned financial institu-
tions and substituting majority-based institutions in their place
provides a subtle, but impenetrable, barrier to the development of
minority control of capital.
At present, there is a paucity of minority-owned institutions in
the country. 40 9  Minority-owned institutions face the task of
attracting adequate capital from traditional sources, while maintain-
ing their competitive position with majority-owned competitors.
410
Unfortunately, the recent emphasis on enforcement of the CRA has
discouraged the creation and sustenance of minority-owned
institutions. Increased emphasis on majority-owned institutions'
lending has created greater competition among existing minority
institutions."' A heavier CRA stick has impelled majority-owned
banks to intrude aggressively into what is often the local market
niche of many minority-owned banks and to co-opt the customer
base of minority-owned institutions by offering more competitive
4
08 See David R. Sands, Money, Power Dwell Together, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1990,
at Al ("'It's always better if you have somebody across that desk who understands
your basic problems, and you just don't get that when you're talking to a white loan
officer.. . .'" (quoting Edward Jones, a black real estate agent)).
"' As of the end of 1992, there were 36 black-owned banks in the country, 6
female-owned banks, 26 Hispanic-owned banks, 32 Asian-owned banks, 4 Native-
American-owned banks, and two multiracial-owned banks. See Office Correspon-
dence, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Regarding Minority-Owned
Banks (Mar. 29, 1993) (on file with author).
41
1 See, e.g., Veronica Byrd, Black Bankers Seek Broader Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1993, at 33 (discussing black-owned banks' efforts to "'reach[] out for mainstream
status'" (quoting Samuel L. Foggie, President of the National Banker's Association));
Franklin Smith, Black Bankers Undaunted by the Freedom Fiasco, AM. BANKER, July 11,
1991, at 8 (discussing reaction to failure of Freedom National Bank of New York, a
bank controlled by a racial minority, and explaining that raising sufficient capital is
the biggest obstacle facing minority-owned banks).
4" See, e.g., Nanine Alexander, Tough CRA Rules Hurting Minority Banks, U.S.
BANKER, Sept. 1991, at 70 (stating that the CRA has "spurred larger mainstream
banks to challenge the traditional markets of smaller minority-owned institutions").
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products than minority-owned institutions are able to offer.412 At
the same time, many minority banks receive poorer CRA ratings
because of their narrow market niche. 13
The new emphasis on direct lending by majority institutions is
certain to exacerbate these problems. The Lending Test, which
constitutes the principal grade for larger retail institutions,4 14
threatens to encourage further destruction of minority-owned
institutions, rather than investment in and development of those
institutions. Minority-owned institutions must compete directly
with larger institutions seeking loans for consideration under the
Lending Test. For example, larger institutions may have an
incentive to actively seek loans that might otherwise have been made
by minority-owned institutions. The CRA could better be employed
to provide incentives for cooperative alliances between existing
majority institutions and smaller minority institutions, or direct
investment in minority institutions, for example, by giving greater
weight to such activities under the Investment Test. Although such
an approach deemphasizes actual lending, it would be far better
than encouraging deadly competition, as the GRA's emphasis on
actual lending may do. As it stands, what should be one key to the
problem of credit discrimination-minority ownership of financial
institutions-is being at least ignored, if not openly discarded.
CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1977, the CRA has generated intense and
often bitter controversy. While all participants in the debate
continually claim allegiance to the goals of the Act, disagreement
over the extent to which the Act should intervene into the affairs of
regulated institutions has stalled the effort to revitalize and
strengthen our communities. The themes of community and
localism have fueled the controversy. This Article has argued that
arguments about localism and community are unproductive for
assessing the proper scope of legal intervention to further the cause
412 See id. at 70-71.
41s See Robert B. Cox, Minority Banks Seen Lagging in CRA Arena, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 1 (claiming that although they make more loans to minorities,
minority banks "singl[e] out the richest segment of their communities to a greater
degree than all other banks," resulting in lower CRA ratings); Terrence O'Hara,
Calif. 's Asian Banks Feel the Sting of CRA, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21, 1993, at 6 (discussing
poor ratings resulting from minority-owned banks' failure to serve all minorities, as
opposed to a particular minority group).
414 See supra text accompanying notes 185-94 (describing the Lending Test).
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of community reinvestment. Particularly given the ever-growing
intensity of the social problems that the CRA was intended to help
ameliorate, the misplaced dialogue of community and localism
should be put aside.
This Article has argued that individual equality, rather than
community or localism, provides the best justification for the CRA.
Specifically, the CRA is a warranted legislative intervention that
should ensure equality of access and opportunity in lending. Yet,
the most recent attempt to invigorate the CRA threatens to move
the CRA further along the wrong road. An efforts-based enforce-
ment regime was effective in ensuring equality of access and
opportunity. The political pressure on regulators to move the CRA
toward measuring results rather than efforts not only indicates that
we stand dangerously close to total governmental control of the
market for credit, but also may construct a CRA that often slights,
rather than embraces, equality.
Everyone agrees that there are problems with the CRA that need
to be addressed. The solution to these problems will be found only
through further dialogue concerning the potential that a commit-
ment to equality has for addressing credit discrimination and lack
of access to financial institutions. Equality not only provides a
framework for enforcing the CRA, but also provides a template for
developing other forms of government initiatives that will advance
equality of access and opportunity. This Article has argued that,
under equality, consideration should be given to limited safe
harbors from the CRA evaluation process, to expanding the scope
of the CRA to encompass institutions such as finance companies
and mortgage companies, and to developing incentives for the
growth of CDCs, CDFIs, and minority-owned financial institutions.
Only then will we finally find ourselves on the road toward the
vision that everyone shares and wants to attain. That we continue
to grasp at creating a CRA that works without reference to equality
indicates that we are far from that point.
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